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EDITOR’S NOTE
Every year, the ILSA Journal of International & Comparative Law (ILSA
Journal) attends the International Law Weekend (ILW) conference which is
hosted annually by the American Branch of the International Law
Association (ABILA) and the International Law Students Association
(ILSA) at Fordham University School of Law. ILW is well-attended by
individuals such as diplomats, prestigious scholars, students, attorneys, and
members from governmental and non-governmental sectors. The theme for
ILW 2017, “International Law in Challenging Times,” engaged the
audience with compelling arguments about challenges the world faces
today, putting forth potential resolutions to those challenges, and discussing
an array of relevant issues in international law.
This Issue is entirely concentrated on ILW and is best known as the
International Practitioner’s Notebook (IPN). Because ILSA Journal is
responsible for publishing the IPN, we have the opportunity to both
network with and solicit articles from the esteemed panelists and
moderators. The ILSA Journal thanks those who coordinated ILW, and
especially Ms. Tessa Walker of ILSA and Mr. David P. Stewart of the
ABILA for all of their assistance with access to authors. The Journal is
also very appreciative and thankful for the panelists and authors who
contributed to this Issue. The ILSA Journal is confident that these
exceptional pieces chosen for publication best reflects ILW and the 2017
overall theme.
Additionally, I want to thank the entire Executive Board of the ILSA
Journal for all of their hard work during ILW, the Editorial Board for their
editorial assistance, and the Senior and Junior Staff Members for their
dedication to the Journal. It has been a complete honor to lead this
respected Journal and work with you all. Thank you to my husband, Jack
Esau, and family for all of your support this year.
Finally, the ILSA Journal is proud to welcome the elected 2018–19
Executive and Editorial Board. I know that you will all do amazing things
and that Volume 25 will continue the tradition of producing high-quality
publications and will be a testament to their hard work, dedication, and
professionalism.
Lora Esau
Editor-in-Chief, 2017–18
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“Well, at least he’s got us moving.”1
I.

INTRODUCTION: THE DAY AFTER

The day after Donald Trump’s inauguration, women and their
supporters marched across the United States (and around the world), in
what was probably the largest single day of protest in American history.2

Barbara Stark 2017. Professor of Law and Hofstra Research Fellow, Hofstra Law School.
Thanks to reference librarian Patricia Kasting for outstanding research assistance; to Jonathan Hafetz,
Baher Azmry, and Azadeh Shashani for their participation in the panel on International Human Rights
After Trump at International Law Weekend, Oct. 20, 2017, where an early version of this paper was
presented, and to Joyce Cox, for her patience in preparing the manuscript.
1.
“[W]hen Donald Trump beat Hillary Clinton it triggered a visceral response in masses of
American women, and their trauma may be turning into a political uprising more powerful than the Tea
Party.” Gail Collins, Donald Trump’s Gift to Women, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 13, 2017), https://www.ny
times.com/2017/12/13/opinion/donald-trump-women.html.
2.
See Jenna Wortham, Who Didn’t Go to the Women’s March Matters More than Who Did,
N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 24, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/24/magazine/who-didnt-go-to-the-wome

318

ILSA Journal of International & Comparative Law

[Vol. 24:2

More than 500,000 people clogged the capital.3 Four hundred thousand
protested in New York City, Trump’s hometown.4 The official march was
cancelled in Chicago after 250,000 overflowed Grant Park.5 One hundred
seventy-five thousand showed up in Boston.6 Protests are fine, of course,
but they are ephemeral. Their significance may be especially questionable
when they purport to represent such a large and fractious group.7
But I start with the March because that’s how women started, not even
twenty-four hours after Trump took the oath of office. I also start with the
March because that astonishing outpouring, the sheer numbers of people
who literally took to the streets, was not a one-off, but a harbinger.
Trump’s presidency is for those who support women’s human rights, what
Roe v. Wade8 was for abortion opponents, a “target,” as Justice Ruth Bader
Ginsburg has characterized it, an event that has focused and united people
who did not realize how much they had in common.9 “[A]nger over Roe
fuel[ed] a state-by-state campaign that has placed more restrictions on
abortion.”10 As Justice Ginsburg has explained, “[t]hat was my concern,
that the court had given opponents of access to abortion a target to aim at
relentlessly. . . . My criticism of Roe is that it seemed to have stopped the
momentum that was on the side of change.”11 Just as Roe did for the

ns-march-matters-more-than-who-did.html (noting photo of black woman holding sign, “Don’t Forget:
White Women Voted for Trump.”).
3.
Anemona Hartocollis & Yamiche Alcindor, Women’s March Highlights As Huge Crowds
Protest Trump: ‘We’re Not Going Away’, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 21, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017
/01/21/us/womens-march.html (quoting homeland security director, Christopher Geldart).
4.
Id. (quoting Mayor Bill deBlasio’s office). See also Emma G. Fitzsimmons, In Trump’s
Hometown, A Clear Message of Defiance from Women, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 21, 2017), https://www.ny
times.com/2017/01/21/nyregion/womens-march-donald-trump-manhattan.html.
5.

Hartocollis & Alcindor, supra note 3 (quoting the Chicago Tribune).

6.

Id. (citing Mayor Martin Walsh’s office).

7.
See Wortham, supra note 2 (noting that fifty-three percent of white women who voted,
voted for Trump); see also Susan Chira, Since When Is Being A Woman A Liberal Cause?, N.Y. TIMES
(Feb. 11, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/11/sunday-review/since-when-is-being-awoman-aliberal-cause.html (noting that conservative women feel left out).
8.

Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).

9.
Associated Press, Ginsburg: Roe Gave Opponents Target, POLITICO (May 11, 2013,
9:56 PM), https://www.politico.com/story/2013/05/ruth-bader-ginsburg-roe-v-wade-abortion-091218
[hereinafter Roe Gave Opponents Target].
10.

Id.

11.

Id. (emphasis added).
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radical right, this presidency has not only unified those concerned with
women’s human rights but galvanized them.12
This Article focuses on three major areas of women’s human rights:
civil and political rights; the right to be free from sexual harassment; and
the right to health. All of these rights were vigorously and creatively
asserted during the marches. The range of these rights shows the scope of
women’s resistance to this Administration, and how women’s international
human rights law supports that resistance.
II.

CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS: THE MARCH

I also begin with the March because the signs, posters, hats, chants,
songs, and speeches addressed the full array of what the protesters were
marching for. These included: an end to sexual harassment and domestic
violence; support for women’s health, especially reproductive health,
including contraception and abortion; support for a healthy environment,
including international cooperation to combat climate change; peace in
general and the elimination of nuclear weapons more specifically;13 a
reversal of unprecedented, and growing, economic inequality; the rejection
of draconian immigration policies, including ‘Muslim bans’ that have been
struck down by federal courts; and the rejection, and repudiation, of
racism.14
This Part first sets out the legal grounds for these claims, ranging from
blackletter American law to emerging norms of international human rights.
Second, it sets out the civil and political rights which those who support
women’s human rights exercised during the marches and have continued to
exercise ever since.
12.
Editorial, Pumping Life into the Equal Rights Amendment, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 25, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/25/opinion/sunday/pumping-life-into-the-equal-rights-amendment.
html [hereinafter Pumping Life].
13.
Months after the March, Trump’s repeated taunts of North Korea’s President Kim Jong-un
has fueled anxiety, and more protests. See, e.g., Choe Sang-Hun, Fearing Korean Nuclear War, Women
of 40 Nations Urge Trump to Seek Peace, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 26, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com
/2017/04/26/world/asia/north-korea-trump-nuclear-war.html.
14.
Trump’s public and private statements since the march, including Tweets and remarks
leaked by aides, continue to stoke criticism and protest. See, e.g., Andrew Rafferty, Marianna
Sotomayor & Daniel Arkin, Trump Says ‘Two Sides’ Share Blame for Charlottesville Rally Violence,
NBC NEWS (Aug. 16, 2017, 7:19 AM), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/trump-defends-allsides-comment-n793001; Sophie Tatum, Trump: NFL Owners Should Fire Players Who Protest the
National Anthem, CNN POL. (Sept. 23, 2017, 4:05 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2017/09/22/politics/
donald-trump-alabama-nfl/index.html; Sierra Teller Ornelas, Donald Trump Would Make A Terrible
Navajo, NY TIMES (Dec. 2, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/02/opinion/sunday/donald-trumpnavajo-pocahontas.html (describing Trump’s interruption of ceremony to “honor Navajo code talkers to
degrade Senator Elizabeth Warren by referring to her as Pocahontas”).

320

A.

ILSA Journal of International & Comparative Law

[Vol. 24:2

Legal Grounds

Women’s resistance to the Trump administration’s position on the
issues raised by the marchers is grounded in several distinct legal
arguments. First, some of Trump’s actions clearly violate American law,
such as his admission in the Access Hollywood tapes that he has sexually
assaulted women.15 He has not, however, called for the decriminalization
of sexual assault.16
Second, other claims represented claims to women’s human rights that
are not recognized as “rights” under United States law but are recognized as
rights under well-established international human rights law. These include
economic rights, such as the right to health and the right to an adequate
standard of living.17 These claims are significant because they show the
widespread influence of women’s human rights, and their rhetorical power
even in a country that refuses to recognize them. They also show why
ratification of international human rights treaties is so important for
American women.
Third, there were claims made by marchers that are better understood
as emerging human rights law, such as the claims against discrimination on
the basis of sexual orientation18 and the right to a healthy environment.19
Nor is there a specific human right to peace, freedom from the threat of a
nuclear war; or freedom from staggering economic inequality. The rights
of immigrants and their families, similarly vary under domestic laws. But
these claims, like those that draw on international law not yet recognized in
the United States, show that Americans who support women’s human rights
are attuned to an international zeitgeist. They show further that these
Americans are ready and able to participate in the process of developing
and crystalizing emerging human rights.

15.
See Maggie Haberman & Jonathan Martin, Trump Once Said the ‘Access Hollywood’
Tape Was Real. Now He’s Not Sure, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 28, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/2
8/us/politics/trump-access-hollywood-tape.html.
16.
He has, however, subsequently questioned his own public admission of the legitimacy of
the tapes. Id.
17.
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights arts. 11–12, Dec. 16,
1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter ICESCR].
18.
The Yogyakarta Principles Plus 10, YOGYAKARATA PRINC. http://yogyakartaprinciples.
org/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/A5_yogyakartaWEB-2.pdf; see, e.g., Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v.
Colorado Civil Rights Commission, OYEZ, https://www.oyez.org/cases/2017/16-111 (last visited Feb.
10, 2018).
19.
Our Mission, WOMEN’S MARCH, https://www.womensmarch.com/mission (last visited
Feb. 27, 2018).
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Civil and Political Rights

The clearest human rights claims—by all of the roughly four million
marchers—were the civil and political rights recognized under the
Constitution, as well as the International Bill of Rights.20 These include the
rights to freedom of expression, access to the courts, to associate with
others, and the rights to vote and to be elected.21 Among other notable
effects, the exercise of these rights culminated in victories for women in the
first wave of national elections since Trump has occupied the White House.
The political resistance of those who support women's human rights is
broad and deep. It encompasses issues ranging from electing more women
to public office to addressing gun violence to resuscitating the Equal Rights
Amendment (ERA).22 It deploys a similarly broad range of tactics
including litigation, lobbying, marches, town halls, and door-to-door
canvassing.

1.

Organizing

The marchers did not go home after the marches. In Chicago, women
in their 60s, 70s, and 80s organized monthly meetings in which they
planned, email and canvassing campaigns, organized phone trees, and
developed strategies for electing more women to office.23 More than 100
‘Solidarity Sunday’ groups formed throughout the United States, from New
York to California, including groups in Missouri, Texas, and Louisiana.24
They meet every second Sunday to “tackle national issues at a local
level.”25 By February, one month after the inauguration, the group had
12,000 members, meeting in twenty-seven states.26
20.
See G.A. Res. 217A (III), Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Dec. 10, 1948);
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter
ICCPR]; ICESCR, supra note 17. It is globally recognized as the definitive law of international human
rights. See The Limburg Principles on the Implementation of the International Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights, 9 HUM. RTS. Q. 122 (1987).
21.

ICCPR, supra note 20, at arts. 14, 19(2), 22, 25.

22.
Martha Holstein, Opinion, Ways to Resist Trump, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 13, 2017), https://
www.nytimes.com/2017/04/13/opinion/ways-to-resist-trump.html; Pumping Life, supra note 12.
23.

Holstein, supra note 22.

24.
Adam Gabbatt, Solidarity Sundays: Women Resist Trump with Monthly Activism Meetups, GUARDIAN (Mar. 31, 2017, 7:00 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2017/mar/31/trumpresistance-movement-solidarity-sundays-meetup.
25.

Id.

26.
Ronda Kaysen, Home Is Where the Resistance Is, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 19, 2017), https://
www.nytimes.com/2017/02/17/realestate/home-politics-resistance.html.
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Plans included a strike by women on International Women’s Day
(March 8, 2017). More than 30,000 people registered to participate, mostly
from California and New York.27 Women were encouraged to stay home
from work, wear red, and refuse to spend money.28 While some schools in
North Carolina, Virginia, and Maryland closed because of teachers’
absence, the national turnout was far from that seen on January 22nd.29 But
the strike’s leaders said that that had never been the objective.30 “The
object for us isn’t that we hope to shut the whole economy down, we see
this as an opportunity to introduce women to different tactics of activism,”
said one of the co-chairs.31 These women are looking forward to 2018 and
to 2020.

2.

The November 2017 Elections

Trump has energized women, who have begun to run for office in
unprecedented numbers.32 According to the deputy press secretary at
Emily’s List, more than 25,000 have contacted her organization expressing
an interest in running for local or state office since Trump’s election.33 In
the first nation-wide elections since Trump took office, there was a clear
surge in women’s political visibility.34 “[A] wave of first-time female
candidates stood for state and local office . . . across the United States—and
they won.”35 In Virginia, women gained ten seats in the House of
Delegates, bringing their total to twenty-seven.36 “Virginia’s blue wave ‘ . .
27.
Susan Chira et al., ‘Day Without a Woman’ Protest Tests A Movement’s Staying Power,
N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 8, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/08/us/a-day-without-a-woman.html.
28.

Id.

29.

Id.

30.

Id.

31.

Id.

32.
Karin Kamp, Women Becoming More Politically Engaged Since Trump's Win, MOYERS &
CO. (Mar. 31, 2017), http://billmoyers.com/story/women-becoming-politically-engaged-since-trumpswin/.
33.
25,000 Reasons to Be Excited for 2018, EMILY’S LIST (Dec. 20, 2017), https://www.emily
slist.org/news/entry/emilys-list-announces-that-20000-women-are-ready-to-run-for-office.
34.
Claire Zillman, 5 Ways Women Won Big on the First Trump-Era Election Night, FORTUNE
(Nov. 8, 2017), http://fortune.com/2017/11/08/election-results-2017-women-trump/.
35.
Tom McCarthy, ‘Women Are Pissed’: Trump Protest Turns to Action – and Surge in
Female Candidates, GUARDIAN (Nov. 24, 2017, 10:22 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/usnews/
2017/nov/24/trump-women-female-candidates-pennsylvania-the-promise.
36.
Michelle Cottle, Women Exit the Party of Trump, ATLANTIC (Nov. 22, 2017), https://
www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/11/why-republican-women-arent-galvanized-bythetrumpera/
546533/.
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. was about Trump,’ [observed] a long-time [Republican] party strategist.”37
“It was not specific issues. It was a visceral reaction to what people
perceive of his representing. And it’s not welcoming. It’s not inclusive. It
makes people very uncomfortable.”38
Women won mayoral elections for the first time in Manchester, New
Hampshire; Provo, Utah; and Milledgeville, Georgia.39 Seattle elected its
first woman as mayor in almost a hundred years.40 Women won all seven
of the open judicial posts in Pennsylvania.41 New Jersey elected a
Democratic governor who received 55% of the women’s vote.42 The
victories—including the election of the first transgender state legislator—
were encouraging, especially on the West Coast.43 And the Democrats are
looking forward to the 2018 midterm elections.44
But American women remain far from meaningful political parity.
Women in the United States comprise approximately 19.8% of the
representatives in Congress, while women in Europe comprise between
30% and 40% of their national parliaments.45 The first-time, candidates
have few to mentor them. Here again, international women’s human rights
law and institutions could provide resources, experience, and guidance for
American women.

37.

Id.

38.

Id.

39.

Id.

40.

McCarthy, supra note 35.

41.

Id.

42.

Id.

43.

Cottle, supra note 36.

44.
Rachel Shorey & Lilia Chang, Democrats Leave Few Seats Unchallenged in Quest for
House Control, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 24, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/24/us/democrats-housecontrol-2018-midterms.html (noting that, “[n]early a year out from the election, Democratic candidates
have filed in all but 20 House districts held by Republicans”).
45.
See, e.g., Women in the U.S. Congress 2018, CTR. FOR AM. WOMEN & POL., EAGLETON
INST. POL., RUTGERS U., http://www.cawp.rutgers.edu/women-us-congress-2018 (last visited Mar. 18,
2018); Facts and Figures: Leadership and Political Participation, UN WOMEN, www.unwomen.org/
en/what-we-do/leadership-and-political-participation/facts-and-figures (last updated July 2017). See
also Ruth Rubio-Marín, A New European Parity-Democracy Sex Equality Model and Why It Won’t Fly
in the United States, 60 AM. J. COMP. L. 99 (2012); Steven Hill, Why Does the US Still Have So Few
Women in Office?, NATION (Mar. 7, 2014), https://www.thenation.com/article/why-does-us-still-haveso-few-women-office/.
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III. SEXUAL HARASSMENT
A.

1.

In America

Title VII, the Women’s Movement, and Catharine MacKinnon

As Professor Joanna Grossman has succinctly explained, growing
feminist consciousness in the late 1970s and early 1980s resulted in:
The eventual melding of outrage with the protections of Title
VII, a statute that had been on the books for more than a decade
already. In the background was the women’s rights movement,
and in the foreground was Catharine MacKinnon’s theory of why
harassment should be deemed an actionable wrong.46

As Professor MacKinnon defined it in her groundbreaking book,
“[s]exual harassment, most broadly defined, refers to the unwanted
imposition of sexual requirements in the context of a relationship of
unequal power.”47 The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC) adopted MacKinnon’s framework, issuing guidelines that
recognized two forms of harassment under Title VII: 1) quid pro quo
harassment, in which sexual favors are demanded in return for a job or a
promotion and 2) hostile environment harassment, in which people are
demeaned or intimidated at their workplace because of their sex.48 As
Professor Grossman concludes, however, after more than thirty years,
“sexual harassment remains disturbingly common and unaddressed . . . the
law has done little to change the cultural understanding of sexual
misconduct.”49

2.

Anita Hill and Clarence Thomas

Twenty-five years ago, Professor Anita Hill testified against Clarence
Thomas in the hearings on his nomination to the United States Supreme

46.
Joanna Grossman, Moving Forward, Looking Back:
Harassment Law, 95 B.U.L. REV. 1029, 1032–33 (2015).

A Retrospective on Sexual

47.

CATHERINE MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN 1 (1979).

48.

Grossman, supra note 46, at 1047.

49.
Id. Rather, as she describes at length elsewhere, a growing body of affirmative defense
case law inspired employers to adopt convoluted policies and procedures that did little to improve the
workplace. See, e.g., Joanna L. Grossman, The Culture of Compliance: The Final Triumph of Form
Over Substance in Sexual Harassment Law, 26 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 3 (2003); Deborah L. Brake &
Joanna L. Grossman, The Failure of Title VII as A Rights-Claiming System, 86 N.C. L. REV. 859 (2008).
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Court.50 Professor Hill had worked for Justice Thomas at two federal
agencies, the Department of Education and the EEOC. She told the allmale Senate Committee that Thomas had repeatedly made unwelcome
sexual comments and advances.51 The Committee was skeptical, and
Thomas was confirmed.52
Although Professor Hill was criticized by many at the time of the
hearings, and her testimony widely discredited, polls taken a year later
showed that public opinion had reversed in her favor. As Professor Hill
described her subsequent experience:
The response to my Senate Judiciary Committee [t]estimony has
been at once heartwarming and heart-wrenching. In learning that
I am not alone in experiencing harassment, I am also learning
that there are far too many women who have experienced a range
of inexcusable and illegal activities—from sexist jokes to sexual
assault—on the job . . . . In letters to me, women tell of incidents
that occurred fifty years ago when they were first entering the
workplace, incidents they [have] been unable to speak of for that
entire period.53

But the letters to Hill were private. Women came forward to support
her, but not to join her in publicly exposing the men who had harassed
them.

3.

The 2016 Campaign

The conduct Trump bragged about on the Access Hollywood tape
clearly constituted sexual harassment as well as sexual assault: “[W]hen
you’re a star, they let you do it. You can do anything . . . . Grab ‘em by the
pussy. You can do anything.”54 Millions of women were appalled,
although their outrage took time to coalesce and to build. Only 42% of

50.
Clyde Haberman, Do We Believe Women Yet? The Battle to End Sexual Harassment,
N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 17, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/17/us/retro-sexual-harassment.html.
51.

Id.

52.
For an analysis of the ways in which “the harassment of women of color is distinctive and
cannot be fully understood simply as a more virulent form of harassment faced by white women,” see
MARTHA CHAMALLAS, INTRODUCTION TO FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY 246–50 (2d ed. 2003).
53.
(1992).

Anita F. Hill, Sexual Harassment: The Nature of the Beast, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 1445–46

54.
Ronan Farrow, From Aggressive Overtures to Sexual Assault: Harvey Weinstein’s
Accusers Tell Their Stories, NEW YORKER (Oct. 23, 2017), https://www.newyorker.com/news/newsdesk/from-aggressive-overtures-to-sexual-assault-harvey-weinsteins-accusers-tell-their-stories.
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women who voted, voted for Trump,55 compared to the 54% who voted for
Clinton, including 94% of black women and 68% of Hispanic women.56
Even if 53% of white women who voted, voted for Trump,57 78% of them
said that “they were bothered to some extent by his treatment of women.”58
In October, after the release of the Access Hollywood tape, Trump
admitted that he had made the remarks attributed to him and he
apologized.59 But, he emphatically denied that he had actually committed
the assaults he bragged about.60 Several women came forward, however, to
contradict him and corroborate his initial account.61 He called them all
liars.62 One of the women, Summer Zervos, filed a defamation suit against
him.63
The election was a wake-up call for millions of women who realized
that “a predator was in the Oval Office.”64 The co-workers who had
harassed them were not outliers; norms of male behavior that they thought
they could take for granted were not norms at all. Press coverage and social
media picked up steam after the election. As Jessica Bennet, the new
“gender editor” of the New York Times, explains it:
Some see it as the other shoe dropping after Donald J. Trump’s
taped boasting about offensive behavior did not block his path to
the presidency: He may have gotten away with it, but women

55.
Clare Foran, Women Aren’t Responsible for Hillary Clinton’s Defeat, ATLANTIC (Nov. 13,
2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/11/hillary-clinton-white-women-vote/507422/.
56.

Id.

57.

Id.

58.

Chira, supra note 7.

59.
Michael D. Shear, Trump Sexual Misconduct Accusations Repeated by Several Women,
N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 11, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/11/us/politics/trump-accused-sexualmisconduct.html.
60.

Id.

61.

Id.

62.
Margaret Hartmann, What Happened to the 19 Women Who Accused Trump of Sexual
Misconduct, N.Y.: DAILY INTELLIGENCER, http://nymag.com/daily/intelligencer/2017/12/whathappened
-to-trumps-16-sexual-misconduct-accusers.html (last updated Dec. 12, 2017).
63.

Id.

64.
Time Waits for No Woman, The Real Sexual Predator Is in the White House Now, DAILY
KOS (Nov. 19, 2017, 12:55 AM), https://www.dailykos.com/stories/2017/11/18/1716932/-Trump-HasDone-What-Franken-is-Accused-of-Many-Times.
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were no longer going to let that boss, that mentor, that colleague
get away with it, too.65

Roger Ailes, founder of Fox News, had been forced out of his job the
year before because of multiple, detailed complaints of harassment by over
twenty women.66 But after the election, Bill O’Reilly, Bill Cosby, and
Harvey Weinstein found their former impunity gone.67
As journalist Ronan Farrow explains, although Weinstein’s behavior
was an “open secret” in Hollywood and beyond for over twenty years,
victims and witnesses were afraid that their careers would be over, their
lives ruined, and that they would be crushed if they spoke out.68 But after
the election, they realized that they—and their daughters—would not only
be crushed if they didn’t speak out, but that their harassers would persist,
even more openly and unapologetically.69 As Farrow writes:

65.
Jessica Bennett, The ‘Click’ Moment: How the Weinstein Scandal Unleashed A Tsunami,
N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 7, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/05/us/sexual-harrasment-weinsteintrump
.html.
66.
Gabriel Sherman, The Revenge of Roger’s Angels, N.Y. MAG. (Sept. 2, 2016, 7:30 AM),
http://nymag.com/daily/intelligencer/2016/09/how-fox-news-women-took-down-roger-ailes.html
(detailing an account of “[h]ow Fox News women took down the most predatory, and powerful, man in
media”).
67.
Jodi Kantor & Megan Twohey, Harvey Weinstein Paid Off Sexual Harassment Accusers
for Decades, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 5, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/05/us/harvey-weinsteinharassment-allegations.html; see Michelle Goldberg, Save the Phony Weinstein Outrage, Republicans,
N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 17, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/16/opinion/columnists/weinsteinsexualharassment-republicans.html (concluding that: “The movie business is corrupt, depraved and
iniquitous—and still morally superior to the Republican Party under Trump. Betraying the principle of
gender equality is bad. Rejecting it is worse.”); See also Laura Bates, A Thank-You to Taylor Swift,
N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 21, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/20/opinion/a-thank-you-to-taylorswif
t.html (contrasting the subservience of women with the “overconfidence of mediocre men . . . . It is no
coincidence that such men celebrated the triumph of Donald Trump, a man who has boasted about being
able to grab women ‘by the pussy.’ The president is the very epitome of overconfident male mediocrity
and, unsurprisingly, a big proponent of pliant, pretty femininity.”).
68.

Farrow, supra note 54.

69.
Editorial, Will Harvey Weinstein’s Fall Finally Reform Men?, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 28, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/28/opinion/sunday/harvey-weinstein-sexual-harassment.html (noting
“Then, of course, there’s the current occupant of the Oval Office, who won the election only weeks after
the public heard him brag about grabbing women’s genitalia, and who once said that if his daughter
were ever sexually harassed at work, she should go find a new job.”). See also Kantor & Twohey, supra
note 67.
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It’s likely that the women who spoke to me have recently felt
increasingly emboldened to talk about their experiences because
of the way the world has changed regarding issues of sex and
power. Their disclosures follow in the wake of stories alleging
sexual misconduct by public figures, including Donald Trump . .
. .70

In response to a comment by Woody Allen, warning of “a witch hunt
atmosphere,” Lindy West wrote an op-ed in the New York Times, “Yes,
This is a Witch Hunt.”71 What Allen means, she says, is “an atmosphere in
which [men] are expected to comport themselves with the care,
consideration and fear of consequences that the rest of us call basic
professionalism and respect for shared humanity.”72 West attributes this
“whole catastrophic cultural moment” to our predator in chief.73
In Sacramento, “more than 140 women—including legislators, senior
legislative aides and lobbyists—came forward to denounce what they
describe as pervasive sexual misconduct by powerful men in the nation’s
most influential legislature.”74 In early December, the focus shifted to
Congress, as the Democrats pressured Congressman John Conyers and
Senator Al Franken to resign in response to allegations of sexual
misconduct.75 Republican Trent Franks also resigned after he was asked to
do so by Paul Ryan, following his admission that he had discussed
surrogacy with two of his female aides.76 A culture of silence and
acquiescence had enabled many of these powerful men to maintain their
positions, wealth, and reputations for decades.
The law had helped, through nondisclosure agreements and
confidential settlements. In fact, under the Congressional Accountability
70.

Farrow, supra note 54.

71.
Lindy West, Opinion, Yes, This Is a Witch Hunt. I’m a Witch and I’m Hunting You., N.Y.
TIMES (Oct. 17, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/17/opinion/columnists/weinstein-harassmentwitchunt.html.
72.

Id.

73.

Id.

74.
Adam Nagourney & Jennifer Medina, Women Denounce Harassment in California’s
Capital, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 17, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/17/us/california-womensexualharassment-sacramento.html.
75.
Makini Brice & Richard Cowan, Franken and Franks Resign As Misconduct Charges
Batter Congress, REUTERS (Dec. 7, 2017, 6:02 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-congressfranken/franken-and-franks-resign-as-misconduct-charges-batter-congress-idUSKBN1E11DG. For a
cogent and persuasive argument that Senator Franken was treated unfairly, see Zephyr Teachout, I’m
Not Convinced Franken Should Quit, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 12, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/
11/opinion/franken-resignation-harassment-democrats.html.
76.

Id.
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Act of 1995, taxpayers have been paying for settlements to those who have
accused members of Congress of violations of workplace safety, as well as
employment and civil rights, including claims of sexual misconduct.77
Since 1997, more than $17 million has been paid to settle more than 260
claims.78
But the law’s failure, or complicity, no longer means that there are no
consequences. On October 15th, actress Alyssa Milano tweeted, “[i]f
you’ve been sexually harassed or assaulted, tweet #MeToo in response to
this tweet.” Twelve million people on Facebook tweeted the hashtag
#MeToo in the first twenty-four hours.79 On December 6, Time Magazine
named “The Silence Breakers” of the #MeToo movement the 2017 Person
of the Year.80
In December 2017, in the wake of the #MeToo movement, postWeinstein, and after the first democrat had won a Senate seat in Alabama in
twenty years,81 Professor Hill was asked to head a privately-funded Sex
Abuse Commission to “tackle widespread sexual abuse and harassment in
the media and entertainment industries.”82 A critical mass has been
reachedʊenough women are willing to speak out and enough women have
the money, clout, and political savvy, to establish institutions to support
them.83 The announcement of the Time’s Up movement included a pledge

77.
Editorial, What Congressmen Are Hiding, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 28, 2017), https://www.
nytimes.com/2017/11/27/opinion/congressmen-sexual-harassment-taxpayers.html.
78.

Id.

79.
More Than 12M “Me Too” Facebook Posts, Comments, Reactions in 24 Hours, CBS
NEWS (Oct. 17, 2017, 6:26 PM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/metoo-more-than-12-millionface
book-posts-comments-reactions-24-hours/; see Anna Codrea-Rado, #MeToo Floods Social Media with
Stories of Harassment and Assault, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 16, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10
/16/technology/metoo-twitter-facebook.html.
80.
Erik Ortiz, Time’s Person of the Year Is ‘The Silence Breakers’ of #MeToo Movement,
NBC NEWS (Dec. 6, 2017, 5:53 PM), https://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/sexual-misconduct/time-sperson-year-silence-breakers-metoo-movement-n826936.
81.
Editorial, Roy Moore Loses, Sanity Reigns, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 12, 2017), https://www.
nytimes.com/2017/12/12/opinion/roy-moore-loss-alabama.html.
82.
Cara Buckley, Anita Hill to Lead Hollywood Commission on Sexual Harassment, N.Y.
TIMES (Dec. 15, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/15/movies/anita-hill-hollywood-commissionsexual-harassment.html.
83.
See, e.g., Cara Buckley, Powerful Hollywood Women Unveil Anti-Harassment Action
Plan, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 1, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/01/movies/times-up-hollywoodwomen-sexual-harassment.html (describing the Time’s Up movement and the 300 prominent actresses
and female agents, writers, directors, and entertainment executives supporting these women).
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of support for working class women.84 Despite the success of #MeToo,
working class women have complained that little has changed for them.85
B.

Women’s Human Rights Law

Even if the American justice system had failed to adequately address
sexual harassment, moreover, it has been in the crosshairs of international
human rights law for some time. The Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) unequivocally
condemns sexual harassment as a violation of women’s human rights.86 In
July 2017, the Committee adopted General Recommendation No. 35 on
Gender-Based
Violence
Against
Women,
updating
General
Recommendation No. 19 on Violence Against Women.87 The Committee
noted that in the twenty-five years since its adoption, “[t]he opinio juris and
State practice suggest that the prohibition of gender-based violence against
women has evolved into a principle of customary international law.”88 This
means that even states that are not parties to the CEDAW, such as the
United States, are bound since customary law is binding on all states that
have not persistently objected to it.89 Violence against women explicitly
includes “harassment.”90 The state is responsible for non-state actors as
well as state actors.91
Human rights law also requires states to provide human rights
education. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), for
84.

Id.

85.
See, e.g., Susan Chira & Catrin Einhorn, The #MeToo Moment: Blue-Collar Women Ask,
‘What About Us?’, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 20, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/20/us/the-metoomoment-blue-collar-women-ask-what-about-us.html (noting $10 million settlement reached with Ford
in August by EEOC for sexual and racial harassment at two Chicago plants). See also Susan Chira &
Catrin Einhorn, Ford Apologizes for Sexual Harassment at Chicago Factories, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 21,
2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/21/us/ford-apology-sexual-harassment.html?.
86.
See generally G.A. Res. 34/180, Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination Against Women (Dec. 18, 1979).
87.
See Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, General
Recommendation No. 35 on Gender-Based Violence Against Women, Updating General
Recommendation No. 19, CEDAW/C/GC/35 (July 14, 2017), http://tbinternet.ohchr.org/Treaties/CED
AW/Shared%20Documents/1_Global/CEDAW_C_GC_35_8267_E.pdf
[hereinafter
General
Recommendation No. 35].
88.

Id. at para. 2.

89.
See The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900) (noting Justice Gray held
“[i]nternational law is part of our law”).
90.

General Recommendation No. 35, supra note 87, at para. 14.

91.

G.A. Res. 34/180, supra note 86, at art. 2(e).
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example, requires that: “Education shall be directed to the full development
of the human personality and to the strengthening of respect for human
rights.”92 The Economic Covenant, similarly, states that education shall
“strengthen the respect for human rights.”93 The Convention on the Rights
of the Child (CRC) repeats this language and further requires states to
prepare children for “responsible life in a free society, in the spirit of . . .
tolerance [and] equality of sexes.”94 The CEDAW goes further, requiring
that states teach “the common responsibility of men and women in the
upbringing and development of their children.”95
Despite the proliferation of international treaties, regional and
domestic laws, reports by special rapporteurs, white papers by experts,
country monitoring reports, and harassment-prevention training sessions,
sexual harassment persists. In part, this can be attributed to states’ failure
to comply with their own obligations under CEDAW. According to the
WORLD Policy Analysis Center at UCLA, sixty-eight countries have no
laws against sexual harassment at the workplace.96 While this might leave
countries that are parties to the CEDAW in violation of their obligations
under international human rights law, individuals cannot rely on that law to
proceed directly against their employers until and unless they are authorized
to do so under their own domestic law. This leaves 424 million working
age women with no legal protection against harassment on the job.97
The #MeToo movement resonated globally. Over 1.7 million women
in more than eighty-five countries throughout the world responded to the
tweet on Twitter.98 On October 29th, thousands of French women and men
took to the streets in every major city in France protesting sexual
harassment.99 Even in Sweden, that paradigm of gender equality, tens of
thousands of women signed a series of appeals in the national press
documenting harassment of women, not just by famous and powerful men,

92.

G.A. Res. 217A (III), supra note 20, at art. 26.

93.

ICESCR, supra note 17, at art. 12.

94.

Convention on the Rights of the Child art. 29(1)(d), Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3.

95.

G.A. Res. 34/180, supra note 86, at art. 5(b).

96.
Jody Heymann & Rachel Vogelstein, Commentary: When Sexual Harassment is Legal,
FORTUNE (Nov. 17, 2017), http://fortune.com/2017/11/17/sexual-harassment-legal-gaps/.
97.

Id.

98.
Andrea Park, #MeToo Reaches 85 Countries with 1.7M Tweets, CBS NEWS (Oct. 24,
2017, 12:43 PM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/metoo-reaches-85-countries-with-1-7-milliontweets/.
99.
James McAuley, Weinstein Scandal Sparks Uproar in France, WASH. POST (Oct. 29,
2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/weinstein-scandal-sparks-an-uproar-in-france-enoughisenough-indeed/2017/10/29/e7a03aac-bcbd-11e7-9294-705f80164f6e_story.html?utm_term=.cc6318d97
331 (noting that the hashtag in France is #balancetonporc, or “squeal on your pig”).
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but by men in virtually every profession.100 Journalist Jenny Nordberg
characterizes the Swedish workplace as “more cold, correct, and asexual on
the surface” than its American counterpart.101 So perhaps all those agencies
promoting gender equality have had some effect. But after work, or after a
drink, Nordberg continues, Swedish men lose their inhibitions.102 Perhaps
in Sweden, as in other countries where women now work in fields
traditionally dominated by men, there are simply more opportunities for
harassment, and a corresponding, if inadequately unrecognized, need to nip
it in the bud. Finally, no one ever suggested that law alone was enough to
transform culture. But it can certainly help. The on-going global shaming
of harassers may contribute to such cultural transformation.103
IV. WOMEN’S HEALTH
This Part addresses the impact of the Trump administration on
women’s health in general, and on women’s reproductive health more
specifically. It also examines the ways in which those who support
women’s human rights have challenged and resisted the onslaught of
cutbacks and the denial of healthcare for women and their families. The
first section focuses on federal law, including the Affordable Care Act
(ACA or Obamacare),104 Medicaid, and Medicare. The second section
discusses Trump’s efforts to restrict reproductive healthcare, not only in the
United States but throughout the world. This Part concludes by describing
the right to health under human rights law recognized and accepted in
virtually every other country, and what the human right to health, including
reproductive health, would mean for American women.
A.

The Affordable Care Act and Other Federal Programs

Medicare, which covers everyone over age sixty-five, and Medicaid,
which is available to those with low enough incomes, qualified pregnant

100. Jenny Nordberg, Yes, It Happens in Sweden, #Too, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 15, 2017), https:
//www.nytimes.com/2017/12/15/opinion/sunday/sweden-sexual-harassment-assault.html.
101.

Id.

102.

Id.

103. Motoko Rich, She Broke Japan’s Silence on Rape, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 29, 2017), https://
www.nytimes.com/2017/12/29/world/asia/japan-rape.html (noting that when a young Japanese
journalist reported that she was raped by “one of Japan’s best-known television journalists,” her claim
was met with skepticism).
104. See generally Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111–148, 124 Stat.
119 (2010).
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women and children; and those on SSI,105 were basically the only forms of
government healthcare assistance until the passage of the ACA in 2010.106
Historically, insurance coverage was provided by employers. But with
changes in the labor market, including the decline of union jobs, the growth
of the non-unionized service worker sector, and the entry of women into the
workforce, coverage was unavailable or unaffordable for many. The ACA
provided more than sixteen million people with health insurance.107 It is
undisputed that having health insurance is consistent with better health.108
Yet the repeal of the ACA was among Trump’s earliest, and most
frequently repeated, campaign promises. “If we don’t repeal and replace
Obamacare, we will destroy American healthcare forever,” he reiterated at a
rally in King of Prussia, Pennsylvania a week before the election.109
Despite his “repeated, confident assertions on the campaign trail that it
could be done in just a day,” however, Trump and the Republican
Congress, have been unable to do so to date.110 Rather, on July 18th, after

105. See Supplemental Security Income Home Page -- 2017 Edition, SOC. SECURITY, http://
www.ssa.gov/ssi/ (last visited Jan. 16, 2018) (providing that Supplemental Security Income is a federal
income supplement for low-income aged, blind, or disabled people).
106. Michelle Andrews, Women Could Pay More Than Men for Health Care Under Trump,
(Nov. 29, 2016, 11:44 AM), https://www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/2016/11/29/503713772/
women-could-pay-more-than-men-for-health-care-under-trump. In addition to expanded coverage, the
ACA prohibited insurance companies from discriminatory pricing. Before the ACA, women were
typically charged more than men even for health plans that had no maternity coverage. Id.

NPR

107. Barry Liss, The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act Six Years Later, 299 N.J. L.
41, 41 (2016).
108.

Id.

109. Jenna Johnson, Trump’s Grand Promises to ‘Very, Very, Quickly’ Repeal Obamacare Run
into Reality, WASH. POST (July 18, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trumps-grandpromises-to-very-very-quickly-repeal-obamacare-run-into-reality/2017/07/18/91b5f220-6bd3-11e79c15
-177740635e83_story.html?utm_term=.c5ec8526053d.
110. Robert Pear & Kate Kelly, Trump Concedes Health Law Is ‘Unbelievably Complex’, N.Y.
TIMES (Feb. 27, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/27/us/politics/trump-concedes-health-lawov
erhaul-is-unbelievably-complex.html (providing that Trump was “surprised that health care could be so
complicated”).
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yet another healthcare bill failure,111 Trump gave up: “[W]e’ll just let
Obamacare fail. We’re not gonna own it . . . .”112
But Obamacare has not imploded. 8.8 million people signed up during
the last open enrollment period, only slightly less than the 9.2 million who
had signed up during the previous open enrollment period, which had been
twice as long and much better advertised.113 The Tax Cuts and Jobs Act
(TCA) eliminates the public mandate, which required everyone to obtain
coverage and imposed a penalty on those who did not.114 But the TCA did
not repeal Obamacare, although Trump claims that it did.115 As Larry
Levitt of the Kaiser Family Foundation explains, “[t]he heart of the ACA—
the premium subsidies, the Medicaid expansion, and protections for preexisting conditions—remain in place . . . . The premium subsidies should
provide enough of an incentive for many healthy people to get coverage to
keep the individual market reasonably stable.”116 In fact, by ending the
public mandate, the Republicans are driving healthy people from the
market, inadvertently increasing the role of Medicaid.117
The future of Medicaid and Medicare is an open question. On one
hand, another of Trump’s early, oft-repeated promises was, “[s]ave

111. Gail Collins, Susan Collins and Lisa Murkowski, the Health Vote Heroines, N.Y. TIMES
(July 29, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/28/opinion/health-susan-collins-murkowski.html
(explaining that the bill ultimately failed because of two Senate Republicans, Susan Collins and Lisa
Murkowski, who became “fierce, consistent forces of resistance” after the thirteen men Majority Leader
Mitch McConnell appointed to write the bill deleted the requirement that insurance plans cover
contraceptives and barred Medicaid reimbursement for any services provided by Planned Parenthood).
112. Kristen Welker et al., Trump: ‘Let Obamacare Fail…I’m Not Going to Own It’, NBC
NEWS (July 18, 2017, 3:44 PM), https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/donald-trump/trump-lays-blamehealth-care-bill-failure-n784006.
113. Robert Pear, Obamacare Sign-ups at High Levels Despite Trump Saying It’s ‘Imploding’,
N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 21, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/21/us/politics/health-obama-careafford
able-care-act.html.
114.

MR. BRADY, TAX CUTS AND JOBS ACT, H.R. Doc. No. 115, at 153–54 (2017).

115. See Jon Greenberg, Trump Wrongly Says End of Mandate is ‘Essentially’ Obamacare
Repeal, POLITIFACTS (Dec. 21, 2017, 11:59 AM), http://www.politifact.com/truth-ometer/statements/
2017/dec/21/donald-trump/trump-wrongly-says-end-mandate-essentially-obamaca/.
116. Jon Greenberg, Mandate Rollback Not A Repeal of Obamacare, but It May Undermine It,
POLITIFACTS (Dec. 21, 2017, 11:19 AM), http://www.politifact.com/truth-o-meter/promises/trumpome
ter/promise/1388/repeal-obamacare/.
117. Robert Pear, Years of Attack Leave Obamacare A More Government-Focused Health Law,
N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 27, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/26/us/politics/republicans-trumpaffo
rdable-care-act-obamacare.html [hereinafter More Government-Focused Health Law].
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Medicare, Medicaid and Social Security without cuts. Have to do it.”118 At
the same time, the 2018 White House budget proposal released in May,
before passage of the TCA, cut Medicaid more than $600 billion “over [ten]
years, compared to current spending levels.”119 Medicare spending would
be cut by more than $50 billion over the same period, again, compared with
current levels.120 The TCA tax cut is projected to increase the deficit by
more than a trillion dollars, according to the Congressional Budget
Office.121 In December, Speaker Paul Ryan promised that Republicans
would try to slow the growth of federal spending on healthcare because
“it’s the health care entitlements that are the big drivers of our debt.”122 In
contrast, Senator McConnell has indicated that the Republicans will not
revisit health care, at least not in an election year.123
Threats to health care entitlements are threats to women. Women are
disproportionately affected by cuts to such entitlements in two ways, as
healthcare consumers and as healthcare providers. As Quoctrung Bui and
Susan Chira explain, “in the United States, women tend to benefit from
social safety net spending more than men.”124 As healthcare consumers,
women receive sixty-nine percent of total Medicaid spending.125
As healthcare providers, women will also be hurt by cuts in
Medicaid.126 Nursing homes, home care and community-based programs

118. Allison Colburn, Future of Medicare Funding Uncertain Under Trump Presidency,
POLITIFACTS (Sept. 13, 2017, 11:09 AM), http://www.politifact.com/truth-o-meter/promises/trumpomet
er/promise/1347/make-no-cuts-medicare/ (quoting from his presidential announcement speech).
119.

Id.

120.

Id.

121. Damian Paletta & Jeff Stein, Sweeping Tax Overhaul Clears Congress, WASH. POST (Dec.
20, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/gop-tax-bill-passes-congress-as-trumpprepares-to-sign-it-into-law/2017/12/20/0ba2fd98-e597-11e7-9ec2-518810e7d44d_story.html?utm_term
=.ff0e604634c9 (noting that a 2010 law known as “‘PAYGO,’ or ‘pay-as-you-go’. . . requires spending
cuts to Medicare and other programs if legislation is approved that is projected to add to the deficit.” A
waiver is likely to be sought when Congress reconvenes.).
122.

More Government-Focused Health Law, supra note 117.

123.

Id.

124. Quoctrung Bui & Susan Chira, How Trump’s Budget Affects Women, N.Y. TIMES (May
24, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/05/24/upshot/how-trumps-budget-affects-women
.html.
125.

Id.

126. See Maxine Eichner, The Privatized American Family, 93 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 213,
255–56 (2017) (explaining how neoliberalism has produced the “privatized American family,” and what
this has meant for American women).
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for seniors account for roughly two-thirds of Medicaid spending.127 Unpaid
family caregivers, who are overwhelmingly women, already spend about
two weeks of full time work, or seventy-seven hours, per month, with
dependent parents.128 As recent research from the Center for Retirement
Research at Boston College shows, an already-overextended caregiving
system is likely to collapse if there are deep cuts to Medicaid.129
B.

Women’s Reproductive Health

Denying women control over their own bodies and their own
reproductive capacity may well be the most effective way to disempower
them.130
Trump has eliminated American support for women’s
reproductive health from contraception131 to providing women with
information about safe abortions—not only throughout the United States,
but everywhere in the world. As journalist Michelle Goldberg has shown,
after merely six months in office, “Mr. Trump ha[d] already surpassed
George W. Bush as the American president most hostile to reproductive
rights and measures to promote sexual health.”132

1.

In the United States

In the United States, the Trump administration has focused on
reducing insurance coverage for contraception, tightening restrictions on
clinics that provide abortion services, and forcing clinics to close.133 As
Professor Grossman has explained, the Obama administration addressed
127. Editorial, Daughters Will Suffer from Medicaid Cuts, N.Y. TIMES (July 15, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/15/opinion/medicaid-health-care-bill-daughters.html.
128.

Id.

129. Id. (providing that such cuts are virtually assured by both the House and Senate versions
of the proposed new tax law).
130. See, e.g., MARGARET ATWOOD, THE HANDMAID’S TALE 308 (1st ed. 1985). Susan Brooks
Thistlethwaite, Barefoot and Pregnant: The Supreme Court and the War on Women, HUFFPOST:
BLOG, https://www.huffingtonpost.com/rev-dr-susan-brooks-thistlethwaite/barefoot-and-pregnant-the_b
_5563422.html (last updated Sept. 6, 2014, 10:51 AM).
131. Robert Pear, Foes of Obama-Era Rule Work to Undo Birth Control Mandate, N.Y. TIMES
(July 11, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/10/us/politics/birth-control-contraception-healthcare
-bill.html.
132. Michelle Goldberg, Opinion, The Playboy President and Women’s Health, N.Y. TIMES
(July 14, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/14/opinion/donald-trump-women-reproductiverights
.html.
133. Joanna L. Grossman, Sex, Lies, and Trump’s Rollback of the Contraceptive Mandate,
VERDICT JUSTIA (Oct. 10, 2017), https://verdict.justia.com/2017/10/10/sex-lies-trumps-rollback-contra
ceptive-mandate [hereinafter Sex, Lies, and Trump’s Rollback].
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contraception in 2011, requiring all employer-based health plans to pay for
prescription contraceptives.134 This was grounded in solid, scientific, nonpartisan evidence that, “access to contraception is a necessity for women’s
health.”135 As a result, fifty-five million women gained access to free
contraceptives, expanding their workplace opportunities and reducing
unintended pregnancies, abortions, and maternal deaths.136
Although unable to “repeal and replace Obamacare,”137 Trump has
undermined it. For example, he repealed a regulation promulgated by
Obama requiring states to pass along Title X funds to Planned Parenthood.
Title X governs the federal family planning program. The repealed
regulation was a response to more than twelve states that had blocked
Planned Parenthood from receiving Title X funds.138 Trump told Planned
Parenthood that it could continue to receive funding if it stopped providing
abortions.139
In addition, in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby,140 the Supreme Court held, in
a five to four decision, that closely-held, for-profit companies could deny
contraceptive cover to employees on the basis of “sincerely held” religious
beliefs.141 Trump compounded the Court’s error by promulgating a
regulation allowing employers who disapprove of contraception on “moral
convictions” to deny employees contraceptive coverage.142
Those who support women’s human rights have fought back on a
number of fronts. Limits on contraceptive coverage have been addressed

134.

Id.

135. Id. (providing the “Congressionally chartered group, the Institute of Medicine” that had
found that birth control was an essential health benefit for women, and that the major barrier was cost).
136.

Id.

137.

See supra Part IV. A.

138.

Julie Hirschfeld Davis, Trump Signs Law Taking Aim at Planned Parenthood Funding,
N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 13, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/13/us/politics/planned-parenthoodtrump
.html.
139. Maggie Haberman, Trumps Tells Planned Parenthood It’s Funding Can Stay if Abortion
Goes, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 6, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/06/us/politics/plannedparenthood
.html (noting that, “[i]n private discussions with people close to Planned Parenthood, White House
officials have suggested that there could even be an increase in federal earmarks if the work related to
abortion ends.”).
140.

Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014).

141. See, e.g., Sex, Lies, and Trump’s Rollback, supra note 133 (noting “the dubious idea that a
for-profit corporation meaningfully engages in the “exercise of religion”). Gregory M. Lipper, The
Contraceptive Coverage Case and Politicized Free-Exercise Law, 2016 U. ILL. L. REV. 1331 (2016).
142.

Sex, Lies, and Trump’s Rollback, supra note 133.
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on the state level.143 In addition, “[i]n a massive public comment
submission effort . . . more than a dozen leading reproductive and civil
rights organizations, members of Congress, and allies [from all fifty states] .
. . delivered over a half-million public comments” opposing the new
regulation to the Department of Health and Human Services.144
As noted above,145 those who oppose women’s right to choose, have
made abortion the subject of a long, fierce campaign. Abortion, of course,
is a constitutionally-protected right under Roe.146 But because rights are
generally framed negatively under the Constitution, i.e., as freedom from
state interference rather than as an affirmative obligation on the part of the
state, the state is not required to fund abortions. In Harris v. McRae, the
Supreme Court upheld the Hyde Amendment of 1976, barring the use of
federal Medicaid funds for abortion, even for medically necessary
abortions, unless the mother’s life was in danger.147 Thus, poor women
effectively have a right without a remedy; woman have a right to an
abortion, but only if they can afford one. As Professor Reva Siegel has
shown, the overwhelming majority of American woman who give birth
raise their children, regardless of their circumstances.148 By 2011, lowincome women were more than five times as likely to become pregnant
unintentionally than better-off women.149 Those who sought an abortion
but were unable to obtain one “were three times as likely to fall into poverty
over the following two years as those women who were able to get one.”150
Women who can’t afford an abortion can’t afford a child.
In Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, the
Court upheld Roe but allowed states to impose restrictions on abortions as
long as they did not amount to an “undue burden” on the pregnant woman’s

143. Sheryl Gay Stolberg, States Lead the Fight Against Trump’s Birth Control Rollback, N.Y.
TIMES (June 9, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/09/us/politics/states-lead-the-fight-againsttru
mps-birth-control-rollback.html.
144. Press Release, Ctr. for Reprod. Rights, Over a Half-Million Public Comments from
Across the Country Submitted Opposing Trump Administration Rules Threatening Access to
Contraception (Dec. 5, 2017) (on file with Ctr. for Reprod. Rights).
145.

See supra text accompanying notes 8–10.

146.

See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).

147.

Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 318 (1980).

148. Reva Siegel, Reasoning from the Body: A Historical Perspective on Abortion Regulation
and Questions of Equal Protection, 44 STAN. L. REV. 261, 370 (1992).
149. Bryce Covert, Opinion, Why Abortion Is A Progressive Economic Issue, N.Y. TIMES (Apr.
25, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/25/opinion/why-abortion-is-an-progressive-economiciss
ue.html.html.
150.

Id.
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right to choose.151 The states responded by passing a wide range of
requirements making abortions harder to obtain.152 Almost 400 restrictions
on abortion have been passed at the state level since 2010, including
twenty-two in Texas alone.153
Those who support women’s human rights have filed lawsuits
challenging some of the more egregious restrictions. On November 22,
2017, the federal district court in Austin struck down a Texas measure
banning one of “the safest and most common methods of ending a
pregnancy after approximately [fifteen] weeks” in Whole Woman’s Health
v. Paxton.154 “Every court that ha[d] looked at a ban [like the Texas
measure] ha[d] blocked it, including courts in Alabama, Arkansas, Kansas
and Oklahoma.”155

2.

Abroad

The Helms Amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1973 already
bans the use of United States foreign aid for abortions “as a method of
family planning.”156 The Mexico City Policy, also known as the Global
Gag Rule, adopted by Ronald Reagan in 1984, goes much further.157 It bars
any United States aid to any foreign non-governmental organization (NGO)
that even counsels women regarding abortion in the course of providing
family planning services.158
Trump has taken the Gag Rule to a new level. His plan, protecting life
in “global health assistance” extends the Gag Rule beyond the $600 million

151.

Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 871, 874 (1992).

152. See Linda Greenhouse & Reva B. Siegel, Casey and the Clinic Closings: When
“Protecting Health” Obstructs Choice, 125 YALE L.J. 1428, 1430, 1449 (2016) (critiquing and focusing
on those attacks purporting to protect women’s health).
153. Press Release, Ctr. for Reprod. Rights, Texas Court Strikes Down Ban on Safest, Most
Common Method of Abortion After Approximately 15 Weeks (Nov. 22, 2017) (on file with Ctr. for
Reprod. Rights) [hereinafter Texas Court Strikes Down Ban].
154.

Id.; See Whole Woman's Health v. Paxton, 264 F. Supp. 3d 813, 824 (2017).

155.

Texas Court Strikes Down Ban, supra note 153.

156. Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, Pub. L. No. 87–195, § 104(f)(1) 75 Stat. 13 (as amended
by the Foreign Assistance Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93–189 (1993)); Ann M. Starrs, The Trump Global
Gag Rule: An Attack on US Family Planning and Global Health Aid, 389 LANCET 485 (2017).
157. LUISA BLANCHFIELD, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41360, ABORTION AND FAMILY
PLANNING RELATED PROVISION IN U.S. FOREIGN ASSISTANCE LAW 10 (2017); Starrs, supra note 156.
158.

BLANCHFIELD, supra note 157; Starrs, supra note 156.
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family planning funding to which it has historically been applied.159 Under
Trump’s plan, it applies to “$8.8 billion in global health funding [from] the
State Department, United States Agency for International Development
(USAID), and the Department of Defense (DoD).”160
The consequences are likely to be far-reaching. As Nicholas Kristof
has recently noted, this will be devastating for countries like Liberia, where
American aid historically benefitted half the population.161 Trump’s plan
also includes cutting the United States’ annual contribution to the United
Nations (U.N.) Population Fund, which promotes family planning. As
Eugene Linden, author of The Alms Race, recently observed, “Remember
the Population Bomb? It’s still ticking.”162 The “population bomb” has
been used since the 1970s to refer to the risks posed by unchecked
population growth given the finite resources of the planet.163 The Green
Revolution and globalization may have postponed the reckoning, Linden
argues, but the risks are even greater now, in view of the current population
figures (approximately 7.6 billion) and the impact of climate change.164
The Senate Appropriations Committee voted in September to overturn
the Mexico City Policy.165 While this is likely to be symbolic, symbols
matter. Eliminating funding from the budgets of the State Department,

159. See Memorandum from President Donald Trump to the Secretary of State, the Secretary of
Health and Human Services, the Administrator of the United States Agency for International
Development (Jan. 23, 2017) (on file with Law & Justice); BLANCHFIELD, supra note 157.
160. Laura Bassett, Donald Trump Drastically Expands ‘Global Gag Rule’ On Abortion,
HUFFPOST (May 15, 2017, 2:09 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com.au/2017/05/15/donald-trumpdrastically-expands-global-gag-rule-on-abortion_a_22092544/?utm_hp_ref=au-sexual-health (Austl.).
See also Starrs, supra note 156. Ann Starrs, President of the Guttmacher Institute, anticipates an even
broader impact. As she explains, “Under Trump’s order, the gag rule now applies not only to US
bilateral family planning assistance (US$575 million for fiscal year 2016), but also to all ‘global health
assistance furnished by all departments or agencies’—encompassing an estimated $9.5 billion in foreign
aid.” Id.
161. Nicholas Kristof, Opinion, President Trump, Meet This 2-Year Old, N.Y. TIMES (June 24,
2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/24/opinion/sunday/president-trump-meet-this-2-year-old.html
(describing child dying of malaria in Liberia after taking ineffective, probably ‘counterfeit’ drugs).
162. Eugene Linden, Remember the Population Bomb? It’s Still Ticking, N.Y. TIMES (June 15,
2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/15/opinion/sunday/remember-the-population-bomb-its-stillticking.html.
163.
164.
21, 2018).

Id.
Id. World Population, WORLDOMETERS, http://www.worldometers.info/ (last visited Jan.

165. Lev Facher & Ike Swetlitz, Senate Panel Votes to Reverse Mexico City Policy, Signaling
Support for Global Family-Planning Assistance, STAT NEWS (Sept. 7, 2017), www.statnews.com/2017
/09/07/senate-mexico-city-family-planning.
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USAID, and the DoD, moreover, may well inspire more concrete
opposition.
As Professor Martha F. Davis has shown, under international human
rights law, abortion is not viewed primarily as a question of women’s
rights.166 Nor is contraception. Rather, state support for both are situated
squarely within women’s right to health.167 This approach would help
address the illusory right to abortion of poor women under Harris v. McRae
and Maher v. Roe.168
Viewing contraception and abortion as part of a continuum of
women’s reproductive health, which also includes infertility, pregnancy,
and postpartum care, makes it possible to deal with the ways in which
reproductive healthcare has been shaped by racism. Abortion in the United
States has often been viewed as a concern of white women, while women of
color have historically been more concerned with efforts to discourage their
childbearing, through “denial of welfare benefits, forced contraception, or
even sterilization.”169
In addition, as Professor Davis demonstrates, “contextualizing”
abortion as an element of women’s broader right to health has had strategic
advantages, as pro-choice advocates in the United States increasingly
recognize.170 Analyzing decisions from Colombia, Mexico, and the
European Court of Human Rights, Davis shows that where the right to
health was already recognized, and incorporated in a national health plan
(like the ACA), extending coverage to abortion “generated little
controversy.”171
V.

CONCLUSION: A YEAR OF RESISTANCE

The Women’s March was the beginning of a year of resistance.172
Each Part of this Article has shown how Trump’s attacks against women’s
166. Martha F. Davis, Abortion Access in the Global Marketplace, 88 N.C. L. REV. 1657, 1657
(2010) [hereinafter Abortion Access].
167.

See ICESCR, supra note 17, at art. 12. G.A. Res. 34/180, supra note 86, at art. 5.

168. See Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 479–80 (1977) (holding that states have no constitutional
obligation to pay for non-therapeutic abortions).
169.

Abortion Access, supra note 166, at 1659.

170.

Id. at 1657.

171.

Id.

172. Michelle Goldberg, The Year in Resistance, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 18, 2017), https://www.
nytimes.com/2017/12/18/opinion/trump-2017-resistance.html (noting “a recent poll show[ing] that
[fifty-three] percent of voters want [Trump] to resign” and concluding, “Trump has done more to spur
progressive political organizing than Bernie Sanders, George Soros, and Saul Alinsky combined.”).
Paul Krugman, America Is Not Yet Lost, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 25, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017
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human rights have inspired a backlash and fueled a movement. Part I
showed how millions of women, and their supporters, took to the streets
following his inauguration. Rather than return home after the marches, they
organized powerful and effective get-out-the-vote initiatives that produced
a wave of progressive victories in the first national elections following
Trump’s move to Washington. As impressive and promising as these
efforts were, however, they are unlikely to produce greater political parity
for women absent express demands for such parity. Ratification of the
CEDAW, and United States appearances before the committee that
monitors the CEDAW, would help clarify the need for gender parity, and
provide tools for achieving it.
Part II focused on the impassioned outcry against sexual harassment,
sparked by the Access Hollywood tapes and fueled by the Weinstein
scandal. Outrage against Trump’s crude misogyny inspired actresses, like
Ashley Judd, to speak out and journalists to investigate their allegations.
Wealthy, powerful men lost their positions, their power, and their onceunrestricted access to vulnerable women. It soon became clear, however,
that American anti-harassment law alone cannot identify and remediate the
wide-ranging harms.
Again, women’s international human rights law could be useful.
Legal instruments addressing a range of harms have already been drafted
and ratified by many states.173 These have been clarified by the Reports of
the Special Rapporteurs on Violence Against Women and applied to
country-specific situations by the CEDAW Committee in its reviews of
countries’ self-monitoring reports. Americans do not have to re-invent the
wheel.
Part III analyzed Trump’s attacks against women’s health, at home and
abroad, and the real dangers they pose for us all, as well as the planet itself.
His plan to abruptly terminate desperately needed funding for health
services, including former President George W. Bush’s campaign for H.I.V.
prevention, will devastate women and their families throughout the world.
This Article has focused on the response of American women and their
supporters to Trump’s physical, rhetorical, and fiscal attacks. It has pointed
out how human rights law can be used to counter or deflect such attacks.
But, human rights law also connects Americans to the rest of the world and
shows how this President seeks to undermine the human rights of women
everywhere.
/12/25/opinion/america-is-not-yet-lost.html (suggesting that, “[i]f American democracy survives this
terrible episode, I vote that we make pink pussy hats the symbol of our delivery from evil.”).
173. See, e.g., Council of Europe Convention on Preventing and Combatting Violence Against
Women and Domestic Violence, Apr. 7, 2011, C.E.T.S. No. 210; Inter-American Convention on the
Prevention, Punishment, and Eradication of Violence against Women, 33 ILM 1534, 1537 (1994).
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Now, even as Trump congratulates himself on the Tax Cuts and Jobs
Act (that promises to slash the few remaining safety nets to further engorge
the richest Americans, including himself and his family);174 he continues to
fuel a growing resistance. Though many were dumbfounded a year ago, the
shock has been replaced by commitment and determination. As Paul
Krugman recently noted, “tens of millions of Americans have risen to the
occasion,”175 organizing, canvasing, protesting, filing lawsuits, and running
for office. As Trump’s approval ratings continue to sink, women and their
supporters continue to build on their momentum.176

174. Editorial, The Tax Bill That Inequality Created, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 16, 2017), https://
www.nytimes.com/2017/12/16/opinion/sunday/tax-bill-inequality-created.html (noting that “the top
[one] percent of the population by wealthʊthe group that would primarily benefit from the tax
billʊcontrols nearly [forty] percent of the country’s wealth.”). Susan Faludi, The Patriarchs Are
Falling. The Patriarchy is Stronger than Ever., N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 31, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/
2017/12/28/opinion/sunday/patriarchy-feminism-metoo.html (noting that the Act “systematically guts
benefits that support women who need support the most”).
175.

Krugman, supra note 172.

176. See Kate Zernike, The Trump Resistance Found Early Success. Can It Also Find
Momentum?, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 9, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/09/health/the-trumpresis
tance-found-early-success-can-it-also-find-momentum.html. See also Editorial, What Trump Doesn’t
Get About the State of the Union, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 31, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/
2018/01/30/opinion/editorials/donald-trump-sotu-boasting.html (noting that, “If not exactly ‘woke,’ this
country might certainly be described as awakening, with a shot at shedding the civic apathy that has
afflicted it for far too long. It is with backhanded gratitude that we might all thank President Trump for
that.”).
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I.

INTRODUCTION

Since 2011, the conflict in Syria has caused the death of hundreds of
thousands of individuals and the displacement of millions.1 Efforts to refer
the Syrian situation to the International Criminal Court (ICC) have
consistently failed despite well-documented reports about the commission
of serious crimes in Syria, including the use of chemical weapons against
civilians, torture, the use of child soldiers, and crimes of sexual violence.2
Only a handful of situations have been investigated thus far, mostly within
national jurisdictions of western European nations.3 While the Security
Council has been deadlocked with respect to Syria, the General Assembly
passed a resolution in December 2016, establishing the International,
Impartial and Independent Mechanism to Assist in the Investigation and
Prosecution of Persons Responsible for the Most Serious Crimes Under
International Law Committed in the Syrian Arab Republic since March
2011 (Mechanism or IIIM).4 As of today, it is unclear whether the evidence
gathered through the Mechanism will be used in a subsequent prosecution,
and whether the work of the Mechanism will lead toward accountability for
those responsible for Syrian atrocities.

*
Associate Dean for Academic Enrichment and Professor of Law, Cleveland-Marshall
College of Law. The author would like to thank the organizers of International Law Weekend 2017 for
the opportunity to present these remarks and discuss other arguments from this Article.
1.
Jack Moore, Syria War Death Toll Hits 321,000 with Further 145,000 Missing: Monitor,
NEWSWEEK (Mar. 13, 2017, 1:14 PM), http://www.newsweek.com/sixth-anniversary-syrian-conflict-loo
ms-war-monitor-says-465000-killed-or-567181 (reporting that as of March 2017, the war in Syria has
resulted in 321,000 deaths and that an additional 145,000 individuals were missing).
2.
Press Release, Security Council, Referral of Syria to International Criminal Court Fails As
Negative Votes Prevent Security Council from Adopting Draft Resolution, U.N. Press Release
SC/11407 (May 22, 2014).
3.

See infra Part II.

4.
Beti Hohler & Elizabeth Pederson, The Syria Mechanism: Bridge to Prosecutions Or
Evidentiary Limbo?, E-INT’L REL. (May 26, 2017), http://www.e-ir.info/2017/05/26/the-syria-mechanis
m-bridge-to-prosecutions-or-evidentiary-limbo/.
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Parallel to the ongoing quest for accountability, the international
community has been concerned with negotiating peace for Syria in order to
end the violent civil war, which has already claimed thousands of lives.5
Achieving peace in Syria may not necessarily lead toward immediate
accountability, and conversely, a focus on accountability may derail the
peace process. This Article will explore whether the dual goals of peace
and justice can be reconciled in the Syrian context, and how these goals
may be properly sequenced, in order to potentially achieve long-lasting
peace in Syria without sacrificing justice. Part I will explore the tension
between the dual goals of peace and justice in both a theoretical manner, as
well as in the Syrian context. Part II will describe existing accountability
models in the international community and how these may be applicable in
the Syrian situation, and Part III will focus on the work of the Mechanism,
an already established model of preliminary accountability for Syria. This
Article will conclude that peace and justice may appear irreconcilable in
some contexts, but that such goals may co-exist if properly sequenced and
applied to a particular situation, such as Syria.
II.

DUAL GOALS OF PEACE AND JUSTICE

Peace and justice may co-exist in some contexts and societies. Peace
and justice may however appear irreconcilable in other transitional justice
scenarios. In some situations, the pursuit of justice and accountability may
be viewed as undermining the prospects of peace. In such transitional
justice societies, the pursuit of peace may appear more important than the
quest for accountability, and the latter may be sacrificed in order to halt
bloodshed and achieve peace.6 In other situations, however, it may be
possible to sequence peace and justice—to seek the end of violence first but
to focus on accountability later.
In several Latin American countries, dictators which had ruled such
countries in the late 1970s and early 1980s peacefully stepped out of power,
but requested blanket amnesties for themselves and other members of their
oppressive regimes.7 In such instances, it may be argued that accountability

5.
News Focus: Syria, UN NEWS CTR., https://www.un.org/apps/news/infocusRel.asp?infoc
usID=146 (last visited Jan. 18, 2018) (reporting on ongoing Syrian peace negotiations, and that parties
to the peace process have met in Geneva four times during 2017, and three times during 2016; reporting
also that parties to the peace process attended, in parallel, Astana peace talks in Kazakhstan in early
2017).
6.
See TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE IN LATIN AMERICA: THE UNEVEN ROAD FROM IMPUNITY
TOWARDS ACCOUNTABILITY 1–6 (Elin Skaar et al. eds., 2016).
7.
Steven R. Ratner, New Democracies, Old Atrocities: An Inquiry in International Law, 87
GEO. L.J. 707, 720–29 (1999); see Jo-Marie Burt, The Torture Report: Latin America’s Lessons for the
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was sacrificed toward the pursuit of peace and a peaceful transition to
democracy. In many Latin American countries, however, accountability
has become important and amnesty laws have been overturned or ignored.
Thus, criminal trials have moved forward in several countries, including
Argentina, Chile, Uruguay, Peru, and Guatemala.8 It may be argued that
while the pursuit of peace and the goal of a peaceful transition to
democracy trumped accountability in the first instance in many Latin
American societies, but that accountability remained important nonetheless
and is currently at the forefront in many such countries and societies.
In other instances, peace and justice have always co-existed, either
through peace accords coupled with modified accountability mechanisms,
or through peace accords and concurrent prosecutions. South Africa is an
example of the former. When the South African apartheid regime
negotiated its surrender of power and agreed to transition to a democratic
regime, questions of accountability prominently surfaced.9
Would
members of the apartheid regime face accountability for the atrocities
which they committed while in power? If so, pursuant to which model of
accountability? Accountability became a stumbling stone in the transition
process, with the ruling apartheid party members requiring immunity from
prosecution as a condition of their peaceful exit from power.10 A solution
was negotiated with the creation of the Truth and Reconciliation
Commission (TRC)—a commission equipped with issuing amnesty (from
domestic prosecution) to those who testified before it and were able to
establish that the acts which they committed had a political purpose.11
Ultimately, the TRC granted 1167 applications for amnesty, out of a total of
7000 applications received; those who did not receive amnesty from the
TRC remained subject to the possibility of criminal prosecution in South
African courts.12 In South Africa, the goal of peace resulted in the creation
United States, NACLA (Dec. 10, 2014), https://nacla.org/news/2014/12/10/torture-report-latin-america’slessons-united-states.
8.

Burt, supra note 7.

9.
Jasmina Brankovic, Responsabilidad y Reconciliación Nacional en Sudáfrica
[Accountability and National Reconciliation in South Africa], EDICIONES INFOJUS: DERECHOS
HUMANOS 2, no. 4, 2013, at 55–86.
10.
Unit 6. The End of Apartheid and the Birth of Democracy, S. AFR.: OVERCOMING
APARTHEID BUILDING DEMOCRACY, http://overcomingapartheid.msu.edu/unit.php?id=65-24E-6 (last
visited Feb. 4, 2018); Alex Boraine, Truth and Reconciliation in South Africa: The Third Way, in
TRUTH V. JUSTICE: THE MORALITY OF TRUTH COMMISSIONS 141, 143–44 (Robert I. Rotberg & Dennis
Thompson eds., 2000).
11.
TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION, http://www.justice.gov.za/trc/ (last visited
Feb. 4, 2018).
12.
TRC Category - 3. Amnesty, TRACES TRUTH, http://truth.wwl.wits.ac.za/cat_descr.php?
cat=3 (last visited Feb. 4, 2018).
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of a modified accountability mechanism, the TRC. While many have
applauded the TRC as an appropriate mechanism for achieving peace and
reconciliation in South Africa, some have questioned whether such
commissions in general provide appropriate accountability for those
responsible of the most serious atrocities and violations of international
law.13 It may be concluded that in South Africa, peace and justice coexisted, but that justice took on a modified accountability form through the
TRC.
The former Yugoslavia and Sierra Leone are examples of transitional
justice scenarios where peace and accountability co-existed almost
simultaneously. In the former Yugoslavia, the civil war ended with the
Dayton Peace Accords of 1995; the accords did not include an immunity
clause for any Serbian, Croatian, or Muslim leaders and their respective
regimes.14 The International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia (ICTY),
which was established through Security Council Chapter VII powers a few
years before the Dayton Peace Accords, was ultimately able to prosecute
most senior leaders of former Yugoslav states.15 Thus, in the former
Yugoslavia, justice was not sacrificed for peace, and the pursuit of peace
did not derail the pursuit of accountability. Instead, peace and justice were
correctly sequenced and it may be argued that both were achieved.
In Sierra Leone, the 1999 Lome Peace Accord contained an amnesty
provision.16 When the Special Court for Sierra Leone was established in
2002, the Court determined that it could impose accountability of those who
may have been subjects of the amnesty provision of the Lome Peace
Accord, because the amnesty concerned domestic prosecutions only and the
Court was of an international/hybrid character.17 In Sierra Leone, like in

13.
See Azanian Peoples Org. (AZAPO) et al. v. President of the Republic of South Africa
1996 (4) SA 1 (CC) at 22 para. 21 (S. Afr.).
14.
See generally General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bosn.
& Herz.-Croat.-Yugo., Dec. 14, 1995, 35 I.L.M. 75; see also John R.W.D. Jones, The Implications of
the Peace Agreement for the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 7 EUR. J. INT’L
L. 226, 234 (1996) (noting that the Dayton Peace Accords did not contain an amnesty clause).
15.
The ICTY “was established by the Security Council under Chapter VII of the United
Nations Charter as an enforcement measure aimed at restoring and maintaining international peace and
security in the region (S/RES/827 (1993)).” Jones, supra note 14, at 226 n.2 (1996). For a general
discussion of the relationship between the Dayton Peace Accords and the ICTY, see id. at 226–44.
16.
Peace Agreement Between the Government of Sierra Leone and the Revolutionary United
Front of Sierra Leone, Sierra Leone, Sierra-Leona-R.U.F./S.L., July 7, 1999.
17.
Special Court for Sierra Leone Appeals Chamber, May 25, 2004, SCSL-2004-14AR72(E), (SL); Press Release, Amnesty International, Sierra Leone: Special Court Rejects Amnesty for
the Worst Crimes Known to Humanity (Mar. 18, 2004) (“The Special Court for Sierra Leone held that,
in accordance with international law, the general amnesty granted in the 1999 Lomé peace agreement
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the former Yugoslavia, peace and justice were properly sequenced and
somewhat simultaneously achieved.
The above examples demonstrate that peace and justice may co-exist,
and that, if sequenced properly, both may be achieved in a transitional
society. In Syria, the goal of peace should not altogether trump the goal of
accountability. Peace and accountability could co-exist, similar to the
South African, Yugoslav, and Sierra Leonian experiences. Peace and
justice could co-exist either pursuant to the South African model, where
accountability took the form of a TRC, or pursuant to the former
Yugoslavia and Sierra Leone models, where a peace treaty was signed and
accountability imposed, through an international or hybrid tribunal, in the
short term following the achievement of peace. The section below will
briefly discuss existing accountability options for Syria.
III.

EXISTING ACCOUNTABILITY AND JUSTICE MODELS

Several accountability models exist and have already been utilized in
different international and non-international conflicts. Such accountability
models include national prosecutions, internationalized domestic war
crimes chambers, hybrid tribunals, international ad hoc tribunals, and the
ICC.18 In addition, truth and reconciliation commissions, as mentioned
above, have been formed and analyzed as alternative models of
accountability.19 This section will briefly describe such existing models of
accountability while assessing whether they could be utilized in the Syrian
context.
Perpetrators of atrocities such as war crimes, crimes against humanity,
genocide, or other violations, can be prosecuted in national courts, provided
that such national jurisdictions have penal laws which have codified such
international crimes as well as appropriate jurisdictional statutes.20 As of
today, many national jurisdictions have penal codes which embrace
international crimes.21 In addition, perpetrators of international offenses
was ‘ineffective’ in preventing international courts, such as the Special Court, or foreign courts from
prosecuting crimes against humanity and war crimes.”).
18.
See generally Milena Sterio, The Future of Ad Hoc Tribunals: An Assessment of Their
Utility Post-ICC, 19 ILSA J. INT’L & COMP. L. 237 (2013) (noting different types of models of
accountability and existing tribunals).
19.
Abdul Rahman Lamin, Building Peace Through Accountability in Sierra Leone: The
Truth and Reconciliation Commission and the Special Court, 38 J. ASIAN & AFR. STUD. 295 (2003)
(discussing truth and reconciliation commissions and accountability).
20.
See, e.g., Helmut Kreicker, National Prosecution of International Crimes from A
Comparative Perspective, 5 INT’L CRIM. L. REV. 313 (2005).
21.
DAVID A. KAYE, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL., COUNCIL SPECIAL REP. NO. 61, JUSTICE
BEYOND THE HAGUE: SUPPORTING THE PROSECUTION OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMES IN NATIONAL
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can often be charged and prosecuted for domestic law offenses, such as
murder, torture, rape, kidnapping, etc.22 Most national jurisdictions require
a nexus between the perpetrator or investigated alleged crime and their own
territory.23 Thus, many national courts will exercise jurisdiction over an
offender if the offender is a national of the prosecuting state, if victims were
nationals of the prosecuting state, or if the national security interests of the
prosecuting state were somehow harmed by the underlying criminal
offense.24 Some countries have codified the principle of universal
jurisdiction and allow for prosecutions of all alleged criminals for
particularly heinous offenses, such as genocide, torture, slavery, etc.25
Perpetrators of atrocities in Syria could be prosecuted in Syrian
national courts for domestic/Syrian law offenses under Syrian criminal
law.26 Syrian courts would surely have jurisdiction over Syrian perpetrators
for alleged crimes committed on Syrian territory. This scenario, although
theoretically possible, is not feasible in the current political climate and
leadership of President Assad. It is unlikely that President Assad would
allow Syrian courts to investigate atrocities which may potentially implicate
his own regime. In addition, because of the ongoing conflict in Syria, it is
uncertain how much capacity Syrian domestic courts would have to
undertake a complex investigation and prosecution, which could implicate a
multitude of evidentiary documents, witnesses, and other resources. 27
COURTS 6 (June 2011), https://www.cfr.org/sites/default/files/pdf/2011/05/Beyond_The_Hague_CSR
61.pdf (noting that countries such as Argentina, Bosnia, Colombia and Germany have established
national courts and specialized chambers capable of prosecuting individuals for war crimes and crimes
against humanity, and that many NATO countries have the practice of prosecuting their own military
personnel accused of war crimes).
22.
See, e.g., Courts of First Resort: Prosecuting International Crimes at the National Level,
ICTJ (Oct. 24, 2012), https://www.ictj.org/news/courts-first-resort-prosecuting-international-crimesnati
onal-level (reporting on the Greentree Conference on Complementarity, at which conference
participants assessed national prosecutions for the purposes of ICC complementarity with respect to
Colombia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Guatemala, and Ivory Coast.); see also
National Prosecutions of International Crimes, MAX-PLANCK-INSTITUT FÜR AUSLÄNDISCHES UND
INTERNATIONALES STRAFRECHT, https://www.mpicc.de/en/forschung/forschungsarbeit/strafrecht/nation
ale_strafverfolgung.html (last visited Jan. 31, 2018) (reporting on conferences and reports issued for
various countries around the world and their capacity to prosecute international crimes, in the context of
ICC complementarity regime).
23.

Kreicker, supra note 20.

24.

Id.

25.
See generally Elizabeth B. Ludwin King, Big Fish, Small Ponds: International Crimes in
National Courts, 90 IND. L.J. 829 (2015).
26.
Kreicker, supra note 20. This conclusion flows from the principle of territoriality of
jurisdiction: the idea that states have territorial jurisdiction over offenses committed on their territory.
27.
Mark Chadwick, Jusice in Syria: Five Ways to Prosecute International Crime,
CONVERSATION (July 10, 2017, 9:05 AM), http://theconversation.com/justice-in-syria-five-ways-toprose
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Moreover, it is uncertain whether the Syrian judiciary is truly independent
and neutral, and whether it would be able to lead a politically charged
investigation without interference from the Assad regime.28
National courts of other states, however, could investigate and
possibly prosecute perpetrators of atrocities in Syria. These types of
proceedings can occur either in situations where the prosecuting authority
has a nexus to the alleged crime (for example, if the perpetrator is a national
or resident of the prosecuting state), or in countries where universal
jurisdiction statutes exist and where the heinous and universal nature of the
alleged crime justifies prosecution by any state’s courts.29 According to
recent reports, investigations into Syria are already occurring in France,
Finland, Germany, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and Switzerland.30 In
Sweden, three individuals have been separately tried and convicted of
crimes committed in Syria’s war after they left the country and traveled to
Sweden.31 In addition, German authorities have successfully prosecuted
perpetrators of Syrian atrocities.32 More investigations and cases of this
sort could take place in the future, and it is human rights defenders’ hope
that the Mechanism will continue to assist with such prosecutions and
cases.33 While prosecuting perpetrators of Syrian atrocities in national
courts under universal jurisdiction constitutes imperfect justice (because
such cases are often piecemeal, unlikely to satisfy all victims, result in trials
in absentia, and may result in dismissals), slow and imperfect justice may

cute-international-crime-75908 (“Prosecution of atrocities in the Syrian courts would present
considerable logistical and financial difficulties for a ruined state. Even if national trials were feasible
(if funded externally, for instance) they would risk being politically vulnerable to manipulation by the
ruling elite, whoever that may be.”).
28.

Id.

29.
Justice for Syria, AMNESTY INT’L, https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/campaigns/2017/03/
justice-for-syria/ (last visited Jan. 31, 2018) [hereinafter AMNESTY INT’L].
30.
Q&A: First Cracks to Impunity in Syria, Iraq, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Oct. 20, 2016, 12:01
AM), https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/10/20/qa-first-cracks-impunity-syria-iraq [hereinafter HUM. RTS.
WATCH: Q&A]; see also Chadwick, supra note 27 (reporting that in Sweden, Finland, Germany and
Switzerland refugees present in those countries and suspected of international crimes are being
prosecuted under the doctrine of universal jurisdiction).
31.
Vera Padberg, Prosecutions of Syrian War Crimes, ILAWYER BLOG (Feb. 18, 2017), http://
ilawyerblog.com/prosecutions-of-syrian-war-crimes/.
32.
Syria: First Atrocities Trials Held in Europe, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Oct. 3, 2017, 12:00
AM), https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/10/03/syria-first-atrocities-trials-held-europe (reporting that
German courts have successfully prosecuted and convicted Syrian perpetrators, albeit on terrorism
charges, and that Swedish courts have also successfully prosecuted and convicted perpetrators of Syrian
atrocities).
33.

See AMNESTY INT’L, supra note 29.
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be beneficial to no justice at all.34 According to war crimes prosecutor
Stephen Rapp, “the slow-moving wheels of justice eventually caught up
with Chile’s Augusto Pinochet and Slobodan Milosevic of the former
Yugoslavia.”35 As of today, it appears that the Mechanism will cooperate
with national jurisdictions and will share some of its investigative work
with national prosecutors and that national prosecutions may represent the
only near-future model of accountability for Syria.
Because national prosecutions often suffer from “defects,” such as
inexperienced judges, prosecutors, and defense counsel, inadequate
criminal laws and jurisdictional statutes, and insufficient resources, some
countries have created specialized war crimes chambers within their
existing judiciaries to investigate and prosecute cases involving
international crimes and atrocities.36 Such war crimes chambers already
exist in Bosnia and Herzegovina.37 The advantage of specialized war
crimes chambers is that they may receive assistance from the international
community through programs to train judges, prosecutors, and defense
counsel, assistance with the possible re-drafting of national penal laws as
well as with communications and outreach strategies, and other financial
resources. Some domestic war chambers may become “internationalized”
in light of significant involvement and assistance by the international
community.38
Examples of internationalized domestic war crimes
chambers include the Iraqi Special Tribunal, as well as the new Kosovo
Specialist Chambers.39

34.

See HUM. RTS. WATCH: Q&A, supra note 30.

35.
James Reinl, Could Syria’s ‘Prosecutor Without A Tribunal’ Work?, ALJAZEERA (May
31, 2017), http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2017/05/syria-prosecutor-tribunal-work-17052911
0910869.html.
36.

Sterio, supra note 18, at 244.

37.
Id. at 245 (noting that the Bosnian War Chamber “is a specialized domestic chamber that
handles various war crimes cases, either handed down by the ICTY as part of its completion strategy, or
investigated on its own,” that the Chamber applies local law and is located in the capital city of
Sarajevo, and that the Chamber “employs a mix of international staff, as well as local Bosnian Serbs,
Croats, and Muslims”).
38.

Id.

39.
Id.; see KOSOVO SPECIALIST CHAMBERS & SPECIALIST PROSECUTOR’S OFF.,
https://www.scp-ks.org/en (last visited Jan. 31, 2017) [hereinafter KOSOVO] (“Kosovo Specialist
Chambers and Specialist Prosecutor’s Office are part of the judicial system of Kosovo. The Chambers
are attached to each level of the Kosovo court system . . . . They are of temporary nature with a specific
mandate and jurisdiction, namely over certain crimes against humanity, war crimes and other crimes
under Kosovo law which allegedly occurred between 1 January 1998 and 31 December 2000 . . . . The
Specialist Chambers have a seat in The Hague, the Netherlands, and are to be staffed with international
judges, prosecutors and staff.”).
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Under the current Syrian leadership of President Assad, it is unrealistic
to expect the creation of a specialized war chamber. The same deficiencies
which would plague a national prosecution in Syria would similarly affect a
specialized tribunal or chamber. Because of resources necessary to create a
specialized war crimes chamber, it is also unrealistic to expect that a
foreign jurisdiction would create a specialized chamber within its own
judicial system solely for the benefit of prosecuting Syrian atrocities. The
existing and past war crimes chambers and tribunals, in Bosnia, Kosovo,
and Iraq have all been created toward the purpose of prosecuting
individuals responsible for atrocities committed in those same countries.40
A specialized war crimes chamber, or a national prosecution, in Syria could
however exist if a new regime were to be put in place or elected. If
President Assad were to step down, a new leadership committed to
transitional justice may be interested and able to prosecute perpetrators
either in Syrian national courts or in a specialized war crimes chamber. As
of today, this is a remote possibility.
A third model of accountability which has been utilized by some
countries over the past two decades is the creation of a hybrid tribunal.
Hybrid tribunals are typically established through an agreement between
the host nation, affected by a conflict and resolving transitional justice
issues, and the international community, typically the United Nations.41
Recent examples of hybrid tribunals include the Special Court for Sierra
Leone and the Special Tribunal for Lebanon.42 Hybrid tribunals typically
apply a mixture of domestic and international law and are typically
composed of judicial chambers consisting of domestic and international
judges.43 They may be located in the host country and thus may have a
stronger territorial nexus to the conflict which they are trying to address.44
In theory, one could envision the creation of a hybrid tribunal for Syria
in the future. Academics have already proposed the creation of such a
tribunal.45 In the United States, a group of senators recently introduced a
40.

See KOSOVO, supra note 39; Sterio, supra note 18.

41.

Sterio, supra note 18, at 240–41.

42.

Id.

43.

Id. at 241.

44.
See, e.g., Lindsey Raub, Positioning Hybrid Tribunals in International Criminal Justice,
41 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 1013, 1023–25 (2009).
45.
See Blue Ribbon Panel of Experts to Unveil Draft Statute for Syrian Tribunal on October
3, 8:30-9:30 AM, At the National Press Club in Washington D.C., PILPG (Sept. 25, 2013), https://
www.publicinternationallawandpolicygroup.org/blue-ribbon-panel-of-experts-to-unveil-draftstatuteforsy
rian-tribunal-on-october-3-830-930-am-at-the-national-press-club-in-washington-d-c/ (reporting that a
panel of former international tribunal chief prosecutors, international judges, and leading experts has
prepared a Draft Statute for a Syrian Extraordinary Tribunal to Prosecute Atrocity Crimes).
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bipartisan bill—Syrian War Crimes Accountability Act—aimed at
investigating war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide in Syria
and at imposing accountability on Syrian President Assad.46 In this bill, the
senators called on the United States Secretary of State to assist in creating a
hybrid tribunal to investigate and prosecute those responsible for most
heinous abuses in Syria, as part of “credible transitional justice efforts.”47
Nonetheless, the hybrid tribunal option remains difficult to implement
while President Assad is in power. The establishment of a hybrid tribunal
presupposes the host country’s agreement, and as mentioned above, it is
unlikely that the Assad regime would agree to an investigation and
prosecutions by a hybrid tribunal which would implicate itself.48 If Syrian
leadership changed and a new regime accepted to work with the
international community to establish a hybrid tribunal, this option may be
attractive for a conflict such as the one in Syria. One of the main
advantages of hybrid tribunals is their ability to tailor their statutes to the
particular conflict they are seeking to address, by incorporating both
domestic and international law offenses. A hybrid tribunal for Syria could
prosecute perpetrators for international crimes, but could also incorporate
Syrian penal law offenses, if necessary. Another advantage of such
tribunals is their proximity to the conflict, if they are located in the host
country. This is helpful because in terms of outreach to the Syrian people,
reconciliation, and national healing, a hybrid tribunal located in Syria
would be able to more easily investigate and collect evidence and would
likely perform better.49 As of today, because the probability of regime
change in Syria remains low for the near future, a hybrid tribunal remains a
theoretical but unlikely option.
A fourth model of accountability involves the creation of an ad hoc
international criminal tribunal. The United Nations Security Council,
through its Chapter VII powers, created two such tribunals in the 1990s, for
the former Yugoslavia and for Rwanda.50 These tribunals were created
against the wishes of the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda and were located
outside of these two countries, at The Hague and in Arusha, Tanzania,
46.
US Senators Call for ‘Hybrid Tribunal’ for Syrian War Crimes, RT (Apr. 8, 2017, 11:16),
https://www.rt.com/usa/384024-hybrid-tribunal-syria-bill/.
47.

Id.

48.
Chadwick, supra note 27 (“If the Bashar al-Assad regime is to remain in power in Syria
this may create significant difficulties for this approach. Its success would depend on the government’s
willingness to cooperate and submit itself to investigation alongside opposition groups.”).
49.

See Sterio, supra note 18, at 240.

50.
Marieke L. Wierda, What Lessons Can Be Learned from the Ad Hoc Tribunals?, 9 U.C.
DAVIS J. INT’L L. & POL'Y 13, 13–14 (2002) (noting the establishing of the International Criminal
Tribunal for Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR)).
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respectively.51 International ad hoc tribunals are composed of international
judges and apply international criminal law; they typically do not
incorporate any of the features of domestic criminal systems and do not
employ local judges.52 Although such tribunals do not necessitate the
relevant country’s approval, they do require a Security Council resolution
because they involve a process which breaches the affected country’s
sovereignty. In the Syrian context, Russia and China have already vetoed
resolutions which would have authorized the referral of the Syrian situation
to the ICC, and it is highly likely that Russia and China would also veto a
resolution seeking to establish the creation of a new ad hoc tribunal for
Syria.53 Thus, this option remains of limited utility today. If the geopolitical situation were to change drastically and if Russia and China ceased
to support Assad, or if Assad were to step down and a new regime, less proRussian and pro-Chinese, were put in power in Syria, then an international
ad hoc tribunal could be possible. In the short term, this is unlikely to
occur.
Last, the ICC is another model of accountability, where perpetrators of
atrocities, such as those committed in Syria, can be prosecuted. The ICC
has jurisdiction over three main categories of crimes: genocide; crimes
against humanity; and war crimes.54 In order for a case to come within the
ICC’s jurisdiction, the alleged crime or crimes must have been committed
on the territory of a member state, or the perpetrator must be a national of a
member state.55 Additionally, cases may be referred to the ICC by the
Security Council.56 Syria is not a member of the ICC.57 Assuming war
crimes and crimes against humanity took place in Syria, the ICC would
have jurisdiction only over cases involving so-called “foreign fighters”—
individuals who are nationals of an ICC member state and who chose to
fight in the Syrian conflict.58 The court would not have jurisdiction over
51.

Id.

52.

Sterio, supra note 18, at 238.

53.

See Chadwick, supra note 27.

54.
See, e.g., James F. Alexander, The International Criminal Court and the Prevention of
Atrocities: Predicting the Court's Impact, 54 VILL. L. REV. 1, 2–3 (2009) (describing the establishment
of the International Criminal Court, Situations and Cases).
55.

Id. at 3.

56.
Simi Singh, The Future of International Criminal Law: The International Criminal Court
(ICC), 10 TOURO INT’L L. REV. 1, 8–9 (2000); see also Sterio, supra note 18, at 239–40.
57.

Chadwick, supra note 27.

58.
See Jennifer Trahan, New Paths to Accountability for Crimes in Syria and Iraq (Including
ICC Jurisdiction over Foreign Fighters), JUST SECURITY (Nov. 12, 2014), https://www.justsecurity.org
/17308/paths-accountability-crimes-syria-iraq-including-icc-jurisdiction-foreign-fighters/ (noting that
the ICC would have jurisdiction over “foreign fighters”).
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cases involving Syrian nationals, because the alleged crimes occurred in
Syria, on the territory of a non-member state, and the Syrian perpetrators
are not nationals of a member state.59 As mentioned above, the United
Nations Security Council can refer any case to the ICC; in the case of Syria,
however, Russia and China have already exercised their respective veto
powers over a proposed resolution referring the Syrian situation to the
ICC.60 Thus, the ICC is of limited utility in the Syrian context, as it can
only assume jurisdiction over cases involving foreign fighters who are
nationals of ICC member states.
This relative lack of accountability mechanisms for Syria—as detailed
above, in the current situation, where the only viable accountability model
is national prosecutions of perpetrators in the courts of third countries
which are willing and able to take such remote cases—has led the General
Assembly to envision a more creative solution. Thus, in December 2016,
the General Assembly passed a resolution creating a Mechanism for Syria.61
The section below will discuss the Mechanism’s main features and will
assess whether the Mechanism can lead toward accountability in Syria.
IV.

IIIM

As mentioned above, the United Nations General Assembly created a
Mechanism for Syria in December 2016.62 The Mechanism is not a
tribunal, and its purpose instead is to collect and preserve evidence, which
will later be shared with relevant international and national tribunals that
may in the future prosecute those responsible for crimes committed in
Syria.63 The Mechanism’s mandate is to focus on the most serious crimes:
genocide; crimes against humanity; and war crimes.64 The Mechanism will
be located in Geneva, and it will be staffed with an international judge or
prosecutor and renown experts in international criminal law.65 The
Mechanism’s primary purpose will be to collect and organize evidence

59.

Id.

60.

Id.

61.
Syria: UN General Assembly Adopts Resolution on War Crimes Investigations, HUM.
RTS. WATCH (Dec. 21, 2016, 5:15 PM), https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/12/21/syria-un-general-assemb
ly-adopts-resolution-war-crimes-investigations.
62.

Id.

63.

Id.

64.
Zeid Ra’ad Al Hussein, International, Impartial and Independent Mechanism on
International Crimes Committed in the Syrian Arab Republic, UNITED NATIONS HUM. RTS. OFF. HIGH
COMMISSIONER (Feb. 27, 2017), http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?News
ID=21241.
65.

Id.
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(both inculpatory and exculpatory), which will in the future be shared with
competent tribunals and which will contribute toward future prosecutions of
perpetrators of Syrian atrocities.66 The Mechanism, however, will not share
information with jurisdictions and authorities which impose the death
penalty, and/or which do not abide by basic international human rights
standards, such as the right to a fair trial.67 According to one set of
commentators, “[t]he Mechanism is an important addition to the
international justice landscape” which may “provide a bridge between the
contemporaneous collection of evidence and its use in trials that may take
place years or even decades later.”68 Overall, the Mechanism’s ultimate
goal “is to ensure justice for the victims of these crimes and for all the
Syrian people affected by the violence.”69
For now, according to Kenneth Roth, executive director of Human
Rights Watch, the Mechanism is a “prosecutor without a tribunal,” and it
remains to be seen how the evidence it collects may be used in the future,
and whether the Mechanism will ultimately contribute toward the
protection of human rights.70 Because of Russian and Chinese veto,
Security Council has been deadlocked and it is unlikely that the Syrian
situation will be referred to the ICC in the near future, or that an ad hoc
tribunal will be established for Syria.71 Thus, it appears more likely that the
Mechanism will share evidence and information with national jurisdictions,
prosecuting perpetrators of Syrian atrocities under a universal jurisdiction
model.
In sum, it may be argued that the Mechanism is the first step necessary
toward protecting human rights in Syria, by collecting evidence necessary
toward successful future prosecutions and by initiating the accountability
conversation regarding Syria within the international community. As
mentioned above, in light of the Russian and Chinese veto, it is unlikely
that the Security Council will refer the Syrian situation to the ICC in the
near future.72 It is more likely that the Syrian situation will be investigated
within national jurisdictions. If President Assad were to step down and if a
new regime were to be elected or otherwise installed in Syria, a new hybrid
tribunal could be established for Syria. Such a hybrid tribunal in Syria
66.

Id.

67.

Hohler & Pederson, supra note 4.

68.

Id.

69.
Kailey Love, Will U.N.’s Accountability Mechanism Provide Justice in Syria?, WASH.
REP. ON MIDDLE E. AFF., https://www.wrmea.org/jordan/lebanon/syria/will-u.n.s-accountabilitymechan
ism-provide-justice-in-syria.html (last visited Jan. 23, 2018).
70.

Reinl, supra note 35.

71.

Trahan, supra note 58.

72.

Id.
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could build upon the legacy of the Special Court for Sierra Leone and the
Special Tribunal for Lebanon, and it could contribute further toward the
protection of human rights in the international community. The Mechanism
is likely to work with both national jurisdictions as well as with any Syria
hybrid tribunal in the future; it is, therefore, the first important step toward
accountability for Syria.
V.

CONCLUSION

With respect to Syria, it may be that the war ends in regime transition
and that members of the Assad leadership face accountability, either in the
ICC (assuming no Russian or Chinese veto), or in an ad hoc tribunal, set up
by the Security Council or negotiated by the new Syrian leadership and the
international community. If Assad were to step down from power, a new
Syrian government could also choose to initiate national prosecutions, or to
establish a specialized war crimes chamber to try those responsible for the
most serious atrocities during the Syrian civil war. Because many
accountability options remain open in the future, the ongoing quest for
peace in Syria should not sacrifice accountability. Peace negotiators should
focus instead on ending violence without promising blanket immunity to
those involved in the conflict, thereby leaving open the option of nearfuture accountability, through domestic or international prosecutions.
Peace and justice can be sequenced properly in Syria, as both of these goals
are fundamental to the achievement of global peace and stability.

THE INCONSEQUENTIAL CHOICE-OF-LAW
QUESTION POSED BY JESNER V. ARAB BANK
Beth Van Schaack*
In Jesner v. Arab Bank,1 the United States (U.S.) Supreme Court has
taken up the question of whether victims of human rights abuses can sue
corporations and other legal entities for violations of the law of nations
under the Alien Tort Statute (ATS).2 In Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum
Co. (Kiobel I), the Second Circuit ruled that they cannot because—by its
analysis—international law does not affirmatively provide for corporate tort
liability.3 By contrast, all the other circuits to consider the issue have ruled
or assumed that such cases can go forward in U.S. courts,4 yielding a
decidedly lopsided circuit split.5 Indeed, the Second Circuit itself is now

*
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Sciences at Stanford University and was the Leah Kaplan Visiting Professor in Human Rights at
Stanford Law School (2014–2017). She submitted an amicus curiae brief on behalf of Nuremberg
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1.
In re Arab Bank, PLC Alien Tort Statute Litig., 808 F.3d 144 (2d Cir. 2015); see also
Jesner v. Arab Bank, SCOTUSBLOG, http://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/jesner-v-arab-bankplc/ (last visited Oct. 29, 2017).
2.
The First Congress enacted the ATS as part of the Judiciary Act of 1789, which created
the federal court system; it states that “district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action
by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States.”
Alien’s Action for Tort, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006).
3.
Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111 (2d Cir. 2010) (“Kiobel I”), aff’d on
other grounds. See also Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 569 U.S. 108 (2013) (“Kiobel II”).
4.
See, e.g., In re Arab Bank, 808 F.3d at 151 (“[O]n the issue of corporate liability under the
ATS, Kiobel I now appears to swim alone against the tide.”); Al Shimari v. CACI Premier Tech., Inc.,
758 F.3d 516, 530–31 (4th Cir. 2014); Doe v. Nestle USA, Inc., 766 F.3d 1013, 1022 (9th Cir. 2014),
aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 527 App’x 7 (D.C. Cir. 2013); Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 654 F.3d 11, 57
(D.C. Cir. 2011); Romero v. Drummond Co., Inc., 552 F.3d 1303, 1315 (11th Cir. 2008).
5.
There is some irony to the fact that the Second Circuit now stands as the only circuit to
hold firm to this conclusion. In an era when its judges were less hostile to ATS litigation, it was the
Second Circuit that launched the corporate cases in the first place. In Kadic v. Karadžiü, 70 F.3d 232
(2d Cir. 1995), the defendant Radovan Karadžiü argued that he could not be sued for many of the causes
of action alleged because he was a private citizen. Curiously, he also argued—in an inconsistent
alternative—that he was head of state of the self-proclaimed Republika Srpska and was thus entitled to
immunity. In an opinion evincing a sophisticated understanding of international law, the Second Circuit
concluded that some causes of action under international law require a showing of state action as an
element of the offense—such as the prohibition against torture—whereas others are undifferentiated and
apply equally to non-state actors—such as the prohibitions against genocide and crimes against
humanity. Id. at 239–40. Indeed, U.S. courts have also made clear that still other international rules are
oriented towards non-state actors, such as the prohibitions on terrorism and piracy. See Ali Shafi v.
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subject to an intra-circuit split, with subsequent panels “grudgingly”
following Kiobel I, while urging their brethren to abandon an increasingly
isolated position.6
Inherent to the dispute at hand is an a priori choice-of-law issue:
Should courts look to international law or federal common law to resolve
the question presented? While the Supreme Court established that
international law provides the elements of plaintiffs’ substantive cause of
action in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain,7 the Court did not specify which body
of law governs ancillary rules of decision8—such as the standards for aiding
and abetting liability9 or the rules governing statutes of limitation, damages,
standing, personal jurisdiction, and the like.10 As such, some judges have
looked to federal common law (or to U.S. choice-of-law rules) to answer
these questions that go beyond the strict contours of the plaintiff’s cause of
action.11 Although contentious, this choice-of-law debate proves to be
inconsequential when it comes to the availability of corporate tort liability,
given that both bodies of law point in the same direction and hand victory,
Palestinian Auth., 642 F.3d 1088, 1096 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (“[P]iracy in violation of the law of nations is
by definition perpetrated by nonstate actors.”) (citing United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. 153, 163, n.h
(1820)). By recognizing that some international law prohibitions govern private actors, the Second
Circuit effectively opened the door to suits against corporate entities.
6.
In connection with the denial of en banc review in Jesner, several Second Circuit judges
indicated their disappointment that the Circuit “yet again missed an opportunity to correct the panel’s
majority opinion” in Kiobel I. In re Arab Bank, Plc Alien Tort Statute Litigation, 822 F.3d 34, 40–41
(2d Cir. 2016) (Pooler, J., dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc). Subsequent Second Circuit
panels have considered themselves bound by Kiobel I per Second Circuit practice. See Jones v.
Coughlin, 45 F.3d 677, 679 (2d Cir. 1995) (per curiam) (holding that a decision by a panel of the
Second Circuit “is binding unless and until it is overruled by the Court en banc or the Supreme Court”).
7.
Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 712 (2004) (holding that the ATS enables
“federal courts to hear claims in a very limited category defined by the law of nations and recognized at
common law”).
8.
See Doe v. Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d 932, 965–66 (9th Cir. 2002) (Reinhardt, J.,
concurring), vacated by Doe v. Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d 978 (9th Cir. 2003) (making a distinction
between the underlying tort of summary execution alleged to have been committed by the Burmese
military from the “ancillary legal question” of the corporate defendant’s liability as an accessory). That
case settled while the en banc review was pending.
9.
See, e.g., Chimène I. Keitner, Conceptualizing Complicity in Alien Tort Cases, 60
HASTINGS L.J. 61, 64 (2008) (arguing that the aiding and abetting standard is a conduct-regulating norm
that should be governed by customary international law under Sosa in contradistinction to other
secondary rules of decision governed by domestic law).
10.
Paul L. Hoffman & Daniel A. Zaheer, The Rules of the Road: Federal Common Law and
Aiding and Abetting Under the Alien Tort Claims Act, 26 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 47, 52
(2003) (noting disagreement around how to identify the body of law that should answer “such nuts and
bolts questions”).
11.
See, e.g., Khulumani v. Barclay National Bank Ltd., 504 F.3d 254, 284 (2d Cir. 2007) (per
curiam) (Hall, J., concurring); Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, 487 F.3d 1193, 1202 (9th Cir. 2007).
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at least in this round, to the plaintiffs. In other words, regardless of whether
courts look to U.S. law or to international law, the ATS supports corporate
tort liability.
By way of background, in Sosa, the Supreme Court ended a
longstanding academic debate by characterizing the ATS as “in terms only
jurisdictional.”12 Nonetheless, it found that the statute provides a “limited,
implicit sanction to entertain the handful of international law cum common
law claims understood in 1789.”13 The Court then set out the methodology
to be employed to determine which causes of action are actionable under
the ATS: claims brought under the ATS must “rest on a norm of
international character accepted by the civilized world and defined with a
specificity comparable to the features of the 18th-century paradigms,” such
as piracy, offenses against ambassadors, or violations of safe conduct.14
The choice-of-law exercise presented by Jesner turns in part on how courts
should construe an enigmatic footnote in Sosa.15 There, the Court noted
that whether an international norm satisfies this test gives rise to a “related
consideration”: “whether international law extends the scope of liability for
a violation of a given norm to the perpetrator being sued, if the defendant is
a private actor such as a corporation or individual.”16
Corporate defendants and their supporters contend that international
law speaks to the question of who or what kind of actor can violate
international law. Accordingly, it is argued, the footnote dictates that the
international law delict invoked by the plaintiff must itself be specifically
addressed to corporate defendants.17 This is the position adopted by the
Kiobel I majority, which ruled that international law must affirmatively
extend liability to “a particular class of defendant[s], such as
corporations,”18 and that corporate liability did not meet the Sosa standard
because “[n]o corporation has ever been subject to any form of liability
(whether civil, criminal, or otherwise) under the customary international

12.

Sosa, 542 U.S. at 712.

13.

Id.

14.

Id. at 694, 725. See also id. at 732 (reaffirming standard).

15.

Id. at 732.

16.

Sosa, 542 U.S. at 732.

17.
Brief for Respondent On Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit, 15, 21, Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC, 137 S.Ct. 1432 (2017) (No. 16–499) http://www
.scotusblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/16-499-bs.pdf (last visited Jan. 25, 2018) [hereinafter
Jesner].
18.
Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111, 127 (2d Cir. 2010) (“Kiobel I”), aff’d
on other grounds.
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law of human rights.”19 This camp makes much of the fact that there are
few international fora that assert jurisdiction—criminal or civil—over legal
persons for breaches of international law and point in particular to the
unsurprising fact that none of the international criminal tribunals convened
from Nuremberg onward has exercised criminal jurisdiction over
corporations for international law violations.20
By contrast, plaintiffs and their supporters interpret footnote 20 to be
making a distinction between private actors and state actors—given that
some international law norms require a showing of state action as a
constitutive element of the offense21—rather than suggesting that there are
different classes of private actors that may not be amenable to suit for any
cause of action at all. They argue that, in any case, the question of which
private actors may be subject to tort liability should be resolved according
to standard domestic law tort principles, on the theory that while
international law addresses substantive standards of conduct, it leaves
procedural modes of enforcement to individual states.22 In Kiobel I, Judge
Leval urged this approach in his concurrence, reasoning that international
law contains less developed liability rules and so “leaves the manner of
enforcement . . . almost entirely to individual nations.”23 Reasoning that
ATS cases are—at base—tort cases,24 plaintiffs often argue that default
federal common law rules governing the tort liability of corporations and

19.

Id. at 148.

20.

Jesner, supra note 17, at 24–26.

21.
For example, the conventional prohibition against torture requires a showing that the
prohibited acts are “inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public
official or other person acting in an official capacity.” Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel,
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment art. 1, Dec. 10, 1984, S. Treaty Doc. No. 100-20, 1465
U.N.T.S. 85. See Kadic v. Karadžiü, 70 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 1995); see also Ali Shafi v. Palestinian Auth.,
642 F.3d 1088, 1096 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
22.
An analogy can be drawn to choice-of-law rules in diversity actions in the United States.
See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 471–72 (1965) (discussing importance of differentiating between
rules that modify substantive rights and those that affect the administration of remedies in the context of
choice-of-law determinations in federal diversity cases); see also id. at 475 (Harlan, J., concurring)
(arguing courts should consider whether “the choice of rule would substantially affect those primary
decisions respecting human conduct which our constitutional system leaves to state regulation”).
23.

Kiobel I, 621 F.3d at 152 (Leval, J., concurring).

24.
See Richard Herz, Symposium: It’s Just a Tort Case, SCOTUSBLOG (July 27, 2017, 2:24
PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2017/07/symposium-just-tort-case/.
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other legal entities should apply25 absent compelling reasons for
departure.26
The Second Circuit’s observation about the lack of corporate liability
before international criminal courts is, of course, largely true,27 although
there are some important exceptions. Starting with the World War II
(WWII) era, defendants overlook the fact that the Nuremberg Tribunal did
exercise a form of enterprise liability by declaring certain Nazi
organizations to be criminal.28 By contrast, today’s ad hoc international
criminal tribunals for the former Yugoslavia, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, East
Timor, and Cambodia only assert criminal jurisdiction over natural persons

25.
Plaintiffs also point out that the same result is reached with a strictly textual read of the
ATS, which identifies the class of plaintiffs who can sue but not the class of defendants that can be sued,
implying that there are no limits on the latter.
26.
In addition to being amenable to tort liability as a matter of course, corporations can
conceivably be charged for many international crimes codified in U.S. law. For example, Title 18’s
prohibitions on torture, war crimes, and recruiting child soldiers encompass legal persons in addition to
natural persons. See, e.g., Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal years 1994 & 1995, 18 U.S.C. §
2340 (1994) (“Whoever outside the United States commits or attempts to commit torture shall . . . .”);
War Crimes, 18 U.S.C. § 2441(a) (2006) (holding accountable “whoever . . . commits a war crime”); 18
U.S.C. § 2442 (2008) (applying to “whoever knowingly . . . .”); Words Denoting Number, Gender, and
So Forth, 1 U.S.C. § 1 (2012) (defining “whoever” to include “corporations, companies, associations,
firms, partnerships . . . as well as individuals”).
27.
There is no international tribunal dedicated to holding either corporations or natural
persons civilly liable for international law violations. The International Court of Justice exercises civil
jurisdiction, but only over claims between states. See Statute of International Court of Justice, 1945
I.C.J, ch.II, at art. 34 (Oct. 24) [hereinafter I.C.J.]. Likewise, the human rights treaty bodies call states
to account, although signatories do have obligations not only to “respect” human rights but also to
“ensure” that individuals within their territories and jurisdiction enjoy those rights, which allows states
to be held liable for insufficiently preventing or responding to harm caused by non-state actors,
including corporations. See Human Rights Committee, The Nature of the General Legal Obligation
Imposed on States Parties to the Covenant, General Comment No. 31 [80], ¶ 8, 18th Sess., U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/21/Rev. 1/Add.13 (May 26, 2004) (“[T]he positive obligations on States Parties to ensure
Covenant rights will only be fully discharged if individuals are protected by the State, not just against
violations of Covenant rights by its agents, but also against acts committed by private persons or entities
that would impair the enjoyment of Covenant rights in so far as they are amenable to application
between private persons or entities.”).
28.
See TELFORD TAYLOR, THE ANATOMY OF THE NUREMBERG TRIALS 501 (1st ed. 1992)
(discussing criminal indictment of Nazi organizations). The World War II-era tribunals also prosecuted
corporate principals for international crimes and dissolved a number of corporations that participated in
or benefited from such criminality in order to pay reparations to victims. In obiter dicta, the tribunals
made clear that they considered corporations to be capable of violating international law and to being
held accountable for doing so. See generally Brief for Nuremberg Scholars as Amici Curiae Supporting
Petitioners, Jesner v. Arab Bank, No. 16-499 (U.S. June 27, 2017), http://www.scotusblog.com/wpcontent/uploads/2017/07/16-499-tsac-Nuremberg-Scholars-rev.pdf.
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given the terms of their constitutive statutes.29 In dicta, however, these
tribunals have on occasion indicated that they consider legal persons—such
as paramilitary organizations and business entities—to be capable of
violating international law.30 For example, the International Criminal
Tribunal for Rwanda clearly considered Radio Télévision Libre des Mille
Collines to be responsible for instigating genocide, although it could only
convict individual principals of the organization due to constraints
contained within its statute.31
Drafters of the treaty establishing the permanent International
Criminal Court (ICC) considered empowering the ICC to prosecute
corporations involved in international crimes in connection with a proposal
tabled by France.32 However, as explained in an amicus curiae brief by the
former head of the United States delegation to the treaty drafting
negotiations,33 states could not reach consensus on how such liability would
operate and what penalties would follow a finding of guilt, particularly
given the high degree of variation within national systems, the fact that
imprisonment would be the primary form of punishment available to the
Court, and the short time allotted for the negotiations.34 As a result, the
ICC can exercise jurisdiction only over natural persons per Article 25.35
During the negotiations, there was no consideration given to corporate civil
liability, given that such a concept was outside the scope of the project to
construct an international criminal court.36 In the process by which the ICC
29.
See, e.g., Updated Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia art. 6, May 25, 1993, 32 I.L.M. 1192.
30.
The International Court of Justice recognizes that corporations can have an “independent
and distinct legal personality” under international law. See Ahmadou Sadio Diallo (Guinea v. Dem.
Rep. Congo), Judgment, 2007 I.C.J. 582, at 605 (May 24); Barcelona Traction, Light & Power Co., Ltd.
(Belg. v. Spain), 1970 I.C.J. 3, at 33–39 (Feb. 5) (looking to municipal (domestic) law to determine
Belgium’s standing to sue on behalf of Belgian shareholders of a corporation injured during the Spanish
Civil War). The U.S. Supreme Court has cited Barcelona Traction in a case involving expropriation
claims arising under international law brought by a corporation. First Nat’l City Bank v. Banco Para el
Comercio Exterior de Cuba, 462 U.S. 611, 623, 630 (1983).
31.
Nahimana et al. v. The Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR 99-52-A, Judgement, ¶ 498 (Int’l Crim.
Trib. for Rwanda Nov. 28, 2007) (discussing RTLM’s instigation of genocide).
32.
See Harmen van der Wilt, Corporate Criminal Responsibility for International Crimes:
Exploring the Possibilities, 12 CHINESE J. INT’L L. 43, 43 (2013) (discussing French proposal).
33.
Brief for Ambassador David J. Sheffer, Northwestern University Pritzker School of Law,
as Amicus Curiae In Support of the Petitioners, 8–10, Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC, 137 S.Ct. 1432 (June
26, 2017), http://www.scotusblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/07/16-499-tsac-davidjscheffer.pdf
[hereinafter Sheffer].
34.
35.
17, 1998).
36.

Id.
See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, A/CONF.183/9, art. 25, ¶ 1 (July
Sheffer, supra note 33, at 10.
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and other international criminal tribunals were established, there was never
a question of whether corporate liability—civil or criminal—was legally
available to states; the decision to exclude reference to corporate liability
was based upon logistical and policy concerns, rather than the existence of
any legal impediment. Nonetheless, as states have ratified the treaty that
created the ICC, they have incorporated a range of international crimes into
their domestic legal frameworks and made them applicable to corporate
entities in addition to natural persons.37
The Special Tribunal for Lebanon offers an interesting
counterexample of an international court asserting criminal jurisdiction over
legal entities. Although devoted to prosecuting acts of terrorism under
Lebanese law, it recently held that it had inherent jurisdiction over juridical
persons accused of contempt—specifically media outlets that released the
names of protected witnesses—because the operative provision (Rule 60
bis) applied to all “persons.”38 That conviction was confirmed by the
Appeals Chamber, which issued an exhaustive and erudite survey of
international and domestic law that concluded that corporate liability, both
civil and criminal, is a general principle of law,39 one of the sources of
international law recognized by the International Court of Justice40 and the
United States Supreme Court.41 Further, the African Union has recently
promulgated a draft statute for an African Court of Justice and Human
Rights, not yet in force, that would include a penal chamber with
jurisdiction over legal persons (Article 46C), upon “proof that it was the
policy of the corporation to do the act which constituted the offense.”42
The absence of international criminal jurisdiction over corporations
does not signify that international law does not govern corporate conduct.
Bilateral43 and multilateral treaties increasingly govern corporate conduct or
37.
See, e.g., W. Cory Wanless, Corporate Liability for International Crimes Under Canada’s
Crimes Against Humanity and War Crimes Act, 7 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 201 (2009).
38.
New TV S.A.L. & Ms. Karma Al Khayat, 2 Oct. 2014, Case No. STL 1405/PT/AP/AR126.1, ¶¶ 36–42 (Leb.).
39.

Id. ¶¶ 51–67.

40.

I.C.J., supra note 27, at art. 38.

41.
First Nat’l City Bank v. Banco Para el Comercio Exterior de Cuba, 462 U.S. 611, 623
(1983); see also id. at 628–29 (holding that “the principles governing this case are common to both
international law and federal common law, which in these circumstances is necessarily informed both by
international law principles and by articulated congressional policies”).
42.
See Protocol on Amendments to the Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of Justice
and Human Rights, June 27, 2014, A.U. Doc. No. Assembly/AU/Dec.529 (XXIII).
43.
See Tara Van Ho, International Legal Personality of Corporations: How Investment Law
Answers the Supreme Court Question in Jesner, JUST SECURITY (Oct. 2, 2017), https://www.justsecurity
.org/45543/international-legal-personality-corporations-investment-law-answers-supreme-courtquestion
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empower and/or oblige their signatories to implement a full range of
remedies for corporate breaches. Most importantly for the Jesner case is
the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of
Terrorism. This treaty explicitly states at Article 5 that, “[e]ach State Party
. . . shall take the necessary measures to enable a legal entity located in its
territory or organized under its laws to be held liable when a person
responsible for the management or control of that legal entity has, . . .
committed an offen[s]e” in violation of the Convention, including by
funding terrorist activities.44 At Article 18, the treaty also requires member
states to prohibit the “illegal activities of persons and organizations that
knowingly encourage, instigate, organize or engage in the commission” of
acts in violation of the treaty.45 Upon ratification, the United States
implemented this treaty with the passage of the Anti-Terrorism Act,46
invoked in the Jesner case by the U.S. citizen plaintiffs who prevailed in
their action at trial following the severance of their case from that of the
alien plaintiffs.47 In the immediate aftermath of the attacks of September
11th, the United Nations (U.N.) Security Council, in an effort sponsored by
the United States government, adopted a binding resolution obliging all
states to implement the suite of terrorism treaties already in existence,
including the Terrorist Financing Convention, by inter alia criminalizing
acts of terrorism and terrorist financing within their domestic legal
systems.48 The terms of the Terrorist Financing Treaty are now effectively
binding on all U.N. member states by virtue of their U.N. Charter
obligations to implement Chapter VII resolutions.49
Treaties addressed to other international and transnational law
violations also mandate the imposition of corporate liability and a range of
penalties, reflecting the role business entities play in perpetrating and
enabling these violations. Examples include treaties devoted to combating
-jesner/ (noting that international investment law delineates international rights and responsibilities for
corporations, which, as a matter of public international law, are distinct from their shareholders).
44.
International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, Dec. 9, 1999,
2178 U.N.T.S. 197 (adopted by the General Assembly in Resolution 54/109 of 9 Dec. 1999).
45.
Id. at art. 18. See also Council of Europe Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism art.
10, May 16, 2005, C.E.T.S. No. 196.
46.

Civil Remedies, 18 U.S.C. § 2333 (2016).

47.
The case is Linde v. Arab Bank PLC, 97 F. Supp. 3d 287, 298–99 (E.D.N.Y. 2015). A
jury found for the plaintiffs in Linde; the bank settled before the district court could set damages.
Elements of the settlement are before the Second Circuit. See Nate Raymond & Joseph Ax, Arab Bank
Settles U.S. Litigation Over Attacks by Militants, REUTERS (Aug. 14, 2015, 3:11 PM), https://uk.reuters.
com/article/uk-arab-bank-jo-settlement-hamas/arab-bank-settles-u-s-litigation-over-attacks-by-militantsidUKKCN0QJ21A20150814.
48.

S.C. Res. 1373 ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1373 (Sept. 28, 2001).

49.

U.N. Charter art. 25.
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transnational organized crime,50 human and other forms of trafficking,51 and
bribery.52 Some of these treaties place enforcement obligations on states;
others impose international obligations on legal entities themselves.53
Likewise, a treaty dedicated to crimes against humanity being drafted by
the U.N. International Law Commission envisions corporate liability for
breaches.54 Together, these international instruments attest to the fact that
international law contains no categorical bar to the exercise of domestic
jurisdiction over corporations when they commit violations of international
law. Accordingly, states are free to adopt a variety of responses to
corporate malfeasance, including criminal sanctions and civil suits, such as
those proceeding under the ATS. As such, the fact that most international
war crimes tribunals do not assert criminal jurisdiction over legal entities is
not dispositive of the question presented in Jesner.
The choice-of-law decision is thus inconsequential. Whether domestic
law or international law governs the question presented in Jesner should
land the Court in the same place: Corporate tort liability is a standard
feature of domestic law and there is nothing in international law that would
prevent the United States from providing a tort remedy for corporate
breaches of international law under the ATS. That said, preserving
corporate liability will not result in an immediate win for the plaintiffs in
Jesner. There are a number of other grounds upon which this case could be
resolved for defendants, including on prudential political question or comity
grounds.55
Furthermore, the Kiobel II presumption against

50.
See, e.g., United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime, annex, 1
art. 10(2), Nov. 15, 2000, T.I.A.S. 13127, 2225 U.N.T.S. 209 (indicating that “[s]ubject to the legal
principles of the State Party, the liability of legal persons may be criminal, civil or administrative.” See
also Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and Their
Disposal art. 2(14), Mar. 22, 1989, 1673 U.N.T.S. 57 (defining “person” to include legal persons).
51.
See Council of Europe Convention on Action Against Trafficking in Human Beings art.
22, May 16, 2005, C.E.T.S. 197 (“Each Party shall adopt such legislative and other measures as may be
necessary to ensure that a legal person can be held liable for a criminal offence established in
accordance with this Convention.”).
52.
Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business
Transactions art. 2, Nov. 21, 1997, S. Treaty No. 105-43, 2802 U.N.T.S. 285 (“Each Party shall take
such measures as may be necessary, in accordance with its legal principles, to establish the liability of
legal persons for the bribery of a foreign public official.”).
53.
treaties).

See Flomo v. Firestone Nat. Rubber Co., 643 F.3d 1013, 1020 (7th Cir. 2013) (listing

54.
See Sean Murphy, Corporate Liability and Crimes Against Humanity, JUST SECURITY
(Oct. 24, 2017), https://www.justsecurity.org/46242/corporate-liability-crimes-humanity/.
55.
The fact that this case involves the ever-controversial Middle East should not prompt the
Court to craft an overly broad rule of corporate immunity; rather, the Court should leave it for the lower
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extraterritoriality remains to be considered and particularly the question of
whether automated transactions that route through the United States touch
and concern this country with sufficient force to displace the presumption
against extraterritoriality.56 An overly broad and categorical rule of
corporate immunity, without basis in domestic or international law, is a
poor vehicle to address any such concerns that might be raised by this
litigation. Rather, the Court should continue to leave the door open to
corporate liability under the ATS57 and remand to allow the lower courts to
address remaining arguments as to why plaintiffs should, or should not,
recover for the proven harm that has befallen them on account of the Arab
Bank’s actions.58

courts to consider the unique facts of the case, and particularly the importance of the U.S.-Jordan
bilateral relationship, through a case-specific application of such principles.
56.

Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 569 U.S. 108, 124–25 (2013) (“Kiobel II”).

57.
Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 729 (2004) (holding that “the judicial power
[under the ATS] should be exercised on the understanding that the door is still ajar subject to vigilant
doorkeeping, and thus open to a narrow class of international norms today.”).
58.

See Raymond & Ax, supra note 47.
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Abstract
Saudi human rights lawyer and pro-democracy activist Waleed Abu
Al-Khair was convicted for “inciting public opinion” and “harming the
reputation of the King.” As a result, he is currently serving a fifteen-year
prison sentence in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. This Article analyzes
Abu Al-Khair’s criminal conviction under international law, with a focus
on the universal standard for the protection of freedom of expression.
Specifically, this article explores international law rules that call for narrow
constructions of the offenses of “incitement” and “defamation” under
domestic law when dealing with public figures and public affairs. Portions
of this paper have been reproduced with updates from a prior 2016 Human
Rights Foundation Report, written by the same authors of this article. This
Article is intended to replace the 2016 Report previously published.***
I.

INTRODUCTION

This Article analyzes the case of Waleed Abu Al-Khair, a human
rights lawyer in Saudi Arabia, under international law. Abu Al-Khair was
convicted for “inciting public opinion” and “harming the reputation of the
King,” and is currently serving a fifteen-year prison sentence in Saudi
Arabia. Part I provides a succinct overview of the Kingdom of Saudi
Arabia’s legal system. Part II lays out the standards of international law for
the protection of freedom of expression as applicable to the case of Waleed
Abu Al-Khair. Part III analyzes all the actions and omissions by the
government of Saudi Arabia under international law. Part IV summarizes
the conclusions reached in each part of this Article.
II.

SAUDI ARABIA’S LEGAL SYSTEM

Saudi Arabia is an absolute monarchy,1 which bases its legal system2

***

See infra note 39.

1.

Article 5 of the Basic Law of Governance of Saudi Arabia states:
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on Shari’a law,3 as advocated by the Wahhabi movement.4 The Shari’a,
which translates as the law of God, is a set of moral precepts interpreted as
binding law primarily sourced in the Qur’an and the Sunnah of the
Prophet.5 Shari’a law regulates all areas of Muslim life,6 including family,
Monarchy is the system of rule in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Rulers of the
country shall be from amongst the sons of the founder King Abdulaziz bin
Abdulrahman Al-Faisal Al-Saud, and their descendants. The most upright among
them shall receive allegiance according to Almighty God's Book and His
Messenger's Sunna (Traditions) . . . Government in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia
derives its authority from the Book of God and the Sunna of the Prophet (PBUH),
which are the ultimate sources of reference for this Law and the other laws of the
State.
Basic Law of Governance of Saudi Arabia, art. 5 (adopted by decree) (1992) [hereinafter Basic Law of
Governance]; ANN BLACK ET AL., MODERN PERSPECTIVES ON ISLAMIC LAW 256 (2013). Saudi Arabia
is the “best model of the authoritarian view” of Shari’a law. BLACK ET AL., supra note 1.
2.
See SHARIA INCORPORATED: A COMPARATIVE OVERVIEW OF THE LEGAL SYSTEMS OF
TWELVE MUSLIM COUNTRIES IN PAST AND PRESENT 157 (Jan Michiel Otto ed., 2010) [hereinafter
SHARIA INCORPORATED].
It is often claimed that Saudi law is nothing but Islamic Shari’a. However,
supplemented by government-issued regulations concerning labor, commerce
companies and so forth, the law is more encompassing than at first glance. Also,
one cannot rule out the importance of tribal values and customs in Saudi society,
like in most Middle Eastern societies.
See BLACK ET AL., supra note 1, at 71 (“In the domestic law of some Muslim countries, such as Saudi
Arabia, Iran and Malaysia, Islam is either the principal source of law or a source of law and, therefore,
being a Muslim has significant legal consequences under these domestic legal systems”).
3.
See SHARIA INCORPORATED, supra note 2, at 23 (internal citation omitted) (“According to
Islamic jurisprudence, theology and historiography, the rules of sharia are based on the revelation by
God of his plan for mankind to the Prophet Muhammad until his death in 632. In order to interpret
God’s will from the available sources, religious scholars developed Islamic jurisprudence (fiqh) from the
eighth century onwards. The scholars (ulama) put God’s revelation into effect, drafting a scientific,
legal corpus of behavioural rules.” “There is no such thing as a, that is one, Islamic law, a text that
clearly and unequivocally establishes all the rules of a Muslim’s behaviour. There is a great divergence
of views, not just between opposing currents, but also between individual scholars within the legal
currents, of exactly what rules belong to Islamic law.”). See BLACK ET AL., supra note 1, at 10 (“the
assumption is that there are four major sources of Islamic law: the Quran, the Sunna, analogical
reasoning (qiyas) and consensus of opinion (ijma)”).
4.
The term “Wahhabi” derives from the religious scholar and jurist Muhammad ibn Abd alWahhab, (1703-1793) who “based his ideas on the works of the Salafi tradition within Islam,
particularly as [adopted] by two legal scholars, namely Ahmad ibn Hanbal, founder of the Hanbali
School of Law . . . . The Hanbali doctrine distinguishe[s] itself from other Sunni schools of law by its
strict adherence to the holy sources.” See SHARIA INCORPORATED, supra note 2, at 142. “The Wahhabi
interpretation of the Shari’a necessitates the abandonment of precedent and jurisprudence, providing
individual Saudi judges with wide discretion.” AMERICANS FOR DEMOCRACY & HUMAN RIGHTS IN
BAHRAIN, THE PRETENSE OF PROGRESS iii (2015) http://www.adhrb.org/wp-content/uploads/
2015/03/ADHRB_Pretense-of-Progress_v1_web.pdf [hereinafter PRETENSE OF PROGRESS].
5.

The Sunnah is defined as
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tort, contract, commercial, property, and criminal law. 7 In addition,
religious scholars have developed Islamic jurisprudence (“fiqh”) for all
matters that are not addressed in the Qu’ran and the Sunnah. 8 Islamic
jurisprudence provides an additional authoritative source to the Shari’a law
and is used by judges in their administration of justice.9
Unlike most Muslim majority states, Saudi Arabia has not codified the
Shari’a principles in local statutes or codes.10 Furthermore, Saudi Arabia
has no codified laws with the exception of the Basic Law of Governance
and additional regulations enacted by royal decrees.11 As a consequence,
most areas of the law, including criminal law, are regulated by religious
principles that are not embodied in a written legal instrument and are
therefore subject to the discretion of Saudi judges. Under the Wahhabi
doctrine, the law is subject to judicial interpretation of holy texts and
jurisprudence is based on a particular judge’s religious beliefs and personal
understanding of Islam.12 Saudi judges are not bound to resort to previous
decisions relating to similar cases.13 Therefore, neither the stare decisis nor
the jurisprudence constante doctrines are followed in Saudi Arabia.
[A] body of established customs and beliefs that make up a tradition. In Muslim
legal and religious thought, the term became associated more specifically with the
actions and sayings of the Prophet Muhammad. Inspired by God to act wisely
and in accordance with his will, Muhammad provided an example that
complements God's revelation as expressed in the Qur'an. His actions and
sayings became a model for Muslim conduct as well as a primary source of
Islamic law.
Sunnah, OXFORD ISLAMIC STUD. ONLINE, http://www.oxfordislamicstudies.com/article/opr/t243/e33
(last visited Jan. 20, 2018).
6.
See BLACK ET AL., supra note 1, at 243 (in “Islamic monarchies, like Saudi Arabia, . . .
Sharia is pivotal to all aspects of law and governance”).
7.
Toni Johnson & Mohammed Aly Sergie, Islam: Governing Under Sharia, COUNCIL ON
FOREIGN REL., https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/islam-governing-under-sharia (last updated July 25,
2014).
8.
See ABU AMEENAH BILAL PHILIPS, THE EVOLUTION OF FIQH (ISLAMIC LAW & THE
MADH-HABS) 8 (1990), https://d1.islamhouse.com/data/en/ih_books/single/en_evolution_of_fiqh.pdf.
9.
See Law of the Judiciary, ROYAL EMBASSY SAUDI ARABIA, art. 1, https://www
.saudiembassy.net/law-judiciary (last visited Jan. 20, 2018) (in the administration of justice judges
should apply the “provisions of Sharia and laws in force,” which in this case include ‘fiqh.’).
10.
Nathan J. Brown, Why Won’t Saudi Arabia Write Down Its Laws?, FOREIGN POL’Y (Jan.
23, 2012, 2:10 PM), http://foreignpolicy.com/2012/01/23/why-wont-saudi-arabia-write-down-its-laws/.
11.
See SHARIA INCORPORATED, supra note 2, at 156 (“The King can promulgate regulations
(called nizams) where the Shari’a law does not provide a direct answer to certain legal questions but
where regulations are nevertheless necessary such as in commercial matters.”).
12.
(2008).
13.

See MAHA A. Z. YAMANI, POLYGAMY AND LAW IN CONTEMPORARY SAUDI ARABIA 139
Id.
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Due to the overt control of the executive power over prosecutors and
judges, the judiciary is not an independent authority in Saudi Arabia. 14
Furthermore, the wide authority given to Saudi judges in interpreting and
applying Islamic laws contribute to creating a judicial system characterized
by pervasive arbitrariness and abuse of power. This has led in practice to a
considerable amount of arbitrary prosecutions of peaceful activists and
dissenters on politically motivated charges.
Saudi Arabia is among the worst violators of basic human rights, in
particular the right to freedom of opinion and expression.15 The Kingdom
scored the worst possible grade in Freedom House’s 2015 Freedom in the
World index, which focuses on civil liberties and political rights in a
particular country. 16 Although the Kingdom has signed several United
Nations (U.N.) human rights treaties,17 it has firmly opposed the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) for allegedly being in contradiction
with the principles of the Shari’a Law.18
III.

STANDARD FOR THE PROTECTION OF THE RIGHT TO FREEDOM OF
EXPRESSION UNDER INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW

The legal framework for the freedom of expression, a fundamental
human right, is firmly established in the UDHR and the International
14.
See GAN BUS. ANTI–CORRUPTION PORTAL, SAUDI ARABIA CORRUPTION REPORT (2016),
https://www.business-anti-corruption.com/country-profiles/saudi-arabia.
15.
Arch Puddington & Tyler Roylance, Anxious Dictators, Wavering Democracies: Global
Freedom Under Pressure, FREEDOM HOUSE (2016), https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world2016/overview-essay-anxious-dictators-wavering-democracies.
16.
Freedom in the World—Saudi Arabia (2015), FREEDOM HOUSE, https://freedomhouse.org/
report/freedom-world/2015/saudi-arabia#.VSWKSktN1Zg (last visited Jan. 20, 2018).
17.
See, e.g., International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination, Mar. 7, 1966, 660 U.N.T.S. 195; Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination
against Women, Concluding Comments of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against
Women, Saudi Arabia, 40th Sess., U.N. Doc CEDAW/C/SAU/CO/2 (Apr. 8, 2008); Convention against
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S.
85; Convention on the Rights of the Child, Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3. (noting that the Kingdom
ratified these conventions with reservations).
18.
See Jonathan Russell, Human Rights: The Universal Declaration vs. The Cairo
Declaration, LSE MIDDLE E. CTR. BLOG (Dec. 12, 2010), http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/mec/2012/12/10/1569/.
Most Muslim-majority countries including Egypt, Iran and Pakistan signed the
UDHR in 1948, but crucially Saudi Arabia, where the King must comply with the
Shari’a and Qur’an, did not sign the declaration, arguing that it violated Islamic
law and criticising it for failing to take into consideration the cultural and
religious context of non-Western countries.
See also id. (explaining that Saudi Arabia refused to sign the UDHR believing that it violated the Qur'an
and Sharia law).
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Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR).19 One hundred and sixtynine countries, excluding Saudi Arabia, are parties to the ICCPR. 20
Additionally, Saudi Arabia is both a member of the U.N. and the U.N.
Human Rights Council (UNHRC) and is thus bound to promote and
encourage respect and human rights for all. 21 In fact, the rights and
freedoms provided in the ICCPR are inspired by the principles proclaimed
in the Charter of the U.N., which binds member states to “promote
universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental
freedoms,”22 pursuing the “ideal of free human beings enjoying civil and
political freedom”23 in accordance with the UDHR.
The freedom of expression maintains universal recognition, evidenced
by its inclusion in every regional human rights treaty, including Article 10
of the European Convention on Human Rights, 24 Article 13 of the
American Convention on Human Rights, 25 and Article 9 of the African
Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights.26

19.
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171
[hereinafter ICCPR]; G.A. Res. 217A (III), art. 19, Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Dec. 10,
1948).
20.
See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, UNITED NATIONS TREATY
COLLECTION, ch. IV, https://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=IND&mtdsg_no=IV-4&chap
ter=4&lang=en (last visited Jan. 20, 2018).
21.

G.A. Res. 16/18, at 1 (Apr. 12, 2011).

22.

ICCPR, supra note 19, pmbl.

23.
24.

Id.
Freedom of Expression:
1. Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include
freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without
interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers. This article shall not
prevent States from requiring the licensing of broadcasting, television or cinema
enterprises.
2. The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and
responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or
penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society, in
the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the
prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the
protection of the reputation or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of
information received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and
impartiality of the judiciary.

Freedom of Expression, Eur. Conv. on H.R. art. 10, ¶¶ 1–2.
25.

Freedom of Thought and Expression:
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Similarly, Saudi Arabia maintains obligations under the regional
human rights framework. Article 32 of the Arab Charter on Human Rights
holds that the “Charter shall ensure the right to information, freedom of
opinion and freedom of expression, freedom to seek, receive and impart
information by all means, regardless of frontiers.” 27 Saudi Arabia has
ratified the Arab Charter on Human Rights, 28 and must honor the
obligations it undertook under Article 32. Furthermore, Saudi Arabia has
been a member state of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation29 (OIC)

1. Everyone has the right to freedom of thought and expression. This right
includes freedom to seek, receive, and impart information and ideas of all kinds,
regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing, in print, in the form of art, or
through any other medium of one's choice.
2. The exercise of the right provided for in the foregoing paragraph shall not be
subject to prior censorship but shall be subject to subsequent imposition of
liability, which shall be expressly established by law to the extent necessary to
ensure:
a. respect for the rights or reputations of others; or
b. the protection of national security, public order, or public health or
morals.
3. The right of expression may not be restricted by indirect methods or means,
such as the abuse of government or private controls over newsprint, radio
broadcasting frequencies, or equipment used in the dissemination of information,
or by any other means tending to impede the communication and circulation of
ideas and opinions.
4. Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph 2 above, public entertainments
may be subject by law to prior censorship for the sole purpose of regulating
access to them for the moral protection of childhood and adolescence.
5. Any propaganda for war and any advocacy of national, racial, or religious
hatred that constitute incitements to lawless violence or to any other similar action
against any person or group of persons on any grounds including those of race,
color, religion, language, or national origin shall be considered as offenses
punishable by law.
Freedom of Thought and Expression, Am. Conv. on H.R., art. 13, ¶¶ 1–5.
26.
Afr. Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights art. 9, ¶¶ 1–2. (stating that “[e]very individual
shall have the right to receive information [and] [e]very individual shall have the right to express and
disseminate his opinion within the law”).
27.
League of Arab States, Arab Charter on Human Rights, May 22, 2004, reprinted in 12
INT’L HUM. RTS. REP. 893 (2005) (entered into force Mar. 15, 2008), translated in UNIV. OF MINN. HUM.
RTS. [hereinafter Arab Charter].
28.
See Mohamed Y. Mattar, Article 43 of the Arab Charter on Human Rights: Reconciling
National, Regional, and International Standards, 26 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 91, 93 (2013) (listing the
Middle East and North Africa Region (MENA) states that have thus far ratified the Arab Charter on
Human Rights).
29.
History, ORGANISATION ISLAMIC COOPERATION, https://www.oic-oci.org/page/?p_id=52
&p_ref=26&lan=en (last visited Jan. 20, 2018).
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since 1969. Among the objectives stated in the Charter of the OIC is the
promotion of “human rights and fundamental freedoms, good governance,
rule of law, democracy and accountability in Member States in accordance
with their constitutional and legal systems.”30
By adopting the ICCPR, the international community legally
recognized that “everyone shall have the right to freedom of expression;
this right shall include freedom to seek, receive and impart information and
ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing or in print,
in the form of art, or through any other media of his choice.” 31 This
includes the right of individuals to “hold opinions without interference.”32
The U.N. Human Rights Committee33, charged with compliance and
oversight of the ICCPR, stated in its observations on the subject that
“[f]reedom of opinion and freedom of expression are indispensable
conditions for the full development of the person. They are essential for
any society.” 34 The [Human Rights Committee] also affirmed that
“[f]reedom of expression is a necessary condition for the realization of the
principles of transparency and accountability that are, in turn, essential for
the promotion and protection of human rights.”35 In addition, respect of
freedom of opinion should be binding on all branches of the state and on all

The Organi[z]ation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) [formerly Organization of the
Islamic Conference] is the second largest inter-governmental organization after
the United Nations with a membership of 57 states [and] spreads [across] four
continents. The [OIC] is the collective voice of the Muslim world . . . [and
ensuring] to safeguard and protect the interests of the Muslim world in the spirit
of promoting international peace and harmony among various people of the world.
The [OIC] was established upon a decision of the historical summit which took
place in Rabat, Kingdom of Morocco on 12th Rajab 1389 Hijra (September 25,
1969) following the criminal arson of Al-Aqsa Mosque in occupied Jerusalem. Id.
30.

Charter of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, art. 1, ¶ 14.

31.

ICCPR, supra note 19, art. 19.

32.

Id.

33.
The United Nations Human Rights Committee is the body responsible for overseeing and
advising ratified States on the implementation of the ICCPR treaty principles within that State. As of
April 2012, 160 States had ratified the ICCPR. Introduction: Monitoring Civil and Political Rights,
UNITED NATIONS HUM. RTS. OFF. HIGH COMMISSIONER, http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/CCPR/
Pages/CCPRIntro.aspx (last visited Jan. 23, 2018).
34.
Human Rights Committee, Article 19: Freedoms of Opinion and Expression, General
Comment No. 34, ¶ 2, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/GC/34, (Sept. 12, 2011) [hereinafter General Comment No.
34].
35.

Id. ¶ 3.
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governmental authorities at whatever level. 36 Furthermore, the scope of
protection of this right “includes expression of views and opinions that
offend, shock or disturb.” 37 Therefore, and especially in a context of
political debate, restrictions to the right to freedom of opinion should not be
applied to “expression of opinion and dissent, religion or belief.”38
The international standard of freedom of expression protects against
abusive use of defamation laws aiming at criminalizing legitimate criticism
and stifling freedom of expression.
A. Defamation Under the International Standard of Freedom of
Expression

1.

General Prohibition Against the Criminalization of Speech

The Human Rights Committee stated that criminalizing the holding of
an opinion is incompatible with Article 19, Paragraph 1 of the ICCPR.39 In
fact, any efforts to coerce the holding or not holding of any opinion is
prohibited,40 and “harassment, intimidation or stigmatization of a person,
including arrest, detention, trial or imprisonment for reasons of the opinions
they may hold, constitutes a violation of Article 19, Paragraph 1.”41

2.

Special Prohibition Against the Criminalization of Speech
Directed at Public Officials

Under the universal standard of the ICCPR, defamation laws must not
stifle freedom of expression.42 For official defamation law to comply with
international law requirements, it must satisfy the following six-prong test.

36.
Human Rights Committee, Nature of the General Legal Obligation on States Parties to the
Covenant, General Comment No. 31, ¶ 4, 80th Sess., U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13 (Mar. 29,
2004).
37.
Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection
of the Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression, Frank La Rue, ¶ 37, 17th Sess., U.N. Doc.
A/HRC/17/27 (May 16, 2011) [hereinafter HRC 17th Sess.].
38.
Human Rights Council, Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the
Promotion and Protection of the Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression, Frank La Rue, ¶ 81, 14th
Sess., U.N. Doc. A/HRC/14/23 (Apr. 20, 2010) [HRC 14th Sess.].
39.
JAVIER EL-HAGE & CELINE ASSAF BOUSTANI, HUMAN RIGHTS FOUND., THE CASE OF
WALEED ABU AL-KHAIR 25 (2016).
40.
Id. See also Yong-Joo Kang v. Republic of Korea, Commc’n No. 878/1999, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/78/D/878/1999 (2003).
41.
EL-HAGE & BOUSTANI, supra note 39, at 25; see Andre Alphonse Mpaka-Nsusu v. Zaire,
Commc’n No. 157/1983, U.N. Doc. Supp. No. 40 (A/41/40) at 142 (1986) [hereinafter HRC Zaire].
42.

General Comment No. 34, supra note 34, ¶ 47.
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The first prong requires that laws on defamation are drafted in
accordance with the elements used to measure limitations on freedom of
expression, as set forth in Article 19, Section 3 of the ICCPR, namely the
legality, legitimacy, necessity and proportionality of those limitations. 43
First, restrictions on freedom of expression must be formally provided for
by law.44 In other words, they must be codified by a country’s statutes.
Moreover, they must not be overbroad and must be precise enough that it is
clear what particular types of behaviors are precluded by the law.45 Second,
those limitations must emanate from a need to protect a legitimate state
interest.46 Recognized state interests include protecting the rights of others,
maintaining national security, ensuring public order and health, and/or
preserving morals.47 Third, restrictions on freedom of expression must be
necessary.48 In other words, a restriction should only be applied if it is the
only way to achieve protection of the legitimate state interest.49 Finally,
restrictions on the freedom of expression must be proportional.50 Methods
of limiting expression, if necessary and for a legitimate purpose, must be
implemented in the narrowest possible manner. In other words, criminal or
civil penalties discouraging particular forms of expression must not be
overboard, 51 and must be proportionate to the interest being protected.
Proportionality requires applying the minimum criminal or civil sanction
possible to expressions that must be limited for necessary and legitimate
purposes.52
The second prong requires the defamatory statement in question to be
a fact statement instead of an opinion that is not subject to verification.53
The third prong imposes a heightened standard for public officials and

43.

Id. ¶¶ 24–25, 33–34.

44.

Id. ¶ 22.

45.

Id. ¶¶ 34–35.

46.

Id. ¶¶ 29, 34.

47.

General Comment No. 34, supra note 34, ¶ 21.

48.

Id. ¶ 33.

49.
Id. See also Human Rights Committee, Ballantyne, Davidson, and McIntryre v. Cananda,
Commc’n Nos. 359/1989 and 385/1989, ¶ 11.4, 47th Sess., U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/47/D/359/1989 and
385/1989/Rev.1, (Mar. 31, 1993) [hereinafter HRC 47th Sess.].
50.

General Comment No. 34, supra note 34, ¶ 34.

51.

Id.

52. See Human Rights Committee, Article 12 (Freedom of Movement), General Comment No.
27, ¶ 14, 67th Sess., U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.9, (Nov. 2, 1999); Human Rights Committee,
Rafael Marques de Morais v. Angola, Communication No. 1128/2002, ¶ 6.8, 83rd Sess., U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/83/D/1128/2002, (Mar. 14–Apr. 2005) [hereinafter HRC 83rd Sess.].
53.

See General Comment No. 34, supra note 34, ¶ 47.
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figures, because they are naturally subject to criticisms and opposition.54
The fourth prong requires the existence of actual malice in the defendant’s
actions in cases concerning public officials/figures. 55 The fifth prong
indicates that the burden of proof lies with the plaintiff.56 The sixth and last
prong sets forth the defenses available to the defendant—truth and public
interest of the subject matter.57
Throughout the years, the Human Rights Committee has developed a
stringent standard rejecting the criminalization of speech directed at public
officials and highlighting that citizens of any society must be able to freely
criticize their government “without fear of interference or punishment.”58
In the 2009 UNHRC Report, The U.N. Special Rapporteur on Freedom of
Opinion and Expression (Special Rapporteur) stated, “[m]echanisms for
criticism, particularly of political leaders, were deemed important so that
leaders were held to account [and that] [f]reedom of expression was not
limited to statements considered appropriate or beneficial.”59
Non-democratic countries around the world commonly abuse criminal
defamation laws to stifle freedom of expression, and silence the opposition
in circumstances of public debate. In this context, the Human Rights
Committee held that “the mere fact that forms of expression are considered
to be insulting to a public figure is not sufficient to justify the imposition of
penalties.” 60 Laws such as lèse majesté, desacato, 61 or offenses such as
disrespect for authority,62 disrespect for flags and symbols, defamation of
54.
See Human Rights Committee, Adimayo, M. Aduayom, Sofianou T. Diasso and Yawo S.
Dobou v. Togo, Communications Nos. 422/1990, 423/1990 & 424/1990, ¶ 7.4, 57th Sess., U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/51/D/422/1990, 423/1990 & 424/1990, (July 12, 1996) [hereinafter HRC 57th Sess.].
55.

See General Comment No. 34, supra note 34, ¶ 47.

56.
Human Rights Committee, Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties Under
Article 40 of the Covenant: United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, ¶ 25, 93rd Sess.,
U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/GBR/CO/6, (July 30, 2008) [hereinafter HRC 93rd Sess.].
57.
See General Comment No. 34, supra note 34, ¶ 47; Human Rights Committee, Pavel
Kozlov v. Belarus, Communication No. 1986/2010, ¶ 7.5, 111th Sess., U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/111/D/1986/2010, (July 7–25, 2014).
58.

HRC 57th Sess., supra note 54, ¶ 7.4.

59.
Human Rights Council, Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human
Rights and Follow-Up to the World Conference on Human Rights, ¶ 10, 10th Sess., U.N. Doc.
A/HRC/10/31/Add.3, (Jan. 16, 2009) [hereinafter HRC 10th Sess.].
60.

HRC 83rd Sess., supra note 52, ¶ 6.8.

61.
Human Rights Committee, Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties Under
Article 40 of the Covenant: Dominican Republic, ¶ 22, 71st Sess., U.N. Doc. CCPR/CO/71/DOM, (Apr.
26, 2001).
62.
Human Rights Committee, Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties Under
Article 40 of the Covenant: Honduras, ¶ 17, 88th Sess., U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/HND/CO/1, (Dec. 13,
2006).
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the head of state63 and the protection of the honor of public officials,64 and
any defamation laws should be carefully drafted and implemented to ensure
that they comply with the ICCPR. Furthermore, the Human Rights
Committee recommends that all such laws include the defense of truth and
“with regard to comments about public figures, consideration should be
given to avoiding penalizing or otherwise rendering unlawful untrue
statements that have been published in error but without malice.”65
In any case of defamation, imprisonment should never be an
appropriate penalty. The Special Rapporteur stated that “[s]anctions for
defamation should not be so large as to exert a chilling effect on freedom of
opinion and expression and the right to seek, receive and impart
information; penal sanctions, in particular imprisonment, should never be
applied.”66
Consequently, domestic defamation laws must be constructed
carefully to meet the international standards articulated by the six-prong test,
and so as to not infringe on free speech aimed at both holding public
officials accountable and promoting good governance. Criminal sanctions
for such speech will almost certainly render a state as non-compliant with
their international obligations.
B. Incitement Under the International Standard of Freedom of
Expression

1.

General Prohibitions Against Incitement and Hate Speech

Preventing incitement of violence and hate speech are important
tenants of international law as articulated by Article 20, Paragraph 2 of the
ICCPR. Article 20, Paragraph 2 states that “any advocacy of national,
racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination,
hostility or violence shall be prohibited by law” (the Incitement
Prohibition). 67 The Incitement Prohibition is “fully compatible with the
right of freedom of expression as contained in [A]rticle 19 [of the ICCPR],
63.
Human Rights Committee, Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties Under
Article 40 of the Covenant: Zambia, ¶ 25, 90th Sess., U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/ZMB/CO/3, (Aug. 9, 2007).
64.
Human Rights Committee, Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties Under
Article 40 of the Covenant: Costa Rica, ¶ 11, 91st Sess., U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/CRI/CO/5, (Nov. 16,
2007).
65.

HRC 93rd Sess., supra note 56, ¶ 25.

66.
Commission on Human Rights, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Protection and
Promotion of the Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression, Mr. Abid Hussain, ¶ 28(h), 55th Sess.,
U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1999/64 (Jan. 29, 1999).
67.
Human Rights Instruments, General Comment No. 11: Article 20, ¶ 2, 19th Sess., U.N.
Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.9 (Vol. I) (May 27, 2008) [hereinafter HRI 19th Sess.].
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the exercise of which carries with it special duties and responsibilities.”68
For it to become effective, “there ought to be a law making it clear that . . .
advocacy as described [is] contrary to public policy and providing for an
appropriate sanction in case of violation.”69
According to the Human Rights Committee, “restrictions on
expression which may fall within the scope of Article 20 must also be
permissible under Article 19, paragraph 3, which lays down requirements
for determining whether restrictions on expression are permissible.” 70
Under this provision, “[a]ny restriction on the right to freedom of
expression must cumulatively meet the following conditions: it must be
provided by law, it must address one of the aims set out in paragraph 3 (a)
and (b) of Article 19, and it must be necessary to achieve a legitimate
purpose.”71

68.
Id.; Human Rights Committee, Malcolm Ross v. Canada, Commc’n No. 736/1997, ¶ 11.6,
70th Sess., U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/70/D/736/1997, (Oct. 20, 2000) [hereinafter HRC 70th Sess.]. The HRC
recognized the overlapping nature of Articles 19 and 20, stating that it considered that restrictions on
expression which may fall within the scope of Article 20 must also be permissible under Article 19,
paragraph 3, which lays down requirements for determining whether restrictions on expression are
permissible. HRC 70th Sess., supra note 68, ¶ 11.6.
69.

HRI 19th Sess., supra note 67, ¶ 2.

70.

HRC 70th Sess., supra note 68, ¶ 10.6.

71.
Human Rights Committee, Robert Faurisson v. France, Communication No. 550/1993, ¶
9.4, 58th Sess., U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/58/D/550/1993, (Nov. 8, 1996); General Comment No. 34, supra
note 34, ¶ 12 (elaborating on the links between Articles 19 and 20 of the ICCPR:
50. Articles 19 and 20 are compatible with and complement each other. The acts
that are addressed in article 20 are all subject to restriction pursuant to article 19,
paragraph 3. As such, a limitation that is justified on the basis of article 20 must
also comply with article 19, paragraph 3.
51. What distinguishes the acts addressed in article 20 from other acts that may be
subject to restriction under article 19, paragraph 3, is that for the acts addressed in
article 20, the Covenant indicates the specific response required from the State:
their prohibition by law. It is only to this extent that article 20 may be considered
as lex specialis with regard to article 19.
52. It is only with regard to the specific forms of expression indicated in article 20
that States parties are obliged to have legal prohibitions. In every case in which
the State restricts freedom of expression it is necessary to justify the prohibitions
and their provisions in strict conformity with article 19.
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2.

Three-Prong Test to Determine the Validity of Measures
Implementing the Incitement Prohibition

Any restriction of freedom of expression implementing Article 20 of
the incitement prohibition requires compliance with the three-prong test set
forth in Article 19, paragraph 3.
The Human Rights Committee’s General Comment 34 breaks down
the elements of the three-prong test that must be met in order to impose
exceptional restrictions on freedom of expression. 72 The first prong
requires that laws are formally provided for in a way that they are
understandable to the public, allowing the public to conform their behavior
accordingly, and which are also capable of being applied in a consistent
way by those charged with their execution.73 The second prong requires
that laws be necessary for a legitimate purpose.74 If an alternate restriction
is capable of achieving the legitimate aim, then the law is an inappropriate
use of the restrictions permitted under Article 19. 75 The third prong
requires proportionality, and that the restrictive measure is the least
intrusive means of achieving the protective function. 76 Both formalized
laws, in addition to the judicial authorities charged with their administration,
must reflect this least restrictive principle. 77
Furthermore, the
proportionality of restrictions must take into account the form of expression
being restricted, and when issues of public importance are the subject of
these expressions, the ICCPR calls for uninhibited expression.78 Finally, in
instances where there is a necessary and proportionate restriction aimed at
legitimate concerns posed by the exercise of freedom of expression, the
state must, in each case where it imposes criminal sanctions or penalties
against specific individuals, demonstrate a causal nexus between that
individual’s expression, the immediate threat posed by that expression, and
the particular and urgent cause of sanctions against that specific
individual.79
The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human
Rights (OHCHR) has detailed the three-prong test for the incitement
72.

General Comment No. 34, supra note 34, ¶ E.5.

73.

Id.

74.

HRC 47th Sess., supra note 49.

75.

General Comment No. 34, supra note 34, ¶ 34.

76.

Id.

77.

Id.

78.

Id.

79.
Human Rights Committee, Hak—Chul Shin v. Republic of Korea, Communication No.
926/2000, ¶ 7.3, 80th Sess., U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/80/D/926/2000, (March 15–April 2, 2004) [hereinafter
HRC 80th Sess.].
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prohibition more succinctly. According to the OHCHR, “Article 20 of the
ICCPR requires there be a high threshold” when restricting free speech with
incitement laws, so as to conform to Article 19 requirements of legality,
proportionality, and necessity.80 The restrictions should be clear and not
limit free speech in an overly broad or untargeted way. When sanctions
limiting speech are applied, the benefit to the protected interest must
outweigh the harm to freedom of expression caused by the sanctions.81
In addition, there have been several cases in which the Human Rights
Committee has looked at the intent behind the incitement to discrimination,
hostility, or violence. In 1997, the Human Rights Committee distinguished
between “critical discussion” and “advocating contempt against a group” in
order to determine if the speech restriction was permissible.82 A 2001 Joint
Statement on Racism and Media by the U.N. Special Rapporteur on
Freedom of Opinion and Expression, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) Representative on Freedom of the Media, and
the Organization of American States (OAS) Special Rapporteur on
Freedom of Expression states that “no one should be penalized for the
dissemination of ‘hate speech’ unless it has been shown that they did so
with the intention of inciting discrimination, hostility or violence.”83
IV.

ANALYSIS OF THE CONDUCT OF THE KINGDOM OF SAUDI ARABIA IN
RELATION TO INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW

Waleed Abu al-Khair is a Saudi Arabian human rights lawyer and
activist. He is an outspoken advocate for political reform, particularly for
establishing a democratic state in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. He
focuses on advancing individual liberties and defending victims of human
rights violations. In 2009, he founded the Monitor of Human Rights in
Saudi Arabia (MHRSA), an independent human rights organization.84 On
October 29, 2013, in retaliation for his work as a human rights lawyer and
activist, Abu al-Khair was sentenced by the criminal court in Jeddah to
three months in prison for “contempt of the judiciary” by publically
criticizing a court decision against his client. On February 6, 2014, the
Court of Appeal in Mecca upheld the sentence.
80.

ICCPR, supra note 19, art. 19.

81.
Human Rights Council, Annual Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for
Human Rights, ¶ 18, 22nd Sess., U.N. Doc. A/HRC/22/17/Add.4, (Jan. 11, 2013).
82.

HRC 70th Sess., supra note 68, ¶ 11.5.

83.
Racism and the Media, ORG. FOR SECURITY & CO-OPERATION EUR. (Feb. 27, 2001),
http://www.osce.org/fom/40120?download=true.
84.
E-mail from Ekua Quansah, Human Rights Award Selection Committee, to LSUC Human
Rights Award Selection Committee (June 15, 2016), http://www.lrwc.org/ws/wp-content/uploads/2016
/11/Waleed-Abu-al-Khair.Nomination.Ltr_.-LRWC.UIA_.LSEW_.15-.June_.2016.pdf.
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A few weeks earlier on October 6, 2013, a second case was filed
against Abu al-Khair before the Specialized Criminal Court on various
charges, including “harming the reputation of the Kingdom,” “inciting the
public opinion against the Kingdom,” “breaking allegiance to the ruler,”
and “subverting public order in the Kingdom,” for similar reasons. In July
2014, he was sentenced to fifteen years in prison with a five-year suspended
sentence. On January 12, 2015, the Court of Appeal upheld the conviction
of the Specialized Criminal Court and extended the sentence from ten to
fifteen years after Abu al-Khair refused the judge’s offer to apologize for
his acts.
This Part analyzes the second case against Waleed Abu al-Khair under
international human rights law.
A.

Violation of the Right to Freedom of Expression and Opinion

According to international human rights law, everyone shall have the
right to freedom of expression and the right to hold opinions without
interference through any media or form of expression.85 This right includes
criticism towards the government, its officials and public affairs. 86 The
obligation to respect the right to freedom of expression and opinion is
binding on all branches of the state (executive, legislative, and judicial) and
extends to “expression of views and opinions that offend, shock or
disturb.” 87
International human rights law also recognizes that
“mechanisms for criticism, particularly of political leaders, were deemed
important so that leaders were held to account and that freedom of
expression was not limited to statements considered appropriate or
beneficial.”88
Saudi Arabia is a nondemocratic country where the fundamental rights of
citizens are denied.89 The Kingdom is ruled by a fully authoritarian regime
where freedom of expression is neither guaranteed nor respected.90 Under this
regime, any kind of public dissent is prohibited and dissenters are severely
85.
Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection
of the right to freedom of opinion and expression, Frank La Rue, ¶ 20(a), 77th Sess., U.N. Doc.
A/HRC/17/27, ¶ 20, (May 16, 2011).
86.

Id.

87.

Id. ¶ 37.

88.

HRC 10th Sess., supra note 59, ¶ 10.

89.
Mayan Derhy, Top Five Non-Democratic Countries, BORGEN PROJECT (Jan. 10, 2017),
https://borgenproject.org/top-five-non-democratic-countries/.
90.
Erwin van Veen, Return of Authoritarianism Primes Middle East for More Conflict,
CLINGENDAEL (Dec. 19, 2017, 13:33), https://www.clingendael.org/publication/return-authoritarianismprimes-middle-east-more-conflict.
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punished, especially those who openly express their disagreement with the
government or discuss reforming the Kingdom’s political system.
The prosecution and sentencing of Waleed Abu al-Khair for
expressing his criticism of the judiciary were carried out within the context
of full authoritarianism. In 2011, the public prosecutor charged Abu alKhair with “contempt of the judiciary” and “harming the reputation of the
Kingdom” pursuant to general principles of Shari’a law. The charges were
based on the fact that Abu al-Khair publically criticized a court decision
sentencing Samar Badawi, his client at the time, to six months in prison in a
male guardianship case against her abusive father. In addition, Abu alKhair was accused of sharing information about Badawi’s case with
international organizations and for signing a petition,91 which criticized the
severity of the sentence against peaceful political activists and condemned
the use of violence by security forces against protesters. Based on the
indictment of the public prosecutor, the criminal court in Jeddah, and
subsequently the court of appeal in Mekkah, sentenced Abu al-Khair to
three months in prison for “contempt of the judiciary” for signing a petition,
which the court qualified as damaging to the judiciary and to Islam.92
In the second case filed against Abu al-Khair before the Specialized
Criminal Court, the charging document filed by the public prosecutor
included charges of “criticizing and insulting the judiciary” and
“communicating with international organizations in order to undermine the
reputation of the Kingdom.” These charges were based on the same facts
mentioned in the indictment document filed a year earlier, namely:
“criticizing the Kingdom by communicating on the internet and satellite
channels materials related to the sentences against [political] reformers,”
“signing a petition,” and “publishing comments on twitter criticizing the
government and the human rights status in the Kingdom.”93 In 2014, the
Specialized Criminal Court in Jeddah, and subsequently the appellate court,
sentenced Abu al-Khair to fifteen years in prison based on the charging
document of the public prosecutor, which included the public defamation
offenses of “criticizing and insulting the judicial authority” and “harming
the reputation of the Kingdom.”
91.

See EL-HAGE & BOUSTANI, supra note 39, at 33.

92.
Id. The Petition included statements such as: “unjustified security escalation,” “unfair
judgments,” and “painful repressive measures.” The Petition condemns “the use of weapons” and
demands the constitution of a “judicial fact-finding committee, the identification of persons and entities
involved in the killings, and bringing them to justice.” It is worth noting that Abu al-Khair was not
involved in the drafting of the Petition but was one of the sixty-two petitioners who signed it.
93.
Id. Twitter comments include the following: “Human Rights in Saudi Arabia . . . going
backwards!”; “Saudi Arabia through its oil, buys the silence of the western world due to what is
happening in Bahrain.”; “The politicians remain careful to gain legitimacy from Wahhabism in a regime
that has not much on the human level.”

386

ILSA Journal of International & Comparative Law [Vol. 24:2

Charging and sentencing on the basis of the expression of one’s
opinion, in any form whatsoever, even if such opinion is deemed critical or
offensive toward any third party, including public officials, violates the
principle consecrated in Article 19 of the ICCPR.94 The criminalization of
Abu al-Khair’s expression by the Saudi Arabian court violated this standard.
Therefore, by violating Abu al-Khair’s right to express opinions and
ideas freely, even if such opinion offended public officials, or were found
shocking or disturbing by the judicial and executive authorities of the
country, Saudi Arabia has violated international human rights law.
B. Violation of the General Prohibition Against the Criminalization of
Speech Directed at Public Officials

1.

Saudi Arabia’s Restrictions on Speech Directed at Public
Officials

According to international human rights law, criminalizing the holding
of an opinion is prohibited. 95 The “harassment, intimidation, arrest,
detention, trial or imprisonment” of any individual based on the expression
of an opinion, constitutes a violation of the ICCPR.96 As discussed above,
international law recognizes a special prohibition against the
criminalization of speech directed at public officials due to public figures
being “required to tolerate a greater degree of criticism than private
citizens,” and because “mechanisms for criticism, particularly of political
leaders, were deemed important so that leaders were held to account.”97
The Saudi laws expressly criminalize any critical speech directed at
the government or its officials and Saudi judges broadly interpret these laws
to stifle any form of speech that criticizes the Kingdom and its public
affairs.98 The Law of Terrorism Crimes and its Financing defines a terrorist
crime as any act carried out by the perpetrator to commit a criminal
activity . . . towards the purpose of disabling the Basic Law or any of its
articles; harming the reputation or status of the country. 99 The Saudi
government relies on this law to crush peaceful opposition and justify
severe sentences against those who express critical opinions.
94.

ICCPR, supra note 19, art. 19.

95.

Id.

96.

EL-HAGE & BOUSTANI, supra note 39, at 34; see also HRC Zaire, supra note 41.

97.

HRC 10th Sess., supra note 59, ¶ 10.

98.
Saudi Arabia: New Terrorism Regulations Assault Rights, HUM. RTS.WATCH (Mar. 20,
2014, 12:00 AM), https://www.hrw.org/news/2014/03/20/saudi-arabia-new-terrorism-regulationsassault
-rights.
99.

PRETENSE OF PROGRESS, supra note 4.
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Similarly, the Anti-Cyber Crime Law of 2009 lists “defamation” as
one of the cyber-crimes subject to imprisonment, but fails to define this
offense.100 With such a broad term, any critical expression can amount to a
punishable crime under this law. Article 6 of the same law provides that
the “[p]roduction, preparation, transmission, or storage of materials
impinging on public order, religious values, public morals, and privacy” is a
cyber-crime, which similarly encompasses any communication of material
deemed critical towards public affairs or religion.101
The opinions expressed by Abu al-Khair, whether in the petition, on
television, or via Twitter, were directed at the judicial authority and are
protected by international law. Despite that, and according to the facts of this
case, the Saudi Arabian legal system criminalized this expression by pressing
charges against Abu al-Khair for the alleged crime of insulting the judiciary,
and the criminal court sentenced him to three months in prison on that charge.
Two years later, the Specialized Criminal Court sentenced Abu al-Khair to
fifteen years in prison for charges related to “harming the reputation of the
Kingdom” and “inciting the public opinion against the Kingdom,” based on the
provisions of the Law of Terrorism Crimes and its Financing and Anti-Cyber
Crime Law. Under a broad definition of “terrorist crime” and “defamation,”
these laws harshly criminalize holding any opinion suspected of harming the
reputation of the Kingdom or any of its officials.
The sentencing of Abu al-Khair based on defamation charges violates
the universal standard on defamation set out in international law. The
analysis of the case, in light of the six-prong test discussed in the above
section, demonstrates that Saudi Arabia fails to comply with international
law requirements.

2.

Analysis of the Multi-Prong Test Related to Defamation

The first prong of this test requires that the laws on defamation must be
provided by law and must not be overbroad; must address one of the legitimate
aims set out in paragraph 3(a) and (b) of Article 19 (respect of the rights and
reputation of others; protection of national security or of public order, or of
public health or morals); must be necessary to achieve a legitimate purpose;
must be the least intrusive instrument necessary to achieve the protective
function; and must be proportionate to the interest being protected.102
100. Anti-Cyber Crime Law, M/17, art. 3(5) (Sa.) (March 26, 2007) [hereinafter M/17]. Article
3, Section 5 of the Anti-Cyber Crime Law states, “Any person who commits one of the following cyber
crimes shall be subject to imprisonment for a period not exceeding one year and a fine not exceeding
hundred thousand riyals or to either punishment: Defamation and infliction of damages upon others
through the use of various information technology devices.” Id.
101.

Id.

102.

General Comment No. 34, supra note 34, ¶¶ 26–30.
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Saudi Arabian laws expressly criminalize defamatory statements that
harm the reputation of public officials or the Kingdom. The Law of
Terrorism Crimes and its Financing harshly punishes any speech that “harm
the reputation or status of the country,”103 and the Anti-Cyber Crime Law
criminalizes defamation including any expression deemed critical to public
affairs and religion. 104 The Law of Printed Materials and Publications
proscribes expression of opinion that is “insulting to Islam and to the
system of government” 105 and bans and criminalizes any speech that is
“damaging to the reputation of the Grand Mufti, members of the Council of
Senior Religious Scholars, or senior government officials.”106 While the
laws on defamation are codified, these laws include overbroad expressions
such as “reputation or status of the country,” “public affairs and religion,”
“Islam [or] the system of government,” which render these laws not precise
enough to enable an individual to regulate his or her conduct accordingly.107
In addition, the predominance of the Shari’a law in the Kingdom adds to the
broadness of such laws, especially that Saudi judges have broad discretion
in the interpretation of the law.
Moreover, the ground for restrictions provided in the Saudi Arabian
laws and on which the court decisions in Abu al-Khair’s case are based, is
the protection of the reputation of the country and its judicial system.
Legitimate interests for restriction of free speech include: the rights of
others, 108 such as the human rights articulated by the ICCPR; national
security,109 such as the violent overthrow of the constitutional order; and
public order,110 such as speaking in a public place that may be disruptive to
the public order. This interest of Saudi Arabian law is not protected by the
universal standard of the ICCPR and restricting Abu al-Khair’s speech on
this basis is therefore not necessary for a legitimate purpose. Therefore,

103.

PRETENSE OF PROGRESS, supra note 4.

104.

M/17, supra note 100, art. 6.

105.

Law of Printed Materials and Publications, M/32, art. 18 (Sa.) (Nov. 2000) [hereinafter

106.

EL-HAGE & BOUSTANI, supra note 39, at 10.

M/32].
107. General Comment No. 34, supra note 34, ¶¶ 25, 34. Paragraph 34 requires restricting
laws not to be overbroad and Paragraph 25 states that laws “must be formulated with sufficient precision
to enable an individual to regulate his or her conduct accordingly.” Id.
108. See Human Rights Committee, Jong-Cheol v. Republic of Korea, Commc’n No. 968/2001,
¶ 8.3, 85th Sess., U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/84/D/968/2001, (July. 25, 2005).
109. See Human Rights Committee, AK & AR v. Uzbekistan, Commc’n No. 1233/2003, 95th
Sess., U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/95/D/1233/2003, (Mar. 31, 2009).
110. See Human Rights Committee, Patrick Coleman v. Australia, Commc’n No. 1157/2003, ¶
7.3, 87th Sess., U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/87/D/1157/2003, (July 10–28, 2006).
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sentencing Abu al-Khair to fifteen years in prison on the basis of
defamation charges is neither proportional nor justified.
Because the legality, legitimate grounds, necessity and proportionality
elements are not satisfied, Saudi Arabia fails this prong of the test.
The second prong of the test requires that the defamatory statement in
question be a fact instead of an opinion. 111 The third prong imposes a
heightened standard for public officials and figures, because they are
naturally subject to criticisms and opposition.112 The Saudi Arabian laws
on defamation and the judges in the case of Abu al-Khair do not distinguish
between statements of fact and opinion. Additionally, they do not suggest
that public officials and public figures are subject to a heightened level of
criticism. In fact, harming the reputation of the country, including its
officials, carries a sentence of up to twenty years in prison.113 The second
and third prongs of the test are therefore not satisfied.
The fourth prong of the test requires the existence of actual malice in
the defendant’s actions in cases concerning defamation of public
officials.114 The Saudi Arabian laws do not mandate the existence of actual
malice as a prerequisite for persecution.115 The court in Abu al-Khair’s
case does not state actual malice as a requirement for criminal defamation
and charged him solely based on the fact that he expressed a critical opinion.
This prong is therefore not satisfied.
The fifth prong indicates that the burden of proof lies with the
plaintiff.116 In other words, when an individual is criminally prosecuted for
violating statutes legitimately and necessarily restricting free speech, the
prosecution must plead with particularity how the individual on trial
violated the law, and has the burden of proving these facts before a court of
law. The Saudi statutes do not set forth the burden of proof and Abu alKhair’s case lacked the due process required for demonstrating proof in an
impartial judicial proceeding. Saudi Arabia’s prosecution and sentencing of
Abu al-Khair violated his right to a fair trial and the right to due process.
After he was arrested during a hearing on April 15, 2014, he was denied
access to his lawyer. On April 22, 2014, the judge refused to provide Abu
al-Khair’s lawyer with any explanation for his arrest and detention, and he
was thus unable to present his defense. Consequently, the plaintiffprosecutors did not present any proof for the charges against Abu al-Khair
111.

HRC 17th Sess., supra note 37.

112.

General Comment No. 34, supra note 34, ¶ 38.

113.

HRC 17th Sess., supra note 37.

114.

General Comment No. 34, supra note 34, ¶ 47.

115. The fourth prong of international standards relating to defamation under the ICCPR
requires the existence of actual malice on the part of the defendant in cases concerning public officials.
116.

See ICCPR, supra note 19, art. 14(2).
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who was charged based on the evidence gathered by the Bureau of
Investigation and Public Prosecution during an interrogation. The plaintiffprosecutors in this case could not have met their burden of proving their
case if Mr. Abu al-Khair was denied a defense, as there was no impartial
judicial proceeding within which to prove their case. This prong is
therefore not satisfied.
The sixth prong sets forth the defenses available to the defendant: truth
and public interest of the subject matter.117 Saudi laws do not state that truth
and public interest are justifications for the defamatory statement.118 Likewise,
in Abu al-Khair’s case, he was unable to present his defense as he was denied
access to his lawyer. This prong is therefore not satisfied.
The fact that the Saudi Arabian laws and its application by the courts
do not comply with the multi-prong test renders Saudi Arabia as a noncompliant state with the universal standard on defamation. By enacting and
implementing laws that unambiguously proscribe the expression of one’s
opinion, and even more harshly when directed at public figures, Saudi
Arabia, acting through its executive branch, is internationally responsible
for violating the prohibition against criminalization of speech and the
special prohibition against the criminalization of forms of expression
directed at public officials.119 Additionally, by detaining and imprisoning
Abu al-Khair based on such laws, Saudi Arabia, acting through its judicial
branch, has violated the prohibition against criminalization of speech and
the special prohibition against the criminalization of forms of expression
directed at public officials.120
C.

Violation of the Incitement Prohibition

1.

The Incitement Prohibition

The incitement prohibition limits the right to freedom of expression
when hatred, hostility or violence are encouraged through the speech. 121
According to international human rights law, a particular government’s
measures in implementing the incitement prohibition requires a high
threshold because, as a matter of fundamental principle, limitations on
speech must always remain an exception.122 Such a threshold must be read

117.

Id. art. 14(3)(d).

118.

HRC 17th Sess., supra note 37.

119.

ICCPR, supra note 19, art. 19.

120.

Id.

121.

Id. art. 20(2).

122.

Id. arts. 19–20.
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in consonance with the three-prong test for restrictions123—namely, such
restrictions must be provided by law (legality test); be narrowly defined to
serve a legitimate interest (proportionality test); and be necessary to protect
that interest (necessity test). In particular, the legal provision must not be
overly broad or restrict speech in a wide or untargeted way.124 Similarly,
the principle of proportionality must be respected not only in the law that
frames the restrictions, but also by the administrative and judicial
authorities in applying the law.125 As a result, when a state party invokes a
legitimate ground for restriction of freedom of expression, it must
demonstrate in a specific and individualized fashion the precise nature of
the threat, and the necessity and proportionality of the specific action
taken—in particular by establishing a direct and immediate connection
between the expression and the threat.126

2.

Analysis of the Three-Prong Test Related to the Incitement
Prohibition

The legality test requires that the incitement prohibition restricting
freedom of expression must be provided by law in a clear and targeted way,
and must address one of the aims set out in paragraph 3(a) and (b) of
Article 19 in respect of the rights and reputation of others, protection of
national security or public order, or public health or morals.127
Saudi laws and Shari’a law that govern most areas in the Kingdom are
unclear, overly broad, and restrict speech in a wide or untargeted way,
especially when the speech is found to be offensive, shocking, disturbing,
or merely critical of the government or of Islam. In fact, the Law of
Terrorism Crimes and its Financing,128 the Anti-Cyber Crime Law,129 the
Law of Printed Materials and Publications,130 and the Law on Electronic
Publications,131 all include provisions that restrict the right to freedom of
expression, and are not formulated with sufficient precision to enable an
individual to regulate his or her conduct accordingly. Instead, the legal
system confers arbitrary discretion on prosecutors and judges to restrict
123.

ICCPR, supra note 19, art. 19(3).

124.

General Comment No. 34, supra note 34, ¶ 34.

125.

Id.

126.

HRC 80th Sess., supra note 79.

127.

General Comment No. 34, supra note 34, ¶ 25.

128.

PRETENSE OF PROGRESS, supra note 4.

129.

M/17, supra note 100, art. 6 (Sa.).

130.

M/32, supra note 105, art. 18 (Sa.).

131. Saudi Arabia: Rescind New Online Restrictions, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Jan. 7, 2011, 6:04
P.M.), https://www.hrw.org/news/2011/01/07/saudi-arabia-rescind-new-online-restrictions.

392

ILSA Journal of International & Comparative Law [Vol. 24:2

freedom of expression and apply the incitement prohibition arbitrarily.
Even if the laws were properly narrowly constructed, the unlimited
interpretation power possessed by the Saudi judiciary corrupts the equal
application of the law necessary to safeguard the limitations of the
incitement prohibition enshrined in international human rights law.
In addition, the restrictions to freedom of expression as provided in the
Saudi Arabian laws are not based on legitimate grounds set out in the
ICCPR. The Law of Terrorism Crimes and its Financing and the AntiCyber Crime Law state that the grounds for restriction are to protect “public
order,” “the stability of the state,” “national unity,” “the reputation or status
of the country,” and impinging on public order and “religious values.”132
Most of these grounds are not legitimate grounds according to the universal
standard, which recognize as such the “the rights or reputations of others”
and “the protection of national security or of public order or of public
health or morals.”133 Therefore, Saudi Arabia fails the legality test for the
implementation of the incitement prohibition as established under
international human rights law because the law on incitement is neither
adequately clear nor targeted.
The proportionality test requires that the incitement prohibition
restricting freedom of expression must not be overbroad, must be the least
intrusive instrument necessary to achieve the protective function, and must
be proportionate to the interest being protected.134
In both legal cases against Abu al-Khair, the courts failed to demonstrate
that the legal provisions of the Law of Terrorism Crimes and its Financing, the
Anti-Cyber Crime Law, and the Shari’a law used by the courts were clearly
and narrowly defined to protect a legitimate government interest and that they
were aimed at the “respect of the rights and reputation of others, protection of
national security or of public order, or of public health or morals.” 135 As
evidenced by the charges in both indictment documents and court decisions,
the government’s alleged interest in this case is the protection of the reputation
132. General Comment No. 34, supra note 34, ¶¶ 21, 29, 30. Paragraph 29 provides that although
the exercise of the right to freedom of expression carries with it special duties and responsibilities leading to
restriction of freedom of expression in order to protect the rights or reputations of others or the protection of
national security or of public order, such restricting laws should not jeopardize the freedom of expression as
a right. Id. ¶ 29. Paragraph 29 cautions that extreme care must be taken by States parties to ensure that
such laws relating to national security or public order crafted and applied in a manner that conforms to the
strict requirements of Paragraph 3 of Article 19 of ICCPR. Id. It is not compatible with Paragraph 3 to
invoke such laws to suppress the public information of legitimate public interest that does not harm national
security or to prosecute journalists and other human rights defenders. Id. PRETENSE OF PROGRESS, supra
note 4; M/17, supra note 100, art. 6 (Sa.).
133.

General Comment No. 34, supra note 34.

134.

Id. ¶ 34.

135.

ICCPR, supra note 19, art. 19(3).

2018]

El-Hage & Assaf Boustani

393

of the Kingdom both inside and outside the country. Abu al-Khair is charged
and sentenced with “subverting public order in the Kingdom,” “discrediting the
Kingdom,” and “inciting public opinion against the Kingdom,” and
“transmitting information prejudicial to public order”. These charges are based
on the fact that Abu al-Khair expressed criticism toward the Kingdom, signed a
petition calling for democratic reforms, and communicated with international
organizations and provided information about the status of human rights in
Saudi Arabia.
The charge of “subverting public order,” and “inciting public opinion
against the Kingdom” is not justified given that Abu al-Khair’s peaceful
activities legitimately exercised his right to freedom of expression under the
ICCPR. In addition, prohibiting criticism towards the Kingdom and its
officials in order to preserve its reputation is not a legitimate interest under
international legal standards and especially in the circumstances of public
debate since expressing critical views is a right guaranteed by the ICCPR.
In addition, the ICCPR places a higher value on expression critical to public
figures, even when the expression is offensive, shocking or disturbing.136
The punishment of imprisonment for fifteen years with a fifteen-year
travel ban after release is clearly disproportional to any interest being
protected. In fact, as the interests being protected are not legitimate, any
penalty imposed could never be proportionate. Therefore, Saudi Arabia
fails the proportionality test required for the implementation of the
incitement prohibition.
The necessity test requires that the incitement prohibition restricting
freedom of expression must be necessary to protect a legitimate interest,
and must be the only way to achieve protection.137
The Specialized Criminal Court sentenced Abu al-Khair for “subverting
public order in the Kingdom” and “transmitting information prejudicial to
public order,” because he publically criticized the judiciary by signing a
petition and shared information about the human rights’ situation of the country
with international organizations. The Court interpreted these simple acts of
expression, protected by international human rights law, as threatening to the
public order. Although the protection of public order is considered a legitimate
government interest by international human rights law, in this case the actual
interest at issue is the protection of the reputation of the Kingdom. Legitimate
grounds must conform to the strict requirements of Article 19, Paragraph 3.138
As the Human Rights Committee has noted: “a) It is not compatible with
paragraph 3, for instance, to invoke such laws to suppress or withhold from the
136. See Human Rights Committee, Bodrožiü v. Serbia and Montenegro, Communication
No.1180/2003, ¶ 7.2, 85th Sess., U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/85/D/1180/2003, (Oct. 17–Nov. 3, 2005).
137.

General Comment No. 34, supra note 34, ¶ 33.

138.

Id. ¶ 30.
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public information of legitimate public interest that does not harm national
security or to prosecute journalists, researchers, environmental activists, human
rights defenders, or others, for having disseminated such information.”139
Legitimate grounds related to national security involve restricting
expressions that promote the violent overthrow of the government 140 or
expressions related to official secrets and sedition, 141 a far cry from the
expressions made by Abu al-Khair which were simply critical to the government.
Examples of legitimate grounds connected to public order involve contempt of
court142 and parliamentary privilege.143 However, even here the scope of the
legitimacy for these grounds is strictly limited, and manifestly distinct from the
statements made by Abu al-Khair.144 His statements criticizing the Kingdom’s
judiciary for sentencing peaceful activists fall well outside the scope of
expressions legitimately restricted under international law.
In any case, the court failed to demonstrate that sentencing Abu alKhair to fifteen years in prison was justified and necessary to protect any
legitimate interest, especially when the forms of expression used by Abu alKhair (i.e. signing a petition, publishing comments on Twitter,
communicating with international organizations) did not involve any kind
of violence or incitement of violence whatsoever. Even where a legitimate
interest exists, such as with contempt of court, the punishment must fit the
crime.145 International jurisprudence demonstrates that the lengthy prison
sentence handed to Abu al-Khair was unnecessary and disproportionate to
his actions.146 Necessity and proportionality are both strict requirements a
state must adhere to in order to abide by their Article 19 responsibilities.147

139.

Id.

140.

A.K. and A.R., U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/95/D/1233/2003 (2009); 16 IHRR 719 (2009), ¶ 7.2.

141.

General Comment No. 34, supra note 34, ¶ 30.

142. Human Rights Committee, Fernando v. Sri Lanka, Commc’n No. 1189/2003, ¶ 9.2, 83rd
Sess., U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/83/D/1189/2003, (Mar. 31, 2005) [hereinafter HRC 83rd Sess.].
143. Human Rights Committee, Robert W. Gauthier v. Canada, Communication No. 633/1995,
¶ 13.4, 13.6, 65th Sess., U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/65/D/633/1995 (May 5, 1999).
144. HRC 83rd Sess., supra note 142. The court in this case noted that contempt of court has
traditionally been a ground for limiting speech, but only when the dignity and integrity of the court are
at stake. This suggests that only speech made in court that disrupts the actual administration of justice
qualifies as a legitimate ground for restriction.
145. Id. The court noted that even in cases of equivocal contempt, criminal sanctions are likely
an unnecessary restriction. See also Ballantyne, Davidson and McIntyre v. Canada, supra note 49, ¶
11.4 (prohibiting English advertising is not a necessary restriction of speech, necessary to protect the
legitimate aim of protecting the marginalized Francophone population, as other methods could
accomplish this legitimate goal).
146.

See, e.g., Erbakan v. Turkey, Eur. Ct. H. R. No. 59405/00, ¶ 56.

147.

General Comment No. 34, supra note 34, ¶ 35; HRC 80th Sess., supra note 79.
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In addition, the universal standard as established by the ICCPR requires
the existence of an intent, specifically an intent to incite discrimination,
hostility, or violence. 148 It requires causation between the expression and
threat.149 However, the court failed to demonstrate that Abu al-Khair had the
intent to “incite violence” as it is suggested by the charges against him. He was
charged for signing a petition that is critical of the government and for
defending victims of human rights violations. His acts did not involve any kind
of violence. Abu al-Khair was charged in relation to his opinions and
expressions about social and political issues in the country. There was no
threat associated with his expression and the court failed to demonstrate any
causation between his speech and any threat to the public order.
In conclusion, the speech restrictive measures adopted by the
Kingdom and implemented by its judicial authorities fail to meet the threeprong test under the ICCPR, which renders the Saudi Arabian state as noncompliant with the universal standard on incitement. As a result, through
these measures, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia violated the right of Abu alKhair to freely hold and express his opinion and to disseminate information
to others whether inside or outside of the Kingdom.
As a result, Saudi Arabia is responsible for the violation of Article 19 of
the UDHR, Article 19 of the ICCPR and Article 32 of the Arab Charter for
Human Rights, depriving Abu al-Khair from fundamental rights recognized by
all international legal instruments.150 Saudi Arabia’s domestic law does not
meet the minimum thresholds of legality, proportionality, and necessity under
international law with regards to freedom of expression.
148.

EL-HAGE & BOUSTANI, supra note 39, at 34; HRC 70th Sess., supra note 68.

149. General Comment No. 34, supra note 34, ¶ 38 (stating that “the mere fact that forms of expression
are considered to be insulting to a public figure is not sufficient to justify the imposition of penalties”).
150. See ICCPR, supra note 19, art. 19. Article 19 of the ICCPR provides that:
(1) Everyone shall have the right to hold opinions without interference.
(2) Everyone shall have the right to freedom of expression; this right shall include
freedom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless
of frontiers, either orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art, or through any
other media of his choice . . . . Id.
Article 19 of UDHR stipulates that “[E]veryone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this
right includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart information
and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers.” G.A. Res. 217A (III), supra note 19, art. 19.
See Arab Charter, supra note 27, art. 32. Article 32 of Arab Charter stipulates that:
(1) The present Charter guarantees the right to information and to freedom of opinion
and expression, as well as the right to seek, receive and impart information and ideas
through any medium, regardless of geographical boundaries.
(2) Such rights and freedoms shall be exercised in conformity with the
fundamental values of society and shall be subject only to such limitations as are
required to ensure respect for the rights or reputation of others or the protection of
national security, public order and public health or morals. Id.
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V.

CONCLUSION

Saudi Arabia is ruled by an absolute monarchy, with no independent
judiciary, separation of powers, independent media, or political parties. 151
Citizens have no freedom of thought, expression, religion or association.
Under this regime, there is no guarantee of independence in the administration
of justice or respect for the fundamental rights of citizens, especially for those
who openly express their disagreement with the government.
The prosecution and trials in the case of Waleed Abu al-Khair were
carried out in the context of arbitrariness, abuse of power and full
authoritarianism in Saudi Arabia. This article concludes that Saudi Arabia
has violated Abu al-Khair’s right to freedom of expression. He was
convicted under defamation and incitement laws simply for expressing his
opinions, calling for democratic reform, and advocating for human rights in
the Kingdom. Specifically, he was charged and later convicted under the
internationally wrongful grounds of harming the Kingdom’s reputation and
inciting public opinion against the Kingdom.
Moreover, Waleed Abu al-Khair was not provided a fair trial or the
opportunity to present a defense, as is required by international law. He
was given a fifteen-year prison sentence, an unnecessary and
disproportionate response to comments made without malice and without
the intent to incite violence. His expressions were simply aimed at
promoting the human rights articulated by the ICCPR and other
international instruments.
Abu al-Khair has been imprisoned since April 2014 and his case is one
among many. Despite its seat at the UNHRC and its recent appointment to
lead an influential U.N. Human Rights panel,152 the Kingdom still regularly
engages in the systematic repression of activists and human rights defenders,
often leading to numerous years of imprisonment, without trial, and the use
of repressive measures against them.153

151. Basic Law of Governance, supra note 1, art. 5 (stating that “(a) [T]he system of governance in
the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia shall be monarchical. (b) Governance shall be limited to the sons of the Founder
King ‘Abd al-‘Aziz ibn ‘Abd ar-Rahman al-Faysal Al Sa‘ud, and the sons of his son . . . .”).
152. Christopher Ingraham, Why One of the World’s Worst Human Rights Offenders Is Leading
A U.N. Human Rights Panel, WASH. POST (Sept. 28, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news
/wonk/wp/2015/09/28/why-one-of-the-worlds-worst-human-rights-offenders-is-leading-a-un-humanrights-panel/?utm_term=.d2ea7e456357.
153. AMNESTY INT’L, SAUDI ARABIA: REPRESSION IN THE NAME OF SECURITY 18, 29 (2011),
https://www.amnestyusa.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/04/saudisecurity.pdf (“In July 2007 the Ministry
of Interior announced that 9,000 people had been arrested during counter-terrorism operations between
2003 and 2007 and that 3,106 of them remained held.”).
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Abstract
For centuries, non-state actors have acted as claimants before
international judicial bodies. Only recently, however, have they begun
acting as respondents.
This Article considers how five areas of
international law—international investment law, international human rights
law, international humanitarian law, international criminal law, and the law
of the sea—deal with non-state actors in order to identify a lex generalis
governing non-state actors as respondents. In particular, this Article
examines two elements that must be established to make a successful claim
against a non-state actor: (1) how non-state actors acquire obligations
under international law; and (2) how international judicial bodies acquire
jurisdiction ratione personae over non-state actors.
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INTRODUCTION

For centuries, non-state actors have acted as claimants before
international judicial bodies. The Jay Treaty of 1794—widely considered
to be the foundation of modern arbitration1—permitted non-state actors to
file claims against states. 2 Since then, many international claims
commissions, 3 international investment agreements, 4 and international
human rights treaties 5 have similarly permitted non-state actors to file
claims against states. In fact, the majority of claims heard by the first
international court with jurisdiction over states, the first Central American
Court of Justice, were filed by individuals.6 The phenomenon of non-state
actors acting as claimants before international judicial bodies is thus well
established in international law.
The phenomenon of non-state actors acting as respondents, however,
is relatively new. In 1945, the International Military Tribunal in
Nuremberg was established to adjudicate claims under international law
against individuals.7 Beginning in the 1990s, various international criminal
courts and tribunals were similarly established to prosecute individuals for
international crimes.8 It thus appeared that the phenomenon of non-state
actors acting as respondents was confined to the sphere of international
criminal law. This conception, however, is inaccurate. Some international
1.
See Charles H. Brower II, Arbitration, in MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC
INTERNATIONAL LAW ¶ 13 (2007).
2.
Treaty of Amity, Commerce, and Navigation, Gr. Brit.-U.S., arts. 6, 7, Nov. 19, 1794, 8
Stat. 116 [hereinafter Jay Treaty]. Article VI of the Jay Treaty also permitted non-state actors to file
claims against other non-state actors, but the basis for these claims was contracts, not international law.
See id. art. 6. 1 JOHN BASSETT MOORE, HISTORY AND DIGEST OF THE INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATIONS
TO WHICH THE UNITED STATES HAS BEEN A PARTY 271–76 (1898).
3.
See, e.g., Convention on the Settlement of Matters Arising Out of the War and the
Occupation ch. 5, art. 7, May 26, 1952, 6 U.S.T. 4411, 332 U.N.T.S. 219.
4.
See, e.g., Treaty Concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of Investment,
U.S.-Arg., art. 7, Nov. 14, 1991, 31 I.L.M. 124.
5.
See, e.g., Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art.
34, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221; Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights art. 1, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976).
6.
Rosa Riquelme Cortado, Central American Court of Justice (1907–18), in MAX PLANCK
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW ¶ 16 (2013).
7.
Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the
European Axis, and Charter of the International Military Tribunal arts. 1, 5, Aug. 8, 1945, 82 U.N.T.S.
280.
8.
See, e.g., S.C. Res. 827, ¶ 2 (May 25, 1993) (establishing the International Criminal
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia); S.C. Res. 955, ¶ 1 (Nov. 8, 1994) (establishing the International
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda).
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investment agreements (IIAs) grant arbitral tribunals broad jurisdiction over
disputes between investors and states, 9 such that states have filed
counterclaims against investors, leading the investors to act as respondents.
Also, the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)
grants the Seabed Disputes Chamber of the International Tribunal for the
Law of the Sea (ITLOS) jurisdiction over “disputes between parties to a
contract, being States Parties, the Authority or the Enterprise, state
enterprises and natural or juridical persons,”10 suggesting that a non-state
contractor could act as a respondent in such a dispute settlement proceeding.
Admittedly, it is not common for non-state actors to act as respondents
before international judicial bodies. Nevertheless, as non-state actors are
playing an increasingly important role in international law, this
phenomenon is likely to become more common. This Article thus
examines the particular issues that arise when non-state actors act as
respondents before international judicial bodies.
As a preliminary matter, a few terms must be defined. First, as used in
this Article, a “non-state actor” is any actor that is not only not a state, but also
not an international organization. Non-state actors may thus be, inter alia,
individuals, corporations, terrorist groups, and sub-state entities. Second, the
term “claim” in this Article refers to claims or counterclaims only under public
international law, not under domestic law or private international law. As a
result, contractual claims in international commercial arbitration are excluded
from the scope of this Article. Third, a “claimant” is any actor that makes a
claim or counterclaim against another actor before an international judicial
body. In some forums, the “claimant” is more commonly called an “applicant”
or a “petitioner,” but for uniformity, this Article exclusively uses the term
“claimant.” Fourth, a “respondent” is the actor against whom the claim or
counterclaim is made. In the context of international criminal law, the
respondent is often called an “accused” or a “defendant,” but again for
uniformity, this Article exclusively uses the term “respondent.” Fifth, an
“international judicial body” is any public international body that renders
decisions on the responsibility of the respondent on the basis of public
international law. The term thus includes, inter alia, the International Court of
Justice (ICJ), investor-state arbitral tribunals, panels of the World Trade
Organization, international criminal tribunals, claims commissions, and human
rights treaty bodies.

9.
See, e.g., Agreement Between the Argentine Republic and the Kingdom of Spain on the
Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of Investments, Arg.-Spain, art. X(1), Oct. 3, 1991, 1699 U.N.T.S.
202 [hereinafter Argentina-Spain BIT].
10.
U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea art. 187(c), Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 3
[hereinafter UNCLOS] (emphasis added).
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Over the past decade, the literature on non-state actors has exploded.
Leading commentators have written hundreds of books and articles on the
implications of non-state actors acting as subjects of international law. 11
Nevertheless, the existing literature does not provide a sufficient
understanding of non-state actors acting as respondents before international
judicial bodies. This is for two principal reasons. The first reason is that
most commentary on non-state actors focuses on their rights rather than
their obligations. This can perhaps be explained by the fact that non-state
actors seem to have more rights than obligations under international law.
Further, as noted above, there is a long history of non-state actors acting as
claimants before international judicial bodies, whereas the phenomenon of
non-state actors acting as respondents is rather new. All this said, today
there is undoubtedly a growing literature on the obligations of non-state
actors under international law. This is where the second reason comes into
play: commentary on the obligations of non-state actors tend to focus on
one particular area of law, one particular type of obligation, and/or one
particular type of non-state actor. For example, many commentators have
focused on the obligations of non-state armed groups under international
humanitarian law. 12 Another popular topic is the obligations of
corporations under international human rights law.13 Rather than focus on
any particular area of law, obligation, or type of non-state actor, this Article
aims to identify a lex generalis concerning non-state actors acting as
respondents before international judicial bodies.
As a general matter, a claimant must establish five elements to make a
successful claim under international law against a respondent before an
international judicial body. First, the respondent must hold an obligation under
international law (“an international obligation”). Second, the respondent must
have breached that obligation. Third, the respondent must have responsibility
under international law (“international responsibility”) for that breach. Fourth,
11.
See, e.g., Andrew Clapham, Human Rights Obligations of Non-State Actors in Conflict
Situations, 88 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 491, 498 (2006) [hereinafter Clapham, Human Rights
Obligations]; ANNE PETERS, BEYOND HUMAN RIGHTS: THE LEGAL STATUS OF THE INDIVIDUAL IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW (Jonathan Huston trans., 2016); KATE PARLETT, THE INDIVIDUAL IN THE
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM: CONTINUITY AND CHANGE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 3 (2011); Jean
d’Aspremont et al., Sharing Responsibility Between Non-State Actors and States in International Law:
Introduction, 62 NETH. INT’L L. REV. 49, 49–67 (2015).
12.
See, e.g., Antonio Cassese, The Status of Rebels Under the 1977 Geneva Protocol on NonInternational Armed Conflicts, 30 INT’L & COMP. L. Q. 416, 416–39 (1981).
13.
See, e.g., Sufyan Droubi, Transactional Corporations and International Human Rights
Law, 6 NOTRE DAME J. INT’L & COMP. L. 119 (2016); Emeka Duruigbo, Corporate Accountability and
Liability for International and Human Right Abuses: Recent Changes and Recurring Challenges, 6 NW.
J. INT’L HUM. RTS. 222 (2008).
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the claimant must have the right to invoke that responsibility. And fifth, the
judicial body must have jurisdiction over the matter.
This Article aims to address only the particular issues that arise when
the respondent is a non-state actor. Notably, the second and fourth
elements are inquiries for which, more often than not, particular issues do
not arise when the respondent is a non-state actor as opposed to a state.
Particular issues could arise with respect to the third element, but this
Article also does not address this element because of spatial constraints. As
a result, this Article examines only the first and fifth elements.
The Article is organized as follows: Section II will discuss the non-state
actor’s obligation, focusing on how non-state actors acquire obligations under
international law; Section III will discuss the judicial body’s jurisdiction,
focusing on how the judicial body acquires jurisdiction ratione personae over
non-state actors; Section IV will then conclude the Article.
II.

THE NON-STATE ACTOR’S OBLIGATION

A successful claimant must first establish that the non-state actor holds
an obligation under international law. Commentators today generally agree
that non-state actors can hold obligations under international law. The
more difficult question, however, is how non-state actors acquire such
obligations.
A.

Theory

States acquire international obligations by operation of any of the
sources of international law: treaties, custom, and general principles of law.
To this list may be added unilateral acts. An underlying theme that
pervades most if not all these sources is consent: a state holds only
obligations to which it has expressly or impliedly consented. For treaties,
the pacta tertiis rule provides that a state cannot be bound by a treaty to
which it did not consent.14 And for custom, the persistent objector rules
similarly provides that a state cannot be bound by a custom to which it
objected during its formation.15 Although some scholars assert that nonstate actors are not subject to this “voluntarist paradigm,” 16 this Article
proceeds on the assumption that they are subject to the paradigm. The
14.
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 34, Jan. 27, 1980, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331
[hereinafter VCLT].
15.
Fisheries (U.K. v. Nor.), Judgment, 1951 I.C.J. Rep. 116, at 126 (Dec. 18); Asylum
(Colom. v. Peru), Judgment, 1950 I.C.J. Rep. 266, at 277–78 (Nov. 20).
16.
See, e.g., Marko Milanoviü, Is the Rome Statute Binding on Individuals? (and Why We
Should Care), 9 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 25, 39 (2011).
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reason is that, if international law has now developed to the point where
non-state actors may act as respondents before international judicial bodies
and may be held responsible for breaches of international law, then they
should be treated the same way that states are treated in the context of
dispute settlement proceedings. In light of this understanding, in order to
determine how non-state actors may acquire obligations under international
law, one must examine the three traditional sources of international law
(treaties, custom, and general principles of law), as well as unilateral acts.
First, can non-state actors acquire obligations by treaty? At first, the
answer appears to be in the negative because non-state actors generally may
not be parties to treaties. Nevertheless, Section 4 of Part III (Articles 34 to
38) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT) expressly
recognizes the possibility that a treaty may create rights and obligations for
non-parties.17 Although Section 4 refers only to non-party states, as one
esteemed commentator has observed,18 there is no reason why the section
should not also apply to non-party non-state actors. Article 34 of the VCLT
provides the general rule that “[a] treaty does not create either obligations
or rights for a third State without its consent.”19 Article 35 then provides:
“An obligation arises for a third State from a provision of a treaty if the
parties to the treaty intend the provision to be the means of establishing the
obligation and the third State expressly accepts that obligation in writing.”20
Assuming that this latter provision is equally applied to non-state actors,
there are two requirements for a non-state actor to acquire an obligation by
treaty. First, “the parties to the treaty intend the provision to be the means
of establishing the obligation”; and second, “the [non-state actor] expressly
accepts that obligation in writing.”21
As for the first requirement, it is not difficult to imagine how the
parties to a treaty can express their intent for the provision in question to
establish the obligation. The clearest example is where the text of the treaty
expressly states that the non-state actor “shall” do something. Although
this sort of provision is not common, it does indeed exist in many
international treaties. For example, Article 6(5) of Additional Protocol II
provides: “At the end of hostilities, the authorities in power shall
endeavour to grant the broadest possible amnesty to persons who have

17.

See VCLT, supra note 14, arts. 34–38.

18.

See Cassese, supra note 12, at 423.

19.

VCLT, supra note 14, art. 34.

20.

Id. art. 35.

21.

Id.
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participated in the armed conflict . . . .” 22 Although the “authorities in
power” at the end of hostilities may be a state, it may also be a non-state
armed group. As another example, Article 21(4) of UNCLOS provides:
“Ships shall sail under the flag of one State only . . . .”23 One can also find
examples in provisions governing the constitution of an arbitral tribunal.
For example, the second paragraph of the Annex to the Convention on the
Protection of the Rhine provides: “If the chair of the arbitral tribunal has
not been appointed . . . , the President of the International Court of Justice
shall appoint an arbitrator . . . .”24
There are three ways to interpret these provisions. First, one can interpret
them as only imposing an obligation on the state that has jurisdiction over the
non-state actor to ensure that the non-state actor complies with the prescription.
This interpretation, however, is unpersuasive given that the drafters could
easily have rephrased the provision to make clear that the obligation was on the
state, not the non-state actor. Second, one can interpret them as automatically
placing an obligation on the non-state actor. Under the voluntarist paradigm
outlined above, this interpretation is unpersuasive because, if non-state actors
are to be considered as independent subjects under international law, states
should not have the power to directly impose obligations under international
law on them, even though states may impose obligations under domestic law
on them. Third, one can interpret these provisions as merely expressing an
intention by the states to bind a non-state actor, fulfilling the first requirement
under Article 35 of the VCLT. This third approach is the most sensible.
As for the second requirement, if non-state actors are to be considered
as independent subjects under international law, it makes sense to require
them to expressly consent to any treaty obligation that binds them. If
Article 35 requires that non-party states expressly accept treaty obligations
in writing for the obligations to bind them,25 then it makes sense for nonparty, non-state actors to do the same. In conclusion, then, although nonstate actors generally may not be parties to treaties, they may still acquire
obligations by treaty.

22.
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the
Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts art. 6, ¶ 5, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609
(entered into force Dec. 7, 1978) (emphasis added).
23.

UNCLOS, supra note 10, art. 92(1) (emphasis added); see also id. art. 21(4).

24.
Convention on the Protection of the Rhine annex, ¶ 2, Apr. 12, 1999 (emphasis added);
see also Arbitration Agreement Between the Government of the Republic of Slovenia and the
Government of the Republic of Croatia, Slovn.-Croat., art. 2, ¶ 1, Nov. 4, 2009 (“In case that [the
Parties] cannot agree . . . the President and the two members of the Arbitral Tribunal shall be appointed
by the President of the International Court of Justice from the list.”).
25.

VCLT, supra note 14, art. 35.
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Second, can non-state actors acquire obligations by custom? Once
again, at first, the answer appears to be in the negative because custom,
according to the ICJ, is “to be looked for primarily in the actual practice
and opinio juris of States” 26 —hence the notions of “state practice” and
“opinio juris.” Nevertheless, one must recall that Article 38(1)(b) of the
ICJ Statute does not mention “states” at all; rather, it defines “custom” as
“evidence of a general practice accepted as law.”27 By the terms of the
Article 38(1)(b) alone, there is thus no reason why a non-state actor’s
practice and opinio juris cannot create custom binding on non-state actors.
Third, can non-state actors acquire obligations by general principle of
law? This question is difficult to answer given the lack of consensus over
what constitutes a general principle of law. Nevertheless, as Alain Pellet
notes, there is “little doubt” that general principles of law are “unwritten
legal norms of a wide-ranging character,” “recognized in the municipal
laws of States,” and “transposable at the international level.”28 If general
principles of law may impose obligations on states, there is thus no reason
why they may not impose obligations on non-state actors.
Fourth, can non-state actors acquire obligations by unilateral act? As
the ICJ held in the Nuclear Tests cases, “[i]t is well recognized that
declarations made by way of unilateral acts . . . may have the effect of
creating legal obligations.”29 To the extent that a non-state actor makes a
similar declaration that meets the requirements set forth in the Nuclear
Tests cases, there is no reason why it should not be bound by such a
declaration.
In conclusion, then, non-state actors may acquire obligations by treaty,
custom, general principle of law, and unilateral act.
B.

Lex Specialis

As mentioned above, courts, tribunals, and commentators generally
agree that non-state actors can hold obligations under international law.
The large majority of such courts, tribunals, and commentators do not

26.
Continental Shelf (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya/Malta), Judgment, 1985 I.C.J. Rep. 13, ¶ 27
(June 3) (emphasis added); see also Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua
(Nicar. v U.S.), Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. Rep. 14, ¶ 183 (June 27).
27.
Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38(1)(b), June 26, 1945, 3 Bevans 1153,
UKTS 67 (1946).
28.
Alain Pellet, Article 38, in THE STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE: A
COMMENTARY 677, 766 (Andreas Zimmerman, et al. eds., 2012).
29.
Nuclear Tests (Austl. v. Fr.), Judgment, 1974 I.C.J. Rep. 253, ¶ 43 (Dec. 20); Nuclear
Tests (N.Z. v. Fr.), Judgment, 1974 I.C.J. Rep. 457, ¶ 46 (Dec. 20).
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propound a theory for how non-state actors acquire such obligations. Those
that do tend to only propose such a theory in their particular area of
international law. This Section examines these theories.

1.

International Humanitarian Law

International humanitarian law (IHL) is perhaps the area of
international law where scholars have discussed the question of how nonstate actors acquire obligations the most. The question arises most
frequently in the context of non-international armed conflicts (NIACs).
Common Article 3 (CA3) and Additional Protocol II (APII) both apply in
NIACs. 30 The issue, however, is that NIACs are generally conflicts
between a state and a non-state actor. It would be unfair for IHL
obligations to apply only to one side of an armed conflict. As a result,
commentators generally agree that CA3 and APII apply not only to states
engaged in NIACs, but also to non-state actors engaged in NIACs. States
acquire obligations under CA3 and APII by ratifying or acceding to the
respective treaties. The question, however, is how non-state actors acquire
obligations under CA3 and APII.
Three major groups of theories have developed in this regard.31 The
first and most popular group of theories holds that CA3 and APII apply to
non-state actors through the state’s ratification of or accession to the treaty
because of the treaty’s incorporation into domestic law, and/or the fact that
the non-state actors are nationals of, on the territory of, and/or within the
jurisdiction of the state. As Antonio Cassese notes, however, this group of
theories arguably confuses international law and domestic law.32 It may
explain how obligations become binding on the non-state actor under
domestic law, but it does not explain how obligations under international
law are imposed on the non-state actors.33
The second group of theories holds that CA3 and APII apply to nonstate actors through the non-state actors’ consent to their application by
virtue of unilateral acts or Article 35 of the VCLT (as applied to non-state

30.
Article 19 of The Hague Convention on Cultural Property of 1954 also applies in NIACs,
but commentary tends to focus on CA3 and APII. See Convention for the Protection of Cultural
Property in the Event of Armed Conflict art. 19, May 14, 1954, 249 U.N.T.S. 215.
31.
For commentary attempting to enumerate the theories, see Andrew Clapham, Non-State
Actors, in INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 557, 557–79 (Daniel Moeckli, et al. eds., 3d ed. 2017);
Clapham, Human Rights Obligations, supra note 11, at 498; Cassese, supra note 1212, at 420–30;
Milanoviü, supra note 16, at 39.
32.

See Cassese, supra note 12, at 429.

33.

See id.
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actors rather than states). Cassese has been an advocate of the latter.34 The
first requirement of Article 35—that “the parties to the treaty intend the
provision to be the means of establishing the obligation”35—is met by the
fact that the parties to the Geneva Conventions and APII undoubtedly
intended the treaties to apply to all sides of a NIAC, including non-state
actors. The trickier part is the second requirement—the requirement that
“the [non-state actor] expressly accepts that obligation in writing.” 36
Cassese recognizes that:
As for the second test, i.e. the assent by the third party to the
rights or duties deriving from the treaty, it will of course be
necessary to determine in each civil war whether rebels are ready
and willing to accept the Protocol. This willingness may be
shown in various ways; by a unilateral declaration addressed to
the Government, by tacit compliance with the Protocol, by a
request to the ICRC to intervene and guarantee respect for the
Protocol, or by any other similar means. 37

Interestingly, he appears to take the view that the acceptance need not
be express nor in writing, as he considers “tacit compliance with the
Protocol” as a means of expressing acceptance of obligations thereunder.38
The third group of theories is that CA3 and APII apply as customary
or treaty law to non-state actors either because the customary or treaty rules
apply to non-state actors generally, apply to non-state actors that reach a
certain level of organization, apply to non-state actors that exercise statelike functions, and/or apply to non-state actors that claim to represent the
state.

2.

International Human Rights Law

International human rights law (IHRL) is another area where there is
significant literature on how non-state actors acquire obligations under
international law. It is now widely accepted that many human rights
treaties confer rights on individuals. But there is a question as to whether
non-state actors have the obligation under international law to respect such
rights. In particular, a question that has often arisen in this context is

34.

See id. at 420–30.

35.

VCLT, supra note 14, art. 35.

36.

Id.

37.

Cassese, supra note 12, at 428.

38.

Id.
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whether corporations have international obligations to respect economic,
social, and cultural rights (ESCRs).
The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR),
which monitors the implementation of the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), appears to answer this
question in the negative. The ICESCR confers rights on individuals, and
the CESCR has recognized the importance of corporations in respecting
these rights. Nevertheless, the CESCR has focused its attention on state
obligations under the ICESCR, not corporate obligations.39 Similarly, the
International Labour Organization (ILO) has adopted many conventions
that confer rights on individuals and aim to ensure that corporations respect
labour rights. Nevertheless, as far as the present author is aware, the ILO
conventions do not impose any direct obligations on corporations. Rather,
they impose obligations on state parties to enact legislation and take other
measures in order to influence the conduct of corporations and ultimately
achieve the conventions’ objectives.40
If one is to argue that corporations have obligations to respect ESCRs,
one would have to identify a particular theory under which they acquire
such obligations. One could adopt—and scholars have adopted—any of the
three groups of theories discussed above in the context of IHL for this
question as it relates to IHRL. One could argue that corporations acquire
such an obligation by virtue of the state’s ratification of or accession to the
ICESCR because of the treaty’s incorporation into domestic law and/or the
fact that the corporations are nationals of, on the territory of, and/or within
the jurisdiction of the state. Or perhaps, corporations may expressly or
impliedly consent to the obligation of respecting ESCRs or the obligation
could also arise from customary law, whether it be a customary rule that
applies to corporations generally, applies to corporations that reach a
certain level of organization, and/or applies to corporations that exercise
state-like functions. All of these theories could rationally be invoked.
An additional theory has also been proposed in this context. Steven
Ratner has argued that, contrary to the text of the ILO conventions, “both
the purpose of the conventions and their wording make clear that they do

39.
See, e.g., Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 24
(2017) on State Obligations Under the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
in the Context of Business Activities, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/GC/24 (Aug. 10, 2017) [hereinafter General
Comment No. 24]; Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Statement on the Obligations
of State Parties Regarding the Corporate Sector and Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, U.N. Doc.
E/C.12/2011/1 (July 12, 2011).
40.
See, e.g., Convention (No. 111) Concerning Discrimination in Respect of Employment
and Occupation arts. 2–3, June 25, 1958, 362 U.N.T.S. 31 (entered into force June 15, 1960).
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recognize duties on enterprises regarding their employees.”41 In particular,
he argues that the affirmation of rights in the conventions imply
corresponding obligations. As an example, he notes:
[O]ne of the ILO’s so-called core conventions, the 1949
Convention Concerning the Application of the Principles of the
Right To Organise and To Bargain Collectively, states simply,
“Workers shall enjoy adequate protection against acts of antiunion discrimination in respect of their employment.” While
clearly an injunction to governments to enact legislation against
certain behavior by industry, the obligation also entails, indeed
presupposes, a duty on the corporation not to interfere with the
ability of employees to form unions.42

The investor-state tribunal in the recent case of Urbaser v. Argentina
took a similar approach. It effectively held that corporations acquire the
obligation to respect ESCRs under the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights (UDHR) because it is an implied “corresponding obligation”
derivative from the mere existence of rights.43 The tribunal stated:
It may be said that these and other provisions do not state more
than rights pertaining to each individual. Nevertheless, in order
to ensure that such rights be enjoyed by each person, it must
necessarily also be ensured that no other individual or entity,
public or private, may act in disregard of such rights, which then
implies a corresponding obligation.44

Nevertheless, neither Ratner nor the Urbaser v. Argentina tribunal
explain how a corporation acquires such obligations in the framework of
the sources of international law.

41.
Steven R. Ratner, Corporations and Human Rights: A Theory of Legal Responsibility,
111 YALE L.J. 443, 478 (2001).
42.
Id. at 478–79. Ratner also argues that certain conventions impose direct obligations by
virtue of their text. He cites to Article 16(1) of the Occupational Safety and Health Convention, which
provides that “[e]mployers shall be required to ensure that, so far as is reasonably practicable, the
workplaces, machinery, equipment and processes under their control are safe and without risk to
health.” Id. at 479 n.139. Nevertheless, he fails to note that the language “shall be required” does not
impose a direct obligation on the employer, but rather on another entity (probably the State) that has the
power to impose requirements on the employer. See id. at 478–79, 479 n.139.
43.
Urbaser S.A. and Consorcio de Aguas Bilbao Bizkaia, Bilbao Biskaia Ur Partzuergoa v.
Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/26, Award, ¶ 1196 (Dec. 8, 2016).
44.

Id.
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International Investment Law

Although IIAs generally impose obligations on states, some IIAs—
particularly newer ones—also impose obligations on investors. A recent
example is the Morocco-Nigeria Bilateral Investment Treaty, Article 14 of
which provides in relevant part:
(1) Investors . . . shall comply with environmental assessment
screening . . . .
(2) Investors . . . shall conduct a social impact assessment of the
potential investment . . . .
(3) Investors . . . shall apply the precautionary principle to their
environmental impact assessment.45

An older example is the Investment Agreement of the Organization of
the Islamic Conference (OIC Agreement), Article 9 of which provides:
The investor shall be bound by the laws and regulations in force
in the host state and shall refrain from all acts that may disturb
public order or morals or that may be prejudicial to the public
interest. He is also to refrain from exercising restrictive practices
and from trying to achieve gains through unlawful means. 46

The question is, then, how the investor acquires obligations under such
IIAs. On the one hand, one can argue that the obligations are automatically
imposed on the investor because the investor is operating within the
jurisdiction and/or on the territory of the states in question. On the other
hand, one may ask how the investor can express its acceptance of the
obligations imposed by the IIA. There are many options here. One can
argue that the investor accepts the obligations, inter alia, by merely owning
an investment in one of the contracting states (such that the obligations
would apply in respect of all investments); by the act of investing in one of
the contracting states (such that the obligations would only apply in respect
of investments made after the entry into force of the IIA); or by the act of
filing an investment claim against the host state (such that the obligations
would only apply in respect of investments whose investors filed a claim
with respect to the investments in question). The investor-state tribunal in
45.
Reciprocal Investment Promotion and Protection Agreement between the Government of
the Kingdom of Morocco and the Government of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, Morocco-Nigeria, art
14., Dec. 3, 2016. See also id. art. 18(2)–(3) (stating that “[i]nvestors . . . shall uphold human rights in
the host state [and] [i]nvestors . . . shall act in accordance with core labour standards as required”).
46.
Agreement on Promotion, Protection and Guarantee of Investments Among Member
States of the Organization of the Islamic Conference, art. 9, June 5, 1981.

410

ILSA Journal of International & Comparative Law

[Vol. 24:2

Al-Warraq v. Indonesia, in the context of examining the applicability of
Article 9 of the OIC Agreement, adopted this last approach.47
C.

Lex Generalis

In light of this examination of international humanitarian law,
international human rights law, and international investment law, there are
four general theories for how non-state actors may acquire obligations
under international law: (1) the non-state actor acquires an obligation
because the non-state actor is a national of, on the territory of, or within the
jurisdiction of a state that is bound by the obligation; (2) the non-state actor
acquires an obligation because the non-state actor consented to the
obligation; (3) the non-state actor acquires an obligation because customary
law directly binds that non-state actor; and (4) the non-state actor acquires
an obligation because the obligation corresponds to a right established in
international law. The first three theories have been invoked in the context
of international humanitarian law, all four in the context of international
human rights law, and only the first two in international investment law.
International
Humanitarian
Law

International
Human Rights
Law

International
Investment Law

Theory 1
(Relationship with
State)

X

X

X

Theory 2
(Consent)

X

X

X

Theory 3
(Custom)

X

X

Theory 4
(Corresponding
Obligation)

X

If one adopts the voluntarist paradigm for non-state actors, then the
first, third, and fourth theories could not hold water. The first theory is
47.
2014).

Hesham Talaat M al-Warraq v. Republic of Indon., Final Award, ¶¶ 662–63 (Dec. 15,
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weak because the mere fact that states can impose obligations on non-state
actors in domestic law, does not mean they can also do so in international
law. The third theory is weak because there has been very little study on
the practice and opinio juris of non-state actors. And the fourth theory is
weak because it relies on a purely abstract logic rather than one grounded in
any of the sources of international law.
III. JURISDICTION OVER THE NON-STATE ACTOR
Another element that a successful claimant must establish is that the
judicial body has jurisdiction over the matter. In general, there are four
dimensions of jurisdiction: jurisdiction ratione personae, ratione materiae,
ratione temporis, and ratione loci. The questions of jurisdiction ratione
materiae, ratione temporis, and ratione loci are for the most part the same
regardless of whether the respondent is a state or a non-state actor. The
question with respect to jurisdiction ratione personae, however, raises some
novel questions in cases where the respondent is a non-state actor.
A.

Theory

The fundamental principle governing jurisdiction ratione personae is
the principle of consent: in order for a judicial body to have jurisdiction
over a subject, the subject must consent to the judicial body’s jurisdiction.48
States give such consent most often by treaty (e.g., dispute settlement
clauses, special agreements, arbitration treaties). Nevertheless, states have
also given such consent by unilateral act (e.g., Article 36(2) declarations,
forum prorogatum49). In addition, according to some, states may also give
such consent by operation of a general principle of law: estoppel.50
48.
Status of Eastern Carelia, Advisory Opinion, 1923 P.C.I.J. (ser. B) No. 5, ¶ 33 (July 23,
1923); Monetary Gold Removed from Rome in 1943 (It. v. Fr., U.K. & U.S.), Judgment, 1954 I.C.J.
Rep. 19, 32 (June 15).
49.
See Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Albania), Judgment, 1948 I.C.J. Rep. 15 (Mar. 25); Certain
Questions of Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters (Djib. v. Fr.), Judgment, 2008 I.C.J. Rep. 177, ¶¶
60–64 (June 4); Certain Criminal Proceedings in France (Congo v. Fr.), Provisional Measure Order,
2003 I.C.J. Rep. 102, ¶ 21 (June 17); Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary Between Ghana and Côte
d’Ivoire in the Atlantic Ocean (Ghana/Côte d’Ivoire), ITLOS Case No. 23, Judgment of Sept. 23, 2017,
https://www.itlos.org/en/cases/list-of-cases/case-no-23/#c3685.
50.
See “ARA Libertad” (Argentina v. Ghana), ITLOS Case No. 20, Order, ITLOS Rep. ¶ 52–
73 (Dec. 15, 2012), https://www.itlos.org/fileadmin/itlos/documents/cases/case_no.20/publish
ed/C20_Order_151212.pdf. But see Achmea B.V. v. Slovak Republic, PCA Case No. 2008-13, Award
on
Jurisdiction,
Arbitrability
and
Suspension,
¶
219
(Oct.
26,
2010),
https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0309.pdf; Megan L. Wagner, Jurisdiction
by Estoppel in the International Court of Justice, 74 CALIF. L. REV. 1777, 1777 (1986).
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Although non-state actors cannot conclude treaties, they can still
consent to a judicial body’s jurisdiction by internationalized agreements,
Article 35 of the VCLT, as well as by unilateral act and, in theory, estoppel.
Indeed, non-state actors have given such consent, most often by unilateral
act, when acting as claimants. In such contexts, the question of jurisdiction
ratione personae is a non-issue because it is assumed that the non-state
actor consents to jurisdiction by the mere act of filing the claim. In cases
where the non-state actor is a respondent, however, the issue is not as
straightforward.
B.

Lex Specialis

Currently, international judicial bodies have jurisdiction ratione
personae over non-state actors acting as respondents in at least three areas
of international law: international investment law,51 the law of the sea,52
and international criminal law. 53 This section examines how non-state
actors consent to the jurisdiction of the judicial body in these three areas of
law.

1.

International Investment Law

In all known investor-state arbitrations to date, the investor has always
been the party initiating the arbitration. As a result, the issue of jurisdiction
over non-state actors as respondents arises only where the state files
counterclaims. Both the International Centre for Settlement of Investment
Disputes (ICSID) Convention and the United Nations Commission on
International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) Arbitration Rules allow for
counterclaims, but the counterclaims must be within the jurisdiction ratione
materiae and jurisdiction ratione personae of the arbitral tribunal.54
Many IIAs do not allow for counterclaims because they grant investorstate tribunals jurisdiction ratione materiae only over disputes concerning
51.
See, e.g., Burlington Resources, Inc. v. Republic of Ecuador, ICSID Case No. ARB/08/5,
Decision on Ecuador’s Counterclaims (Feb. 7, 2017); Urbaser S.A. and Consorcio de Aguas Bilbao
Bizkaia, Bilbao Biskaia Ur Partzuergoa v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/26, Award
(Dec. 8, 2016).
52.

See UNCLOS, supra note 10, art. 187(c)–(e).

53.
See, e.g., Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 1, July 17, 1998, 2187
U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force July 1, 2002).
54.
See Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of
Other States art. 46, Mar. 18, 1965, 17 U.S.T. 1270, 575 U.N.T.S. 159 [hereinafter ICSID Convention];
G.A. Res. 31/98, Arbitration Rules of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (Dec.
15, 1976).
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the host state’s allegedly wrongful conduct. For example, Article 9 of the
Greece-Romania bilateral investment treaty (BIT) grants jurisdiction
ratione materiae only over “[d]isputes between an investor of a Contracting
Party and the other Contracting Party concerning an obligation of the latter
under this Agreement”.55 On the other hand, the language of other IIAs is
broader. In Urbaser v. Argentina, the provision at stake was Article X(1) of
the Argentina-Spain BIT, which grants jurisdiction ratione materiae over
“disputes . . . in connection with the investments.”56 In such cases where a
tribunal has jurisdiction ratione materiae over the counterclaim, it must
then proceed to examine whether it has jurisdiction ratione personae over
the investor as a respondent. Investor-state tribunals have declared that
they have jurisdiction ratione personae over investors as respondents on the
basis of two grounds.
First, in some cases, the investor and the state expressly conclude an
agreement granting the tribunal jurisdiction over the counterclaim. For
example, in MINE v. Guinea57 and Atlantic Triton v. Guinea,58 such consent
was given in the concession agreements in question, and in Burlington v.
Ecuador, it was given in a separate agreement.59
Second, in other cases, the investor does not expressly grant the tribunal
jurisdiction over counterclaims. Here, a question arises as to whether the
claimant’s submission of the principal claim to arbitration qualifies as consent to
counterclaims that may be filed against it. In the recent cases of Goetz v. Burundi
(II), 60 Al-Warraq v. Indonesia, 61 and Urbaser v. Argentina, 62 the tribunal
answered this question in the affirmative.

55.
The treaty is not publicly available, but this provision was quoted in Spyridon Roussalis v.
Romania, ICSID Case No ARB/06/1, Award, ¶ 868 (Dec. 7, 2011). In that case, Romania filed a
counterclaim, but the tribunal held that it did not have jurisdiction over it. Id. ¶ 869.
56.

Argentina-Spain BIT, supra note 9, art. 10(1).

57.
Maritime Int’l Nominees Establishment (MINE) v. Republic of Guinea, ICSID Case No.
ARB/84/4, Award, (Jan. 6, 1988), 4 ICSID Rep. 61 (1997).
58.
Atlantic Triton Co. Ltd. v. People’s Revolutionary Republic of Guinea, ICSID Case No.
ARB/84/1, Award, (Apr. 21, 1986), 3 ICSID Rep. 13 (1995).
59.
See, e.g., Burlington Resources, Inc. v. Republic of Ecuador, ICSID Case No. ARB/08/5,
Decision on Ecuador’s Counterclaims, ¶ 60 (Feb. 7, 2017).
60.
Antoine Goetz & Consorts & Others and S.A. Affinage des Metaux v. Republic of
Burundi, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/2, Award, ¶ 278 (June 21, 2012).
61.

See Hesham Talaat M al-Warraq v. Republic of Indon., Final Award, ¶¶ 662–64 (Dec. 15,

2014).
62.
Urbaser S.A. and Consorcio de Aguas Bilbao Bizkaia, Bilbao Biskaia Ur Partzuergoa v.
Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/26, Award, ¶ 1147 (Dec. 8, 2016).
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Law of the Sea

Article 187(c) of UNCLOS grants the ITLOS Seabed Disputes
Chamber jurisdiction ratione materiae over disputes with contractors
operating in the deep seabed. 63 Since contractors cannot be party to
UNCLOS, the question is how the Chamber may acquire jurisdiction
ratione personae over contractors.
The answer is contracts. Any contractor engaging in exploration or
exploitation of the deep seabed must have a contract in force with the
International Seabed Authority (ISA), the intergovernmental authority that
organizes and controls activities in the deep seabed. 64 The ISA has
developed standard terms for exploration contracts, which read: “Any
dispute between the parties concerning the interpretation or application of
this contract shall be settled in accordance with Part XI, section 5, of the
Convention.”65 The current draft standard terms for exploitation contracts
is substantially the same.66

3.

International Criminal Law

In international criminal law (ICL), unlike in international investment
law and the law of the sea, it is very difficult to argue that the non-state
actor in question—the individual on trial—consented, even impliedly, to
the jurisdiction of the judicial body. One thus should question how
international criminal courts and tribunals acquire jurisdiction ratione
personae over individuals.
Interestingly enough, scholars tend to sidestep this question. 67 The
few that have addressed it rely on a single theory: states delegate their
punitive power to international criminal courts and tribunals by way of
63.

UNCLOS, supra note 10, art. 187(c) (emphasis added).

64.

Id. art. 157(1).

65.
Decision of the Council of the International Seabed Authority Relating to Amendments to
the Regulations on Prospecting and Exploration for Polymetallic Nodules in the Area and Related
Matters at Its Nineteenth Session, ISA Doc. ISBA/19/C/17, at annex IV, sec. 25.1 (July 22, 2013);
Decision of the Assembly of the International Seabed Authority Relating to the Regulations on
Prospecting and Exploration for Cobalt-Rich Ferromanganese Crusts in the Area at Its Eighteenth
Session, ISA Doc. ISBA/18/A/11, at annex IV, sec. 25.1 (Oct. 22, 2012); Decision of the Assembly of
the International Seabed Authority Relating to the Regulations on Prospecting and Exploration for
Polymetallic Sulphides in the Area at Its Sixteenth Session, ISA Doc. ISBA/16/A/12/Rev.1, at annex 4,
sec. 25.1 (Nov. 15, 2010).
66.
INT’L SEABED AUTH., DEVELOPING A REGULATORY FRAMEWORK FOR MINERAL
EXPLOITATION IN THE AREA 76, annex VI, Sec. 43 (2016).
67.
See, e.g., Micaela Frulli, Jurisdiction Ratione Personae, in THE ROME STATUTE OF THE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A COMMENTARY 527, 532–33 (Antonio Cassese et al. eds., 2002).
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treaty (e.g., International Criminal Court), U.N. Security Council resolution
(e.g., International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia,
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda), or occupying authority (e.g.,
Nuremberg, Tokyo, Iraq).68 As the International Military Tribunal held:
The Signatory Powers created this Tribunal, defined the law it
was to administer, and made regulations for the proper conduct
of the Trial. In doing so, they have done together what any one
of them might have done singly; for it is not to be doubted that
any nation has the right [thus] to set up special courts to
administer law. With regard to the constitution of the Court, all
that the defendants are entitled to ask is to receive a fair trial on
the facts and law.69

C.

Lex Generalis

In light of this examination of international investment law, law of the
sea, and international criminal law, there are three general theories for how
non-state actors may consent to the jurisdiction of an international judicial
body: (1) the non-state actor concludes an agreement with the state; (2) the
non-state actor consents to jurisdiction by unilateral act; and (3) the state
delegates power it has under domestic law to the judicial body acting under
international law. The first two theories have been invoked in the context
of international investment law, the first theory in the context of the law of
the sea, and only the last theory in international criminal law.
International
Investment Law

Law of the Sea

Agreement

X

X

Unilateral Act

X

Delegated Power

International
Criminal Law

X

68.
See, e.g., 1 KAI AMBOS, TREATISE ON INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 57 (2013); Robert
Cryer, International Criminal Law vs State Sovereignty: Another Round?, 16 EUR. J. INT’L L. 979, 985
(2006).
69.
Trial of the Major War Crimes Before the International Military Tribunal, Judgment (Oct.
1, 1946), reprinted in 41 AM. J. INT’L L. 172, 216–17 (1947).
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If one adopts the voluntarist paradigm for non-state actors, then the
last theory would not be valid. The first two theories, however, would be
perfectly acceptable given that they are based on the consent of the nonstate actor. Nevertheless, it would be unlikely for any individual subject to
an international criminal proceeding to consent to the proceedings against
him or her. One may thus consider international criminal law to be an
exception—a justifiable lex specialis. After all, in domestic law, criminal
cases similarly do not require the consent of the parties. It would thus be
unrealistic to impose a consent requirement in international criminal law.
IV. CONCLUSION
This Article examined two elements that must be established to make a
successful claim against a non-state actor: (1) how non-state actors acquire
obligations under international law; and (2) how international judicial
bodies acquire jurisdiction ratione personae over non-state actors.
Interestingly, the five different areas of law examined deal with these two
elements differently, and associated commentators have propounded
varying theories with regards to the two elements. Thus, there appears to
be greater divergence than convergence.
This raises the question of whether a lex generalis is appropriate for nonstate actors acting as respondents. Perhaps, unlike the regimes for states and
international organizations, the regime for non-state actors should exist only as
lex specialis in particular areas of law. This way, one can better explain why
there are divergences with regards to the two aforementioned elements in the
examined areas of law. On the other hand, one can argue that this divergence
is problematic because the fundamental principles of international adjudication
should be the same across the board. As a result, a divergence between two
areas of law actually means that at least one area of law is not treating non-state
actors as they should be treated.
Regardless of which perspective one takes, the ultimate conclusion of
this Article is that non-state actors acting as respondents before
international judicial bodies must be taken seriously as subjects of
international law. Taking them seriously means that they should, for the
most part, have the same protections that states have: (1) non-state actors
should not be subject to obligations under international law unless one can
point to a concrete source of international law that imposes such an
obligation on them; and (2) international judicial bodies should not have
jurisdiction ratione personae over non-state actors without their consent.
Only by respecting these principles, though perhaps with a few exceptions,
can one hope to develop a legitimate system for non-state actors acting as
respondents before international judicial bodies.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

Those involved in peace negotiations often face the dilemma of
balancing demands for justice with the imperative of stopping the conflict
as quickly as possible. There are abiding ethical and moral debates
surrounding this tension between peace and justice. In Syria—where the
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death toll has exceeded 470,000, 11 million have been displaced, and there
are over 14,000 documented cases of death by torture1—the peace versus
justice puzzle is a living dilemma with which those involved in the peace
process grapple with on a daily basis.
Is it morally permissible to allow conflict (and the attendant human
suffering) to continue, so as to advance the possibility of achieving justice
in the form of accountability against the perpetrators of the violence?
Alternatively, if justice is set aside to achieve peace more rapidly, and
accountability is delayed or even prevented, is the resulting harm (including
a possible return to conflict) acceptable? The debate between peace and
justice lives in delegation meetings, offices of legal advisors, foreign
ministries, and state governments. In the midst of a crisis, negotiators and
those who advise them often must confront the tradeoff between peace and
justice. Indeed, the questions being debated in the Syrian peace process
reflect this lingering puzzle that negotiators have grappled with for decades.
Individuals must determine their priorities in this regard and create a
pragmatic strategy towards achieving that outcome. It is important to
understand the primary tenants of the peace versus justice puzzle in order
for those involved in a particular peace process to best solve this puzzle.
This article does not propose to answer the weighty question of which
approach best resolves the conundrum of peace and justice, nor does the
article intend to recommend a solution to the complex intricacies of
attempting to merge the two together. Rather, this article strives to examine
a timely facet of this multidimensional puzzle: how to successfully
accommodate the desire for justice by artfully weaving tenets of
accountability into a peace process, without undermining a peace process.
One answer to this pressing question is that the best method is to avoid
justice in the peace process altogether. This is the peace-first approach.
Another, competing answer, is that the most salient choice is to treat justice
as a foundational building block of the peace process. This is the justicefirst approach. There is also a third answer, which suggests that the most
effective method for solving the puzzle is to strike a delicate blend of
justice with peace.
As illustrated by the experiences of a rich array of countries that have
grappled with these questions, there is no clear consensus on the degree of
justice that ought to be brought in to a peace process, nor when and how
justice ought to be introduced. There is, however, a clearer sense that
however these questions are ultimately resolved, there should be at least a
modicum of justice. Although there is an increasing trend towards a

1.
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, WORLD REPORT: EVENTS OF 2016 571 (2017), https://www.
hrw.org/sites/default/files/world_report_download/wr2017-web.pdf [hereinafter HRW WORLD REPORT:
EVENTS OF 2016].
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holistic role of justice in the peace process, the question of “how much
justice” remains unresolved.
The Syrian conflict provides a particularly useful foil in examining
this puzzle. After initial uncertainty as to which approach would take
primacy in the Syrian peace process, the failure of pivotal efforts to
introduce accountability measures at the United Nations (U.N.) Security
Council placed the conflict squarely with the peace-first approach. Since
then, however, actors have persistently pursued efforts to weave in justice
into the peace process, through efforts to document violations, to lay the
foundation for victim catharsis, and to engage in new and creative options
for prosecutorial activity.
This article will first explore the peace-first approach: the priorities of
the supporters of this approach, the potential advantages to pursuing peacefirst, and case studies of peace processes that have successfully and
unsuccessfully followed this approach. Next, this article will examine the
justice-first approach in a similar manner. After analyzing the assumed
dichotomy between peace and justice, the article will explore the potential
(although limited) overlap between these two approaches, identifying the
perspective that justice and peace may be compatible in cases where justice
is artfully woven into peace. The article will also identify the limitations to
this approach. Finally, the article will contextualize the peace versus justice
puzzle, with reference to the Syrian conflict. Through an exploration of
each of these topics, the article seeks to examine the puzzle of
accommodating a drive for accountability, without undermining the ability
of the parties to halt a conflict.
II.

THE “PEACE-FIRST” APPROACH

“The quest for justice for yesterday’s victims of atrocities should not be pursued in
such a manner that it makes today’s living the dead of tomorrow.”
Anonymous United Nations Official2

The peace-first approach can best be understood by first understanding
the general perspective and priorities of the approach and then diving
deeper to examine how the approach is implemented in practice. This
section will begin by discussing the tenants of the peace-first approach and
identifying the primary categories of practitioners that support it. Next, the
section will explore the advantages of the peace-first approach in peace
processes. The section will then focus on actions that can be taken to
implement the peace-first approach in the peace process. Finally, to
illuminate the nuances of the approach, this section will explore the case
2.
Anonymous, Human Rights in Peace Negotiations, 18 HUM. RTS. Q. 249, 258 (1996)
[hereinafter Human Rights in Peace Negotiations].
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studies of South Africa, Bougainville, and Yemen and how the peace-first
approach manifested in each context.
A.

Prioritizing Ending the Conflict

As suggested by its name, the peace-first approach prioritizes ending
the conflict above all other interests.3 The singular role of negotiators is to
seek an agreement that brings the most immediate end to the violence.4 All
other goals and concerns that may impede immediate peace should be
pushed aside. In this way, the approach is single-minded and pragmatic:
peace is the priority and any obstacle to peace should be avoided or
eliminated.
There is a tension between ideal outcomes in peace processes and the
outcomes that parties are in fact able to agree to at that moment. 5 The
peace-first approach will always opt for the latter—the most immediate
resolution of the conflict should be pursued. 6 Rather than allowing the
violence to continue while negotiators pursue a more ideal resolution,
ceasing the violence takes precedence. Indeed, achieving justice against
individuals and parties that committed atrocities during the conflict may be
a goal of some parties in the peace process, but it may not be possible to
achieve peace while also pursuing justice.7 As with any other interest, if
the pursuit of justice will prolong the conflict, justice should not be sought.8
The peace-first approach is often associated with parties to the peace
process who have committed atrocities, with the aggressor and frequently
with mediators. The peace negotiator’s role is to end the conflict, not to
assume the role of a prosecutor and assign responsibility or call for justice.9
As articulated by United States (U.S.) Ambassador Richard Holbrooke—a
key figure in mediating the Bosnia’s Dayton Accords—when asked as to
why he continuously declined to indicate Serbian President Slobodan
Milosevic's guilt for the war and atrocities in the former Yugoslavia, 10

3.

Id. at 251.

4.

Id. at 255–56.

5.

Id. at 249, 252.

6.

See id. at 252.

7.

I. William Zartman, Negotiating Forward- and Backward-Looking Outcomes, in PEACE
VERSUS JUSTICE: NEGOTIATING FORWARD-AND BACKWARD-LOOKING OUTCOMES 1, 6 (I. William
Zartman & Victor Kremenyuk eds., 2005).
8.

Id.

9.

Human Rights in Peace Negotiations, supra note 2, at 256.

10.
Michael P. Scharf & Paul R. Williams, Functions of Justice and Anti-Justice in the PeaceBuilding Process, 35 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 161, 186 (2003).͒
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“[t]his is tough slogging, and my job was not to make moral judgments, [ . .
. ] and the highest goal here was to avoid war and bring peace.”11
B.

Benefits of the Peace-First Approach

The peace-first approach’s prioritization of ending the conflict has
advantages. Bringing immediate peace saves lives and ends human
suffering. 12 Additionally, peace ends harm to the environment and
destruction of infrastructure, which are by-products of the conflict, and
reconstruction efforts may begin sooner. 13 The focus on peace also
encourages national reconciliation and social reconciliation.14
1.

Saving Lives

Ending the conflict as soon as possible results in lives being saved and
human suffering ceasing more rapidly. Pursuing objectives other than
peace may prolong the conflict and thus result in more casualties and harm.
Although atrocities may have been committed, ending the conflict as
quickly as possible prevents more from occurring.15
2.

Ending Harm to the Environment and Infrastructure

Conflicts have disastrous impacts on the natural environment and
infrastructure. Achieving peace not only ends the harm being caused to the
environment and infrastructure, but also allows reconstruction efforts to
begin in the state sooner than if the conflict was to continue. By
prioritizing peace, the natural environment can be protected and efforts to
heal it can be initiated. Additionally, prioritizing peace allows the state and
its people to begin rebuilding its infrastructure—such as homes, hospitals,
schools, roads, and power supplies—sooner.
More immediate

11.
Hearings on the Nomination of Hon. Richard C. Holbrooke to Serve as U.S. Ambassador
to the United Nations: Hearings Before the Comm. on Foreign Rel. U.S. Sen., 106th Cong. 101–02
(1999) (statement of Hon. Richard C. Holbrooke).
12.

Human Rights in Peace Negotiations, supra note 2, at 250.

13.
U.N., Dep’t of Econ & Soc. Affairs, Peacebuilding Support Off., Peacebuilding
Commission, Working Group on Lessons Learned, Economic Revitalization in Peacebuilding and the
Development of Service Based Infrastructure 1, 4 (Nov. 22, 2010), http://www.un.org/en/peacebuilding/
pdf/doc_wgll/desa_pbso_background_paper.pdf [hereinafter Revitalization in Peacebuilding].
14.
See Orlaith Minogue, Peace vs. Justice: The Utility of Amnesties, 29 CRIM. JUST. ETHICS
306, 308 (2010); Dwight G. Newman, The Rome Statute, Some Reservations Concerning Amnesties,
and A Distributive Problem, 20 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 293, 304–06 (2005).
15.

See Human Rights in Peace Negotiations, supra note 2, at 258.
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reconstruction in turn prevents the compounding of harmful byproducts of
the conflict, such as lack of access to medical attention or education.16
3.

Promoting Reconciliation

Achieving peace without pursuing justice can lead to national and
social reconciliation. Undertaking prosecutions can allow animosity
between the national and societal factions to continue to fester. Granting
amnesty and achieving peace may instead lead to forgiveness and
reconciliation. 17
Offering amnesty can encourage “gestures of
reconciliation which can contribute to reestablishing normal relations in the
life of a nation which has been divided.”18
C.

Achieving Peace-First in Practice

There are a number of diplomatic tools available to pursue a peacefirst approach. These include limiting peace negotiation participants to
those with the ability to actually end the violence (the guys with guns so to
speak); accommodating and at times appeasing those interests, minimizing
the role of justice mechanisms; and at times providing blanket amnesty.
1.

Singular Objective of Ending the Conflict

To achieve peace, it is necessary to be singularly focused on ending
the conflict. The focus of any agreement is a cessation of hostilities
coupled with subsequent demobilization, demilitarization, and reintegration
of combatants.19 Where necessary some sort of power sharing arrangement
can be established to induce the parties to cease hostilities.20 The mandate
and means for deploying peacekeepers or monitors is also a priority, and
the establishment of some mechanisms to coordinate international
assistance for reconstruction. The mediators and the parties must resist
pressure to expand their mandate to include topics such as deep
constitutional or electoral reform (beyond creating a framework or process
16.

Revitalization in Peacebuilding, supra note 13, at 4, 7–8.

17.

Newman, supra note 14, at 304.

18.
Treaties, States Parties and Commentaries, INT’L COMMITTEE RED CROSS, https://ihldatabases.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/Comment.xsp?action=openDocument&documentId=C6692EB184B
56F56C12563CD0043A476 (last visited Apr. 22, 2018) (discussing the purpose of Additional Protocol
II’s amnesty provision).
19.
See Johannes Langer et al., Peace v. Justice: The Perceived and Real Contradictions of
Conflict Resolution and Human Rights, in 8 CRITERIOS - CUADERNOS DE CIENCIAS JURÍDICAS Y
POLÍTICA INTERNACIONAL 165, 167 (2015) (Colom.).
20.

Id.
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for some future progress on these issues), the creation of new human rights
bodies, and most certainly the establishment of complicated mechanisms
for accountability. 21 The mediators and the parties must avoid the
temptation to be diverted or tempted to use the peace process to create a
modern inclusive democratic state.22 That is the task of the parties—with
assistance from the international community—only after the conflict has
ended.
2.

Negotiating with the Guys with Guns

To end a conflict, it is necessary to induce those actively engaged in
the conflict to cease hostilities. It is not necessary to have the consent of
civil society, refugees, internally displaced persons, marginalized
populations, and women (unless they are armed actors). Including nonarmed actors distracts from the ability of the mediator to navigate the
interests of the armed actors and creates space to introduce issues unrelated
to bringing about an immediate end to the conflict. Only on the rarest
occasions do armed combatants place accountability on the table as a key
interest. Likely this is because anyone engaged in armed activity perceives
that they may be brought before a tribunal; especially in light of the morally
equivalent approach of seeking to “hold all sides accountable” even when
one party is responsible for the overwhelming majority of atrocities. Only
armed combatants should be at the negotiation table, and the mediator
should engage exclusively with their interests.
3.

Accommodation and Appeasement

Frequently it is necessary to accommodate or even appease the
interests of the armed actors. While there is an emerging global consensus
on issues such as democratic reform and the protection of human rights,
these are seldom the objectives of all the major armed groups participating
in the conflict. At times one of the armed groups is interested in promoting
the demise of a repressive regime or defending a marginalized population
from oppression. At other times the armed group is just interested in “their
turn at the table” of corruption and repression.
There is always one major armed group—often the government—that
is interested in retaining the status quo, and it is unlikely that the status quo
is a democratic and human rights-respecting political structure. Frequently,
it is in the interest of one or more of the armed groups to avoid
accountability for any crimes that may have been committed by it or its

21.

Id.

22.

Id. at 177.
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forces during the conflict.23 Given that nearly every conflict in the past few
decades involved the commission of war crimes or crimes against humanity
by at least one of the armed actors, there is little appetite for accountability.
It is the job of the mediator to find a way to embrace the political reality
and accommodate these less than ideal or altruistic interests to get the
armed actors to cease the killing.24
4.

Minimizing Justice

To accommodate or appease the armed actors it is often, if not always,
necessary to minimize the creation of any mechanisms of justice that may
be used to hold the armed actors accountable for war crimes.25 Who, after
all, would sign an agreement that might bring an end to a conflict, only to
find that he will be tried for war crimes, delegitimized in the eyes of his
community, and incarcerated, preventing him from enjoying the fruits
(legitimate or otherwise) of his armed actions?
In fact, recent statistical research indicates that for conflicts between
2002 and 2013, the involvement of the International Criminal Court (ICC)
in a conflict significantly decreased the probability of reaching a timely end
to the conflict.26 The author of this research points out that the pursuit of
justice may undermine peace by “threatening leaders’ political survival and
personal freedom.”27 Moreover, an armed party may also be incentivized to
continue the conflict to make the gathering of evidence against them more
difficult.28 Even justice-based mechanisms that are not prosecutorial, like
truth commissions, should be avoided because they may also prolong
negotiations and the conflict. The mediators must always remember that no
matter how morally appealing it may be to create accountability for war
crimes, assigning responsibility or punishing bad acts is not the purpose of
the peace process—the only concern is ending the conflict.29

23.

Id. at 170–71.

24.

See Langer et al., supra note 19, at 170–71.

25.

Id. at 170.

26.
Alyssa K. Prorok, The (In)compatibility of Peace and Justice? The International Criminal
Court and Civil Conflict Termination, 71 INT’L ORG. 213, 214–15 (2017).
27.

Id. at 215.

28.
Id. at 222 (prohibiting evidence gathering undermines investigators’ ability to develop
sufficient evidence to start a case).
29.

See Human Rights in Peace Negotiations, supra note 2, at 256.
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Amnesty

In addition to minimizing the creation of accountability mechanisms, it
may be necessary to simply agree upon a blanket or conditional amnesty.30
Because actors may be unwilling to step down from power or cease
hostilities so long as they or their associates face the possibility of
punishment, amnesties may be leveraged as a trade-off.31 In some instances
there may be no alternative to granting amnesty as a precondition, so as to
end the conflict more rapidly. 32 While morally unappealing, so is the
prospect of the further loss of life. Amnesty has been an integral part of
numerous peace agreements, including Bougainville, 33 Sierra Leone, 34
South Africa,35 and Yemen.36
D.

Case Studies

The peace-first approach has been tried and implemented in many
conflicts. South Africa is often used as the archetype of success for the
approach and the model of the benefits of prioritizing peace.37 In 1948, the
white National Party became the governing party of South Africa.38 The
party consolidated its power and instituted the statewide program of

30.
PAUL R. WILLIAMS & MICHAEL P. SCHARF, PEACE WITH JUSTICE?: WAR CRIMES AND
ACCOUNTABILITY IN THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA 29 (2002).
31.
Darryl Robinson, Serving the Interests of Justice: Amnesties, Truth Commissions and the
International Criminal Court, 14 EUR. J. INT’L L. 481, 495 (2003).
32.

Minogue, supra note 14, at 307.

33.
Amnesty:
Bougainville Peace Agreement, Art. 331, PEACE ACCORDS MATRIX,
https://peaceaccords.nd.edu/provision/amnesty-bougainville-peace-agreement (last visited Apr. 22,
2018) [hereinafter Bougainville Peace Agreement]; Amnesty: Lincoln Agreement, Art. 10, PEACE
ACCORDS MATRIX, https://peaceaccords.nd.edu/provision/amnesty-bougainville-peace-agreement (last
visited Apr. 22, 2018) [hereinafter Lincoln Agreement].
34.
Amnesty:
Lomé Peace Agreement, Art. IX, PEACE ACCORDS MATRIX,
https://peaceaccords.nd.edu/provision/amnesty-lom-peace-agreement (last visited Apr. 22, 2018).
35.

S. AFR. (INTERIM) CONST., art. 251, 1993.

36.
AMNESTY INT’L, YEMEN’S IMMUNITY LAW: BREACH OF INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS
11 (2012), https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/24000/mde310072012en.pdf; Yemen:
Amnesty for Saleh and Aides Unlawful, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Jan. 23, 2012, 1:55 PM), https://www.hrw.
org/news/2012/01/23/yemen-amnesty-saleh-and-aides-unlawful [hereinafter Yemen].
37.
Elizabeth Sidiropoulos, South Africa’s Regional Engagement for Peace and Security,
FUNDACIÓN PARA LAS RELACIONES INTERNACIONALES Y EL DIÁLOGO EXTERIOR [FRIDE]
[FOUNDATION FOR INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND FOREIGN DIALOGUE] 1, 7 (2007),
http://fride.org/descarga/south.africa.comment.pdf.
38.
NIGEL WORDEN, THE MAKING OF MODERN SOUTH AFRICA: CONQUEST, APARTHEID,
DEMOCRACY 102–04 (5th ed. 2012) (1994).
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apartheid, or racial segregation for the promotion of white interests. 39
Political violence during the apartheid era led to approximately 75,000
people detained without trial, widespread torture, and 21,000 deaths, with
14,000 of these deaths occurring between 1990 to 1994.40
Negotiations between the all-white apartheid South African
government and the anti-apartheid political parties, including the African
National Congress (ANC), resulted in the 1993 interim constitution of
South Africa, which formed the foundation for the first non-racial general
elections in South Africa.41 The interim constitution included an amnesty
clause providing that all persons and parties shall be granted amnesty for
“acts, omissions and offences associated with political objectives and
committed in the course of the conflicts of the past” through a mechanism
determined by the newly elected Parliament. 42 This provision laid the
foundation for a mechanism to determine conditional amnesties. The
express purpose of the amnesty was to advance national “reconciliation and
reconstruction.”43 Notably, key party negotiators, such as Dullah Omar, the
ANC representative and future South African Minister of Justice, have
confirmed that a peace agreement would not have been reached without the
amnesty clause in the interim constitution.44
After elections, in 1995 the Parliament passed a law establishing the
Truth and Reconciliation Commission. 45 The Truth Commission was
designed to give effect to the amnesty clause in the constitution by granting
amnesty to all persons who made a “full disclosure of all the relevant facts
relating to acts associated with a political objective committed in the

39.
See LEONARD THOMPSON, A HISTORY OF SOUTH AFRICA 187–90 (3d ed. 2001)
(recounting the institutionalization of the apartheid era in South Africa by the National Party through
consolidation of resources and legislative activities); see also RODNEY DAVENPORT & CHRISTOPHER
SAUNDERS, SOUTH AFRICA: A MODERN HISTORY 379–83 (5th ed. 2000) (describing the National
Party’s dominance in government and removal of the coloured vote to prevent any dilution of this
power).
40.
HUMAN RIGHTS COMM. OF S. AFR., A CRIME AGAINST HUMANITY: ANALYSING THE
REPRESSION OF THE APARTHEID STATE (Max Coleman ed., 1998).
41.
See S. AFR. (INTERIM) CONST. art. 251, 1993; see Paul Lansing & Julie C. King, South
Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission: The Conflict Between Individual Justice and National
Healing in the Post-Apartheid Age, 15 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 753, 757–58 (1998) (enumerating the
specific voting changes made by the 1993 Constitution that would allow for the first multi-racial
election in South African history).
42.

S. AFR. (INTERIM) CONST. art. 251, 1993.

43.

Id.

44.
59 (2002).
45.

LYN S. GRAYBILL, TRUTH & RECONCILIATION IN SOUTH AFRICA: MIRACLE OR MODEL?
Id.
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course” of apartheid.46 While not without controversy, most commentators
consider the amnesty-based peace process to have been successful in
bringing an end to the South African conflict and laying the foundation for
a lasting peace.47
Another conflict where a peace-first approach prevailed during the
peace process was the Bougainville civil war, fought between the
government of Papua New Guinea and the region of Bougainville.48 In this
case the parties agreed upon an unconditional blanket amnesty. 49 The
brutal civil war between the government of Papua New Guinea and the
Bougainville Revolutionary Army lasted nearly a decade and resulted in the
deaths of 15,000 to 20,000 civilians and fighters—ten percent of the
Bougainville population.50 The conflict was characterized by war crimes
and atrocities, including razing villages and attacks on civilians by the
government, and rape and torture by both parties.51 The peace agreements,
which rendered a plan for Bougainville to become an autonomous entity
with the right to eventual hold an independence referendum, included a
provision that granted “amnesty and pardon” to all persons involved in
crisis-related activities or convicted of offenses arising out of crisis-related
activities. 52 Despite a relative failure to fully implement the peace
agreement, the amnesty is generally considered to have successfully moved
Bougainville into a period of lasting peace.53
The ongoing conflict in Yemen has also seen attempts to resolve the
conflict using a peace-first approach. The conflict began in 2011 when,
caught up in the momentum of the Arab Spring, Yemeni students rose up
demanding social change.54 What started as a peaceful protest demanding
improved living conditions and jobs turned violent when government
46.
Promotion of National United and Reconciliation Act 34 of 1995 (2005), http://www.
justice.gov.za/legislation/acts/1995-034.pdf (S. Afr.).
47.
See, e.g., Charles P. Trumbull IV, Giving Amnesties A Second Chance, 25 BERKLEY J.
INT’L L. 283, 293, 295, 314 (2007).
48.
Peter Reddy, Reconciliation in Bougainville: Civil War, Peacekeeping and Restorative
Justice, 11 CONTEMP. J. REV. 117, 117–19 (2008).
49.

See id. at 117.

50.

Id. at 117, 119.

51.

Id.

52.

Bougainville Peace Agreement, supra note 33; Lincoln Agreement, supra note 33.

53.

Reddy, supra note 48, at 119.

54.
See Khaled Fattah, Yemen: A Social Intifada in A Republic of Sheikhs, 18 MIDDLE E.
POL’Y 79, 81 (2011) (describing the 2011 “Youth-led Revolt” in Yemen and what factors contributed to
the societal unrest within the country); see also Sheila Carapico, Yemen Between Revolution and
Counter-Terrorism, in WHY YEMEN MATTERS: A SOCIETY IN TRANSITION 29, 30 (Helen Lackner ed.,
2014) (depicting instances of cultural transformation, including women’s participation in protests,
blossoming during the Yemen Revolution).
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security forces killed fifty-two protestors. 55 This event fractured the
government with many generals, ambassadors, and government leaders
defecting. 56 Government security forces targeted and killed antigovernment organizers, summarily executing demonstrators, arbitrarily
detaining persons of interest, performing acts of torture, and treating
civilians to cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment.57 Within a year, over
2000 people had been killed and more than 22,000 injured.58
With the conflict turning in the favor of the opposition, the Gulf Cooperation Council stepped in to negotiate an end to hostilities and a transfer
of power agreement. 59 The peace agreement brokered by the Gulf
Cooperation Council and approved by the U.N. approved peace deal,
provided immunity for Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh and his
aides.60 The agreement—President Saleh signed in November 2011 and the
sitting Yemeni Parliament passed granted immunity to Saleh from
prosecution for any crimes during his thirty-three-year tenure. 61
Specifically, the peace agreement provided that President Ali Abdullah
Saleh was entitled to “complete immunity from legal and judicial
prosecution” for any acts that occurred during his presidency and until the
date the law was passed.62 The agreement also shielded from prosecution
those who served under Saleh, by providing that immunity is granted to
55.
Fattah, supra note 54, at 81–82. But see Mohammad Farazmand, The Nature of 2011
Arab Uprisings: A Comparative Analysis, 2 IRANIAN REV. FOREIGN AFF. 7, 15 (2011) (marveling at the
unexpected phenomenon of a divided Yemen unifying under the singular demand to remove President
Saleh and remaining peaceful in the face of government violence).
56.
See, e.g., Carapico, supra note 54, at 34–35 (listing the different categories of individuals
who resigned in outrage of the March 18 sniper attack).
57.
E.g. U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights, Report on the Visit by the Office of the
High Commissioner for Human Rights to Yemen, ¶¶ 32–43 U.N. Doc. A/HRC/18/21 (Sept. 16, 2011).
58.
Ahmed al-Haj, Yemen Says More Than 2,000 Killed in Uprising, WASH. POST (Mar. 18,
2012), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/yemen-says-more-than-2000-killed-in-upris
ing/2012/03/18/gIQAGOtcLS_story.html?utm_term=.6c8b804b3184; see generally Chris Baker Evens
et al., Yemenis Oust Saleh Regime (Yemen Revolution), 2011–2012, GLOBAL NONVIOLENT ACTION
DATABASE (Aug. 28, 2012), https://nvdatabase.swarthmore.edu/content/yemenis-oust-saleh-regimeyem
en-revolution-2011-2012 (summarizing the different protests and events that resulted in the death of
Yemenis during the year of the Yemen Revolution).
59.
See Wojciech Grabowski, The Role of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) in The
(De)Stabilization of Yemen, in ARAB AND MUSLIM WORLD IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 127, 131–35
(Rafaá OĪarowski & Wojciech Grabowski eds., 2016) (reviewing the elements of the GCC’s power
transfer proposal and its failure to resolve the issues at the heart of the Revolution).
60.

Yemen, supra note 36.

61.

Id.

62.
(Yemen).

Law No. (1) of 2012, Granting Immunity from Legal and Judicial Prosecution arts. 1, 5
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“officials who have worked under the President—in state civil, military and
security agencies—in connection to politically motivated acts carried out
during the course of their official duties[.]”63 In exchange, Saleh was to
leave office within thirty days, transferring power to his Vice President.64
Yemen is in the midst of a brutal civil war, and until recently it was
President Saleh who co-led a coalition rebelling against the government
installed by the peace agreement.65 There is nearly unanimous agreement
among commentators that the amnesty played a key role in permitting the
former President to retain his political influence and plot a return to power
through civil war.66
III.

THE “JUSTICE-FIRST” APPROACH
“If you want peace, work for justice.”
Pope Paul VI67

The justice-first approach will be explored in a similar format to the
previous section on the peace-first approach. First, the tenants of the
justice-first approach and the primary categories of practitioners that
support it will be identified. Next, the section will explore the advantages
of taking a justice-first approach in peace processes. The section will then
focus on actions that can be taken to implement the justice-first approach in
the peace process. Finally, the section will examine the case studies of
Yugoslavia, Rwanda, Uganda and Sudan.
A.

Prioritizing Accountability

The “justice-first” approach advances the notion that accountability
through prosecution must be an integral aspect of any negotiated agreement
or post-conflict plan.68 While the justice-first approach does seek peace, the
approach supports the idea that quick peace should not come at the cost of
the pursuit of justice.69 While peace may be achieved temporarily through a
peace-first approach, durable, long-term peace cannot be achieved without
justice. Although insisting upon accountability mechanisms may prolong
63.

Id. art. 2.

64.
Yemen’s Saleh Agreed to Transfer Power, AL JAZEERA (Nov. 24, 2011), http://aljazeera.
com/news/middleeast/2011/11/2011112355040101606.html.
65.

See id.

66.

See id.

67.

Pope Paul IV, Homily on World Peace Day (Jan. 1, 1972).

68.

Scharf & Williams, supra note 10, at 170.

69.

See id.
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the conflict, the eventual peace that is created is more likely to be
sustainable. The justice-first approach is willing to cope with a longer
conflict in order to achieve a sustainable peace.
The justice-first approach has garnered much support. Victims
frequently demand a retributive approach towards perpetrators due to the
grave nature of human rights violations.70 Parties to a conflict who have
disproportionately suffered crimes at the hand of the opposing party
generally support the justice-first approach, as do individual victims. 71
Additionally, many states, particularly those who helped found the ICC and
who have ratified the Rome Statute, tend to promote a justice-first approach
to peacemaking. 72 Countless international non-government organizations
(NGOs) are dedicated to promoting justice for crimes committed and to
preparing for future prosecutions or other justice mechanisms, and even
more NGOs not directly involved have taken a firm stance that justice
should be an inextricable part of peacemaking.73
B.

Benefits of the Justice-First Approach

With the formalization of international laws on war crimes, crimes
against humanity, and other atrocities as well as the establishment of
prosecutorial mechanisms to hold perpetrators accountable, the justice-first
approach recognizes that this progress is meaningless if justice is waived.
Furthermore, the justice-first approach asserts that the implementation of
justice mechanisms assists in creating stable peaceful societies in postconflict states. Justice mechanisms promote this by establishing individual
responsibility and denying collective guilt, delegitimizing institutions and
war criminals responsible for the commission of atrocities, establishing an
accurate historical record, providing victim catharsis, and promoting
deterrence.74

70.

CHANDRA LEKHA SRIRAM, CONFRONTING PAST HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS: JUSTICE
6–7 (2004); see also Reddy, supra note 48, at 119.

VS. PEACE IN TIMES OF TRANSITION

71.

See SRIRAM, supra note 70, at 6–7.

72.
See Catherine Gegout, The International Criminal Court: Limits, Potential and
Conditions for the Promotion of Justice and Peace, 34 THIRD WORLD Q. 800, 800 (2013).
73.
See JULIANE KIPPENBERG & PASCAL KAMBALE, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, THE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: HOW NONGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS CAN CONTRIBUTE TO
THE PROSECUTION OF WAR CRIMINALS 14–18 (Alison Des Forges & Richard Dicker eds., 2004),
https://www.hrw.org/legacy/backgrounder/africa/icc0904/icc0904.pdf.
74.

Scharf & Williams, supra note 10, at 170.

432

ILSA Journal of International & Comparative Law
1.

[Vol. 24:2

Denying Collective Guilt

If justice is not pursued, guilt may be assigned to an entire population
rather than the individuals responsible for the crimes. 75 Additionally,
because justice mechanisms attach responsibility to specific persons, they
lessen the risk that victims and third parties will view an entire group or
population as to blame for the harm. 76 By avoiding a perception of
collective guilt, a post-conflict society may reconcile and heal.
2.

Delegitimizing Institutions and War Criminals

Justice mechanisms delegitimize institutions and leaders responsible
for the commission of atrocities. Justice can advance a sustainable end to
conflict by punishing perpetrators and removing wrongdoers from
leadership and delegitimizing their ideology. 77 Furthermore, justice
mechanisms identify the institutions responsible for crimes and helps
provide a basis for dismantling them.78
3.

Establishing an Accurate Historical Record

Justice mechanisms can establish an accurate historical record of the
conflict, which contributes to long-term peace. The “collective historical
record” that prosecutions produce provides legitimacy to the new postconflict government while delegitimizing the former regime. 79 Such a
record also allows societies to learn from the past, have a mutual
understanding of the actions of all parties, and move towards communal
reconciliation based on a shared understanding of the truth.80
4.

Facilitating Victim Catharsis

Holding violators accountable through justice mechanisms facilitates
victim catharsis. Enduring peace requires justice and accountability
because when the underlying cause of a conflict goes unaddressed and
75.

Id.

76.

Id. at 171.

77.
See Laurel E. Fletcher, A Wolf in Sheep’s Clothing? Transitional Justice and Effacement
of State Accountability for International Crimes, 39 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 447, 450 (2016); Scharf &
Williams, supra note 10, at 170.
78.
Richard J. Goldstone, Justice as A Tool for Peace-Making: Truth Commissions and
International Criminal Tribunals, 28 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 485, 490 (1996).
79.
RUTI G. TEITEL, GLOBALIZING TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE: CONTEMPORARY ESSAYS 105
(2014) (finding that historical accounts provide states with self-knowledge shining a light of past
offenses and abolishing these abuses in the new societal order).
80.

See Scharf & Williams, supra note 10, at 174–75.
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victims do not receive redress, the risk of returning to conflict remains
high.81 This is particularly true when perpetrators of violence or human
rights abuses are granted amnesty and therefore escape punishment. In the
absence of formal justice the victims and other individuals who feel
wronged may engage in extrajudicial means to achieve justice, including
violence.82 Through trials, victims are also able to recover—or establish—
dignity as the possessors of legal rights, which, in turn, come with legal
remedies. 83 In recognizing victims and providing them legally ordered
restitution, prosecutions also provide a venue for victims to heal.84
5.

Deterrence

Accountability also promotes long-term peace by deterring future
atrocities.85 Post-conflict trials remove and punish leaders who perpetrated
gross violations, preventing such individuals from committing further
violations. 86 Conversely, if persons, particularly leaders, are not held
responsible, they may feel emboldened by their impunity and be more
likely to interfere with the peace-building process or commit future
crimes.87 The incorporation of justice mechanism “are a foundational and
forward-looking affirmation that no group, including public officials and
the armed forces, is above the law and that the new democracy will not
tolerate such behavior.”88 The implementation of justice mechanisms can
reinforce broader security and justice reforms to support the post-conflict
state’s ability to strengthen rule of law and establish a framework for
sustainable peace.89 In this way, the justice-first approach believes future
81.
Peace Versus Justice: A False Dilemma, ICTJ (May 9, 2011), https://www.ictj.org/news/
peace-versus-justice-false-dilemma.
82.
TOVE GRETE LIE ET AL., POST-CONFLICT TRANSITIONS WORKING PAPER NO. 5: POSTCONFLICT JUSTICE AND SUSTAINABLE PEACE, WORLD BANK POLICY RESEARCH WORKING PAPER 5
(2007).
83.
Reed Brody, Justice: The First Casualty of Truth?, NATION (Apr. 12, 2001), https://www.
thenation.com/article/justice-first-casualty-truth (concluding that the immunity from justice that a small
group of elites in Haiti received which allowed them to get away with murder and plunder for
generations left the majority of poorer citizens with the impression they had not rights).
84.
Antoine Hol, The Theatre of Justice: On the Educational Meaning of Criminal Trials, in
TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE: IMAGES AND MEMORIES 71, 83–84 (Chrisje Brants et al. eds., 2013).
85.

Prorok, supra note 26, at 214.

86.

LIE ET AL., supra note 82, at 5.

87.

Scharf & Williams, supra note 10, at 171.

88.
Brody, supra note 83. But see RUTI G. TEITEL, TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE 11 (2000) (arguing
that trials are backward-looking at the same time).
89.
U.N. Secretary-General, Guidance Note by the Secretary-General: United Nations
Approach to Transitional Justice (Mar. 2010), https://www.un.org/ruleoflaw/files/TJ_Guidance_Note
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crimes can be deterred by demonstrating that such crimes will be punished,
developing the institutions capable of punishing any future crimes, and
establishing a strong framework for rule of law.
C.

Achieving Justice-First in Practice

To implement a justice-first approach to peace, it is necessary to
ensure that an accountability mechanism exercises jurisdiction over those
who may be responsible for the commission of atrocities. The mechanism
may be an existing court or tribunal, or it could be one created for the
particular conflict by the Security Council, created by the U.N. in
agreement with the state and endorsed by the General Assembly, or by the
parties to the peace process.90 The mechanism may also be active during
the peace process, or it may come into force after the process, but with no
retroactive jurisdiction.91
Peace processes are more likely to confer jurisdiction to an
accountability mechanism when the peace process is inclusive of the
interests of all key stakeholders, not just the armed combatants. While the
armed actors are less likely to seek the inclusion of an accountability
mechanism, civil society, victims, marginalized populations, and other
groups who were harmed during the conflict and did not, themselves,
commit atrocities are likely to seek justice. A transparent peace process is
more accessible to these stakeholders and makes it more likely that they
will be able to assert their interests for insertion in the peace agreement.
Accountability mechanisms are most likely to be fair, balanced, and
successful in states that emerge from conflict as democracies. The peace
process itself should model the democratic process and inclusive
representation that is hoped to be achieved in the state.
There are a number of justice-based mechanisms that can be employed
to further the justice-first approach. These include referral to the ICC; the
creation of an ad hoc tribunal; the establishment of hybrid tribunals; the
creation of domestic war crimes chambers, the application of universal
jurisdiction, and the avoidance of amnesty. Notably, the parties can

_March_2010FINAL.pdf; Padraig McAuliffe, Transitional Justice’s Impact on Rule of Law: Symbol or
Substance?, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE 74, 90 (Cheryl Lawther et al. eds.,
2017) (questioning whether capacity-building and rule of law are realistic objectives due to the
selectivity of prosecutions and the complexity of dealing with past crimes, which could blur the line
between rule of law and political judgment).
90.
See generally Rome Statute of the International Criminal Courts: Some Questions and
Answers, U.N. DEP’T PUB. INFO. (Oct. 1998), http://legal.un.org/icc/statute/iccq&a.htm [hereinafter
Rome Statute: Q&A].
91.

See id.
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activate some of these mechanisms, while others are activated by the
international community.
1.

The International Criminal Court

The ICC can prosecute crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity,
and war crimes.92 The ICC can exercise jurisdiction over atrocities if: (1)
the atrocities were committed by or on the territory of states that have
subjected themselves to the jurisdiction of the court, (2) the U.N. Security
Council refers the matter to the court, or (3) the state refers the matter to the
court.93 The court also has jurisdiction over nationals of state parties to the
Rome Statute, regardless of where the individual’s acts took place.94
States that are parties to the Rome Statue may find the court exercising
jurisdiction and indicting key players in the midst of the peace process or
shortly thereafter. The ICC has ongoing investigations and cases involving,
Burundi, Georgia, the Côte d’Ivoire, and Kenya, which were initiated by
the ICC itself. 95 The ICC also unilaterally initiated preliminary
examinations in Afghanistan, Colombia, Guinea, Nigeria, Ukraine, and in
Iraq.96
During a peace process, the U.N. Security Council acting under
Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter, may determine that the conflict presents a
threat to international peace and security and confer jurisdiction on the
ICC. 97 The Security Council made such referrals in the case of Sudan
(Darfur)98 and Libya.99 In the case of Sudan, the court indicted Omar AlBashir, the President of Sudan for genocide,100 and in the case of Libya the
court indicted Muammar Gaddafi for crimes against humanity.101
92.

Id.

93.

Id.

94.

Id.

95.
Situations Under Investigation, INT’L CRIM. CT., https://www.icccpi.int/pages/situations
.aspx (last visited Apr. 22, 2018).
96.
Preliminary Examinations, INT’L CRIM. CT., https://www.icc-cpi.int/pages/preliminaryexaminations.aspx (last visited Apr. 22, 2018).
97.

U.N. Charter ch. VII.

98.
S.C. Res. 1593, ¶ 1 (Mar. 31, 2015); Bethel Aregawi, The Politicisation of the
International Criminal Court by United Nations Security Council Referrals, ACCORD (July 21, 2017),
http://www.accord.org.za/conflict-trends/politicisation-international-criminal-court-united-nationssecuri
ty-council-referrals/ (S. Afr.).
99.

S.C. Res. 1970, ¶ 4 (Feb. 26, 2011); Aregawi, supra note 98.

100. Prosecutor v. Al Bashir, ICC-02/05-01/09, Case Information Sheet, (Apr. 6, 2017),
https://www.icc-cpi.int/darfur/albashir/Documents/AlBashirEng.pdf.
101. Prosecutor v. Gaddafi, ICC-01/11-13, Warrant
https://www.icc-cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2011_08351.pdf.
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States may also refer matters to the ICC on their own initiative, as was
the case with the Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of the
Congo (DRC), Uganda, and Mali.102 These states all referred the matter to
the court while the conflict was still ongoing and arrest warrants,
indictments, or convictions were issued against political and armed leaders
during the peace process or directly after. 103 For instance, in the DRC,
Thomas Lubanga Dyilo founded and led the rebel group, the Union of
Congolese Patriots, and was a key actor in the Ituri Conflict.104 The ICC
issued a warrant for Lubanga’s arrest while the peace process was
underway, and Lubanga was arrested and indicted.105 The ICC also opened
preliminary examinations in Gabon and Palestine at the request of the
states.106 Such a referral may happen during a conflict, retroactively by a
new government, or by including a commitment to refer in the terms of a
peace agreement.107
2.

Ad Hoc Tribunals

On a number of occasions the Security Council, or the General
Assembly acting with a member state, created an ad hoc tribunal to cement
a role for justice in the peace process or as part of the transition process.108
Such tribunals were created for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda.109 The
Yugoslavia Tribunal was formed and began its investigations and
indictments while the peace process was ongoing, and the Rwanda Tribunal
was established at the conclusion of the conflict.110
102.

Situations Under Investigation, supra note 95.

103. Gegout, supra note 72, at 810; see generally SARA DAREHSHORI, HUMAN RIGHTS
WATCH, SELLING JUSTICE SHORT: WHY ACCOUNTABILITY MATTERS FOR PEACE (Richard Dicker et al.
eds., 2009), https://www.hrw.org/report/2009/07/07/selling-justice-short/why-accountability-matterspea
ce.
104. A Duty to Protect: Justice for Child Soldiers in the D.R.C., WITNESS & AMNESTY INT’L
18, https://www.amnestyusa.org/files/pdfs/dtplessonguide.pdf (last visited Apr. 22, 2018) [hereinafter A
Duty to Protect].
105. Prosecutor v. Lubanga Dyilo, ICC-01/04-01/06, Warrant of Arrest, (Feb. 10, 2006),
https://www.icc-cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2006_02234.pdf; Pursuing Peace, Justice or Both?, INT’L
CTR. FOR TRANSITIONAL JUST. 2 (2009), https://www.ictj.org/sites/default/files/ICTJ-Global-PeaceJustice-2009-English.pdf [hereinafter Pursuing Peace].
106.

Preliminary Examinations, supra note 96.

107.

A Duty to Protect, supra note 104.

108.

OFFICE OF THE PROSECUTOR, INT’L CRIMINAL COURT, REPORT ON PRELIMINARY
EXAMINATION ACTIVITIES (2015) ¶ 9 (2015), https://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/otp/OTP-PE-rep-2015Eng.pdf; Rome Statute: Q&A, supra note 90.
109.

Rome Statute: Q&A, supra note 90

110.

Id.
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Hybrid Tribunals

Hybrid tribunals are a mix of international and domestic actors and can
be created by the international community, the parties themselves, or in
collaboration. 111 The U.N. Security Council, at the request of the
government of Sierra Leone, created the Special Court for Sierra Leone,112
and the General Assembly in cooperation with Cambodia created the
Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (“Cambodia
Tribunal”).113 The Sierra Leone Tribunal conducted prosecutions based on
both international and domestic law for crimes committed during the Sierra
Leone Civil War, which began with a Liberian-led coup attempt.114 The
tribunal tried and convicted a number of high-level officials, including
Liberian President Charles Taylor.115 The Cambodia Tribunal was created
in 2001 to try cases based on international and domestic law for acts
occurring under the Khmer Rouge from 1975 to 1979. 116 To date, the
tribunal has indicted five high-level Khmer Rouge officials, leading to three
convictions117 and two suspensions of proceedings—one due to the death of
the defendant118 and one due to the defendant’s poor health.119
111. Caitlin E. Carroll, Hybrid Tribunals Are the Most Effective Structure for Adjudicating
International Crimes Occurring Within A Domestic State 1 (Seton Hall L. Student Scholarship Paper
No. 90, 2013), http://scholarship.shu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1090&context=student_scholarsh
ip; OFFICE OF THE U.N. HIGH COMM’N FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, RULE-OF-LAW TOOLS FOR POST-CONFLICT
STATES, at 13–14, U.N. Sales No. E.08.XIV.2 (2008).
112. S.C. Res. 1315, ¶ 1 (Aug. 14, 2000); TOM PERRIELLO & MARIEKE WIERDA, INT’L CENTER
TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE, THE SPECIAL COURT FOR SIERRA LEONE UNDER SCRUTINY 1 (2006),
http://hrlibrary.umn.edu/instree/SCSL/Case-studies-ICTJ.pdf.

FOR

113. U.N. Audiovisual Library of Int’l Law, Agreement between the UN and the Royal
Government of Cambodia Concerning the Prosecution Under Cambodian Law of Crimes Committed
During the Period of Democratic Kampuchea, at 1 (2012), http://legal.un.org/avl/pdf/ha/abunac/
abunac_ph_e.pdf.
114. PERRIELLO & WIERDA, supra note 112, at 2, 4, 44; Sierra Leone Profile: Timeline, BBC
NEWS (Apr. 5, 2018), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-14094419 [hereinafter BBC NEWS].
115.

PERRIELLO & WIERDA, supra note 112, at 27; BBC NEWS, supra note 114.

116.

NUSHIN SARKARATI ET AL., INT’L FED’N HUMAN RIGHTS, THE EXTRAORDINARY
CHAMBERS IN THE COURTS OF CAMBODIA (ECCC) 3 (Antoine Bernard ed., 2011), http://www.fidh.org
/IMG/pdf/dpcambodgedec2011_final.pdf.
117. Chun Han Wong, Khmer Rouge Leaders Convicted of Crimes Against Humanity, WALL
ST. J., https://www.wsj.com/articles/khmer-rouge-leaders-convicted-of-crimes-against-humanity-14073
1407383717 (last updated Aug. 7, 2014).
118. Ieng Sary (Former Accused), EXTRAORDINARY CHAMBERS CTS. OF CAMBODIA, https://
www.eccc.gov.kh/en/indicted-person/ieng-sary-fomer-accused (last visited Apr. 22, 2018).
119. Associated Press in Phnom Phen, Cambodia’s War Crimes Tribunal Releases Former
Khmer Rouge Leader, GUARDIAN (Sept. 16, 2012, 11:20), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2012
/sep/16/khmer-roughe-leader-released.
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Domestic Tribunals

Domestic courts and tribunals may also be utilized to prosecute
atrocities and can be written directly into the peace agreement. Pre-existing
state courts can be used, especially if the state has strong legal institutions
and the courts have jurisdiction over atrocities. Alternatively, a new
domestic tribunal specifically focused on prosecuting atrocities that
occurred during the conflict can be created. In Uganda, the International
Crimes Division (ICD), a special division in the High Court of Uganda, was
established in accordance with the comprehensive peace agreement
between the government and the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA), a rebel
group.120 The ICD’s prosecutorial efforts are complementary to the ICC’s
ongoing LRA prosecutions. 121 In Colombia, under the 2016 peace
agreement between the government and the Revolutionary Armed Forced
of Columbia (FARC), FARC members who provide false testimony, fail to
make an honest confession, or refuse to confess at all to the truth
commission can be prosecuted in the Colombia criminal justice system.122
5.

Universal Jurisdiction

Universal jurisdiction is the “assertion of jurisdiction over offences
regardless of the place where they were committed and the nationality of
the perpetrator or the victim.”123 The basis of universal jurisdiction is found
in both the Geneva Conventions and customary international law. 124 A
state may exercise universal jurisdiction by enacting state-level universal
jurisdiction legislation and then proceeding with investigations and trials, or
by the state courts assert international law, rather than state law.125 One of
the first instances of states exercising universal jurisdiction were the
120. Kirsty McNamara, Seeking Justice in Ugandan Courts: Amnesty and the Case of Thomas
Kwoyelo, 12 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 653, 653 (2013).
121. International Crimes Division, JUDICIARY: REPUBLIC UGANDA, http://www.judiciary.
go.ug/data/smenu/18/International%20Crimes%20Division.html (last visited Apr. 22, 2018) [hereinafter
UGANDA JUDICIARY].
122. Nicolás Carrillo-Santarelli, An Assessment of the Colombian-FARC ‘Peace Jurisdiction’
Agreement, EJIL: TALK!: BLOG EUR. J. INT’L L. (Sept. 29, 2015), https://www.ejiltalk.org/anassess
ment-of-the-colombian-farc-peace-jurisdiction-agreement/.
123. Universal Jurisdiction Over War Crimes, ICRC (Mar. 2014), https://www.icrc.org/eng/
assets/files/2014/universal-jurisdiction-icrc-eng.pdf.
124. Id. Under the four Geneva Conventions of 1949, “[s]tates are required to search for
alleged offenders ‘regardless of their nationality,’ and either bring them before their own courts or hand
them over for trial by another State Party which has made out a prima facie case.” Id. While customary
international law supports a state’s right to exercise universal jurisdiction, it does not require states to
exercise it. Id.
125.

Id.
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prosecutions of former Chilean dictator, Augusto Pinochet in courts in both
Spain and England.126 Ultimately, both Spanish and British courts made
their decisions grounded in universal jurisdiction as codified in their
domestic laws, 127 and these cases set off a firestorm, bringing universal
jurisdiction front and center in efforts to hold violators accountable for war
crimes and crimes against humanity.128

126. See Patrick Wegner, No Limits for Justice? Universal Jurisdiction and the Case of Former
Chadian President Hissene Habré, JUST. CONFLICT (Dec. 18, 2011), https://justiceinconflict.org/2011/
12/18/no-limits-for-justice-universal-jurisdiction-and-the-case-of-former-chadian-president-hissenehabr
e/ (naming Pinochet’s case “the most famous” to be brought under universal jurisdiction); Universal
Jurisdiction, INT’L JUST. RESOURCE CTR., http://www.ijrcenter.org/cases-before-nationalcourts/dome
stic-exercise-of-universal-jurisdiction (last visited Apr. 22, 2018) (including Pinochet’s case on its list of
“Prominent Cases Involving Universal Jurisdiction”); see generally Inbal Sansani, The Pinochet
Precedent in Africa: Prosecution of Hissène Habré, 8 HUM. RTS. BRIEF 32 (2001) (reviewing the
application of universal jurisdiction in the case of Pinochet); Sofie A. E. Høgestøl, The Habré
Judgement at the Extraordinary African Chambers: A Singular Victory in the Fight Against Impunity,
34 NORDIC J. HUM. RTS. 147, 148–49 (2016) (discussing the seesaw between the Spanish and English
courts on what legal standards to apply to Pinochet’s case). For more on the efforts of the Spanish court
to prosecute Augusto Pinochet, see generally Naomi Roht-Arriaza, The Pinochet Precedent and
Universal Jurisdiction, 35 NEW ENG. L. REV. 311 (2011).
127. See Sansani, supra note 126, at 33 (finding both the Spanish and English courts grounded
their jurisdiction decisions in domestic law that codified universal jurisdiction over certain activities).
In Spain, Article 23 of the Organic Law of the Judicial Power grants Spanish courts jurisdiction over
crimes that can be classified as torture, genocide, crimes against humanity, or other crimes in
contravention of international agreements. MARGARITA LACABE, THE CRIMINAL PROCEDURES
AGAINST CHILEAN AND ARGENTINEAN REPRESSORS IN SPAIN: A SHORT SUMMARY (1998), http://www.
derechos.net/marga/papers/spain.html. Under this law, the Spanish court claimed jurisdiction over
Pinochet since the complaint alleged genocide, terrorism, and crimes against humanity. Id. Similarly,
England had ratified the Torture Convention and subsequently incorporated that international agreement
into its domestic law allowing universal jurisdiction over cases of torture. Tanaz Moghadam, Note,
Revitalizing Universal Jurisdiction: Lessons from Hybrid Tribunals Applied to the Case of Hissène
Habré, 39 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 471, 480 (2008). This being the case, U.K. courts had
jurisdiction over Pinochet and could extradite him to Spain based on his conviction for torture. Id. at
481.
128. See Paul Chevigny, The Limitations of Universal Jurisdiction, GLOBAL POL’Y F. (Mar.
2006), https://www.globalpolicy.org/component/content/article/97/32133.html (recognizing the
Pinochet case as the start of the “high tide” of universal jurisdiction cases); see also Ex-Chad Dictator
Indicted in Senegal, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Feb. 3, 2000, 7:00 PM), https://www.hrw.org/news/2000/0
2/03/ex-chad-dictator-indicted-senegal (viewing the Pinochet case as reaffirming the principles of
universal jurisdiction wherein states can judge crimes against humanity no matter where the acts
occurred and can extend this jurisdiction even to former heads of state).
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Barring Amnesty

Many scholars argue that amnesty for crimes against humanity, war
crimes, and genocide is in and of itself a violation of international law.129
The U.N. has also established guidelines that prohibit its representatives
from supporting amnesty provisions. 130
Indeed, the international
community tends to hold that perpetrators of war crimes and human rights
violations should be held accountable. 131 Moreover, some argue that
customary international law also obligates states to bring perpetrators of
international crimes to justice.132 Parties may be legally obligated to pursue
justice mechanisms as a part of the peace process.
In some states, there is a combination of the above-mentioned
accountability mechanisms. For instance, in Bosnia, the ad hoc Yugoslavia
Tribunal was initiated during the conflict and later, after the peace
agreement, domestic prosecutions began as well.133 In Rwanda, the ad hoc
Rwandan Tribunal
functioned
simultaneously with
domestic
prosecutions. 134 Additionally, in Rwanda, the gacaca courts, traditional
justice system, provided community-level truth and reconciliation. 135 In
Colombia, the ICC has begun preliminary investigations in parallel to the
domestic prosecutorial process.136

129.

Pursuing Peace, supra note 105, at 1.

130. William A. Schabas, National Amnesties, Truth Commissions and International Criminal
Tribunals, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 373, 374 (Bartram S. Brown
ed., 1st ed., 2011). However, Article 6(4) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(ICCPR) and Article 6(5) of Additional Protocol II both include references to the right of a person to be
pardoned or receive amnesty. Id. at 375. One caveat is that the context in which both are written seems
to refer to cases of capital punishment, not post-conflict situations. Id.
131.

See LIE ET AL., supra note 82, at 1.

132.

Id.

133. What Is the Former Yugoslavia?, U.N. INT’L CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR FORMER
YUGOSLAVIA, http://www.icty.org/en/about/what-former-yugoslavia (last visited Apr. 22, 2018)
[hereinafter ICTY].
134. Rwanda: International Tribunal Closing Its Doors, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Dec. 23, 2015,
2:50 AM), https://www.hrw.org/news/2015/12/23/rwanda-international-tribunal-closing-its-doors.
135. U.N. Dep’t of Pub. Info., The Justice and Reconciliation Process in Rwanda (Mar. 2014),
http://www.un.org/en/preventgenocide/rwanda/pdf/Backgrounder%20Justice%202014.pdf.
136. See generally OFFICE OF THE PROSECUTOR, INT’L CRIMINAL COURT, REPORT ON
PRELIMINARY EXAMINATION ACTIVITIES 2014 (2014), https://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/otp/OTP-PreExam-2014.pdf [hereinafter 2014 REPORT].
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Case Studies

The justice-first perspective can be seen in the peace processes and
peace agreements of many states. The International Criminal Tribunal for
the former Yugoslavia was established through U.N. Security Council
resolution while the conflict in Bosnia was ongoing.137 During the ongoing
peace process, the Yugoslavia Tribunal was granted the authority to begin
indicting individuals perceived as responsible for atrocities. 138 The
President of the self-proclaimed Republka Srpska Radovan Karadžiü and
his commanding general, Ratko Mladiü, were indicted for war crimes,
which prevented them from even attending the peace negotiations at
Dayton.139 The indictments issued by the ICC provided the international
community with moral clarity as to who was responsible for the conflict,
and helped to provide a rationale for when the U.N. Security Council
ordered a no fly zone and eventual air strikes against the Serbian forces to
halt the genocide. In Dayton, Serbia was represented by Slobodan
Miloševiü, and during the negotiations, the New York Times quoted a
Yugoslavia Tribunal official saying “[w]e cannot deny that (Milosevic) is a
suspect.”140 Miloševiü was indicted in 1999, four years after signing the
Dayton Accords,141 he was arrested in 2001, and died in prison in 2006
while his trial was ongoing.142
In post-genocide Rwanda, prosecution of perpetrators of the genocide
was embraced as the means for the restoration of law and order in the
state.143 Justice was a priority in reconciliation and transitioning after the
violence. The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, established by
the U.N. Security Council, prosecuted high-level perpetrators of the
genocide while domestic tribunals addressed lower-level perpetrators. 144
137.

ICTY, supra note 133.

138.

Id.

139. RICHARD H. STEINBERG, CONTEMPORARY ISSUES FACING THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
COURT 218 (2016); see Moments in U.S. Diplomatic History: Negotiating the Dayton Peace Accords,
ASS’N FOR DIPLOMATIC STUD. & TRAINING, http://adst.org/2014/11/the-dayton-peace-accords/#.Wm3li
JM-eRs (last visited Apr. 22, 2018).
140.

Human Rights in Peace Negotiations, supra note 2, at 256.

141. Michael P. Scharf, The Indictment of Slobodan Milosevic, AM. SOC’Y INT’L L., June 5,
1999, https://www.asil.org/insights/volume/4/issue/3/indictment-slobodan-milosevic.
142. Marlise Simons & Alison Smale, Slobodan Milosevic, 64, Former Yugoslav Leader
Accused of War Crimes, Dies, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 12, 2006), www.nytimes.com/2006/03/12/world/euro
pe/slobodan-milosevic-64-former-yugoslav-leader-accused-of-war.html.
143. IZABELA STEFLJA, CHALLENGES OF TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE IN RWANDA 1 (2012),
https://www.africaportal.org/publications/challenges-of-transitional-justice-in-rwanda/.
144.

Id. at 1–2.

442

ILSA Journal of International & Comparative Law

[Vol. 24:2

Additionally, the gacaca courts, a traditional justice system, provided truth
and reconciliation at the community-level.145
In some instances, the ICC has also begun prosecution efforts through
its own initiative or at the request of states while parties are negotiating or
after parties have reached agreement, thus prioritizing justice through its
own volition.146 In 2004, the Ugandan government referred its conflict with
the LRA to the ICC.147 In 2005, in Uganda, the ICC issued arrest warrants
for high-level members of the LRA, including its leader Joseph Kony,
while negotiations between the LRA and the government were ongoing.148
All suspects remain at large, except Dominic Ongwen, who surrendered
himself in 2015.149 A draft comprehensive peace agreement in 2008, which
was ultimately not signed by Kony, also prioritized justice, providing for a
special chamber in the Ugandan courts to prosecute LRA leaders.150 Based
on the draft peace agreement language, the International Crimes Division is
a special Division of High Court of Uganda and is designed to operate in
parallel to the ICC.151
In Sudan the ICC also issued arrest warrants to begin prosecution
efforts for atrocities that took place in Darfur while the peace process was
underway.152 The arrest warrants included a warrant for the President of
Sudan, Omar al-Bashir.153 The Sudanese government strongly protested the
ICC’s actions and has refused to cooperate with investigations or the arrest
warrants. 154 Regional institutions, including the African Union, voiced
support of the Sudanese government’s protests.155

145.

Id.

146.

2014 REPORT, supra note 136, at 2.

147.

Situation in Uganda: ICC-02/04, INT’L CRIM. CT., https://www.icc-cpi.int/uganda.

148.

Id.

149.

Id.

150.

Pursuing Peace, supra note 105, at 2.

151.

UGANDA JUDICIARY, supra note 121.

152.

Pursuing Peace, supra note 105, at 2.

153.

Id.

154.

Id.

155.

Id.
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PEACE WITH JUSTICE

“We have learned that the rule of law delayed is lasting peace denied, and that
justice is a handmaiden of true peace.”156
Kofi Annan, former Secretary General of the United Nations

The purpose of this section is to identify the core components of a
third approach to the peace versus justice puzzle: peace with justice. The
peace-first approach highlights the obstacles to peace (and the resolution of
conflict) posed by the pursuit of justice. The justice-first approach on the
other hand, underscores the impossibility of sustainable peace absent
genuine accountability. The “peace with justice” approach, meanwhile,
advances the notion that peace and justice are not quite so mutually
exclusive as the former two approaches would indicate—rather, in certain
circumstances parties to a negotiation can artfully weave the two
together. 157 There are a variety of techniques by which to accomplish
this. 158 This section will provide a brief overview of the “peace with
justice” approach, followed by a discussion of the primary mechanisms or
techniques for pursuing both peace and justice. The complicated interplay
of these various mechanisms is illustrated by the diverse attempts to build a
“peace with justice” framework in Colombia, Sierra Leone, the Côte
d’Ivoire, and Cambodia.159
There is an emerging third approach to the peace versus justice puzzle.
This approach claims that parties to a conflict can mutually pursue peace

156. Statement, Secretary-General’s Remarks to the Ministerial Meeting of the Security
Council on Justice and the Rule of Law: The United Nations Role, U.N. Statement S/PV4833 (Sept. 24,
2003).
157. Bartáomiej Krzan, International Criminal Court Facing the Peace vs. Justice Dilemma, 2
INT’L COMP. JURIS. 81, 81 (2016); see generally Alex Whiting, An Investigation Mechanism for Syria:
The General Assembly Steps into the Breach, 15 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 231 (2017); Gabriella Blum, The
Crime and Punishment of States, 38 YALE J. INT’L L. 57 (2013); WILLIAM SCHABAS, KEIN FRIEDEN
OHNE GERECHTIGKEIT?: DIE ROLLE DER INTERNATIONALEN STRAFJUSTIZ [NO PEACE WITHOUT
JUSTICE? THE ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW] (Edith Nerke & Jürgen Bauer trans., 2013)
[hereinafter NO PEACE WITHOUT JUSTICE]; Linda M. Keller, The False Dichotomy of Peace Versus
Justice and the International Criminal Court, 3 HAGUE JUST. J. 12 (2008); Beth Van Schaack,
International & US Support for Transitional Justice Initiatives, JUST SECURITY (July 1, 2016),
https://www.justsecurity.org/31737/international-support-transitional-justice-initiatives/.
158. See, e.g., Renée Jeffery, Sequencing Transitional Justice Mechanisms: Lessons from the
Solomon Islands, MIDDLE E. INST. (Mar. 4, 2014), http://www.mei.edu/content/sequencingtransitionaljustice-mechanisms-lessons-solomon-islands; Paul Gready & Simon Robins, From Transitional to
Transformative Justice: A New Agenda for Practice, 8 INT’L J. TRANS. JUST. 339, 344 (2014).
159. See generally Whiting, supra note 157; Blum, supra note 157; Keller, supra note 157;
Van Schaak, supra note 157.

444

ILSA Journal of International & Comparative Law

[Vol. 24:2

and justice.160 This approach rejects the perceived tensions between peace
and justice as a “false dichotomy.” 161 Under this approach, peace and
justice are mutually reinforcing, as opposed to mutually exclusive.162 The
question, then, becomes not which goal to pursue, but rather when and
how. 163 Although this third approach introduces an intriguing concept,
there are ultimately important limitations to this approach as well.164
The primary tenets of the “peace with justice” approach can be
summarized as:
1) peace and justice are inextricably connected to both reinforce
and complement one another;
2) the promotion of both, regardless of how complex and
difficult, should be pursued;
3) there is a grave need for peace, but it should be found in
conjunction with recognition of the demand for justice; and
4) when mishandled, peace and justice may clash, but peace
should never justify impunity.165

Supporters of this approach argue that law is a cornerstone to any
peace-building mission, and thus, pursuing peace with justice seems a
logical step in transitioning a state from conflict to sustainable peace.166 By
integrating peace with justice during a post-conflict transitional period,
peace-builders can provide oversight both to the laying down of arms and
efforts at capacity-building to administer justice. 167 Additionally, when
peace is combined with justice, the perception of justice may shift from the
retributive to the restorative, such that states and citizens more effectively
seek reconciliation. Under this view, a framework for long-term peace that
contemplates more than an immediate end to a conflict relies on justice to
be both sustainable and enduring.168 In support of this argument, states can
160.

See Krzan, supra note 157, at 81.

161. Linda M. Keller, Achieving Peace with Justice: The International Criminal Court and
Ugandan Alternative Justice Mechanisms, 23 CONN. J. INT’L L. 209, 211 (2008) [hereinafter Achieving
Peace with Justice].
162.

Langer et al., supra note 19, at 183.

163.

Id.

164.

See generally DAVID BOSCO, ROUGH JUSTICE: THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT IN

A WORLD OF POWER POLITICS (2014).

165.

See Krzan, supra note 157, at 87.

166.

See OFF. HIGH COMM’R HUM.RTS., RULE-OF-LAW TOOLS FOR POST-CONFLICT STATES:
MAPPING THE JUSTICE SECTOR, HR/PUB/06/2, 1 (2006).
167.

Id.

168.

See id.
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take a variety of steps to intertwine peace and justice. These actions
include a “sequencing” approach and a “holistic” approach. 169
Additionally, states often incorporate a range of justice-oriented
mechanisms that sometimes expand beyond the notion of direct
accountability. Further mechanisms for interlacing peace with justice
include:
1) non-state justice mechanisms;
2) reparations; and
3) truth-seeking.170

A.

Methods to Meet the Needs of the State Post-Conflict

States could use any of these methods, with consideration to which
method most meets the needs of the post-conflict state in question.
1.

Sequencing

As the term suggests, the approach of “sequencing” involves the
strategic phasing of various transitional justice mechanisms.171 Rather than
asking if peace or justice should be pursued, the question then becomes
when and how states should pursue both objectives.172 With sequencing,
there is no need to compromise justice for peace as justice will be pursued
after parties reach a peace agreement. 173 This perspective accepts that
justice may be a necessarily long-term goal, but also recognizes the
importance of justice and underscores that accountability will eventually
manifest. 174 However, opponents of this process argue that under this
approach justice will not occur quickly enough to satisfy citizens and
victims, because it takes time to gain the capacity, legitimacy, and
independence to review claims or overturn amnesties.175

169.

Jeffery, supra note 158; Gready & Robins, supra note 158, at 344.

170. LUC HUYSE & MARK SALTER, TRADITIONAL JUSTICE AND RECONCILIATION AFTER
VIOLENT CONFLICT: LEARNING FROM AFRICAN EXPERIENCES 3 (2008); see generally Reparations,
INT’L CTR. TRANSITIONAL JUST., https://www.ictj.org/our-work/transitional-justice-issues/reparations
(last visited Apr. 22, 2018).
171.

Jeffery, supra note 158.

172.

Krzan, supra note 157, at 82.

173.

See Prorok, supra note 26, at 213.

174.

Jeffery, supra note 158.

175. Daniel Serwer, Justice and Peace: A False Dichotomy, SYRIA JUST. & ACCT. CTR. (July
25, 2016), https://syriaaccountability.org/updates/2016/07/25/justice-and-peace-a-false-dichotomy/.
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Holistic

Additionally, states can accomplish peace and justice through holistic
measures. 176 These measures involve non-prosecutorial accountability
measures that contribute actively to peace while simultaneously supporting
justice.177 Potential mechanisms under this holistic understanding include
truth and reconciliation commissions, local or traditional justice, public
acknowledgment mechanisms, and/or institutional reform. 178 Alternative
methods of justice may be more successful than prosecutorial means of
justice. 179 This framework broadens the approach to transitional justice
beyond merely institutional responses, so as to incorporate broader political
and social involvement. 180 Further, these non-prosecutorial mechanisms
have similar justice goals to traditional prosecutions:
1) discovering, clarifying, and acknowledging past abuses;
2) responding to victims’ needs;
3) contributing to justice and accountability;
4) outlining institutional responsibility and recommending
reforms; and
5) promoting reconciliation and reducing conflict.181

3.

Non-State Justice Mechanisms

Non-state justice mechanisms, sometimes referred to as traditional
justice, incorporate indigenous and customary practices into the transitional
justice process. 182 For instance, gacaca courts, local community courts
inspired by the Rwandan traditional courts, emerged as a traditional
mechanism to assist Rwanda’s national courts with trials of the 130,000
people imprisoned following the Rwandan genocide. 183 The U.N.
Secretary-General emphasized the vital role of “indigenous and informal
traditions for administering justice or settling disputes,” while conforming

176.

Gready & Robins, supra note 158, at 344.

177.

Id.

178.

Id.

179.

See Achieving Peace with Justice, supra note 161, at 209, 212–13, 227.

180.

Gready & Robins, supra note 158, at 344.

181. Diba Majzub, Peace or Justice? Amnesties and the International Criminal Court, 3
MELB. J. INT’L L. 247, 261 (2002).
182.

HUYSE & SALTER, supra note 170.

183.

Id. at 37.
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with international law to ensure the inclusion of all groups in the justice
process.184
4.

Reparations

Granting reparations, meanwhile, is an internationally recognized
method of restoring victims of serious crimes to their financial, physical, or
psychological position before suffering the harm in question.185 Victims’
reparations can take multiple forms, including restitution, compensation,
rehabilitation, satisfaction, and guarantees of non-repetition.186 Whatever
the form of reparations, the purpose of the mechanism is to provide a
meaningful response to the harm suffered, that can be tailored to the
specific context, needs, and priorities of the victim in question—and in
doing so, this mechanism can theoretically meet at least some of the
underlying purposes of accountability.
5.

Truth-Seeking

Truth-seeking is the process of investigating past human rights
violations to determine what happened, why it happened, and to what effect
in order to prevent future abuses.187 Mechanisms for truth-seeking include
truth commissions, commissions of inquiry, and fact-finding missions. 188
Truth commissions are either non-judicial or quasi-judicial bodies that
investigate past abuses to establish the truth of the violations and to publish
a final report that can make policy recommendations, disseminate victims’
voices, and serve as a historical record.189 There have been over forty truth
184. U.N. Secretary-General, The Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict and PostConflict Societies, ¶ 36, U.N. Doc. S/2004/616 (Aug. 23, 2004). Nonetheless, non-state trials may not
be adequate in ethnically or religiously diverse states because each group may develop its own
prosecutorial system, which may result in unequal treatment. HUYSE & SALTER, supra note 170, at
182–83.
185.

Reparations, supra note 170.

186. See Pablo De Greiff, Justice and Reparations, in THE HANDBOOK OF REPARATIONS 451,
452–53 (Pablo De Greiff ed., 2006); INTER-AM. INST. HUM. RTS., CONTRIBUTION OF TRUTH, JUSTICE,
AND REPARATION POLICIES TO LATIN AMERICAN DEMOCRACIES 88 (2011).
187. INT’L CENTER FOR TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE & KONTRAS, DERAILED: TRANSITIONAL
JUSTICE IN INDONESIA SINCE THE FALL OF SOEHARTO 9, 17 (2011); see also U.N. Secretary-General,
United Nations Approach to Transitional Justice: Guidance Note of the Secretary-General, 8 (Mar.
2010), https://www.un.org/ruleoflaw/files/TJ_Guidance_Note_March_2010FINAL.pdf [hereinafter
U.N. Approach to Transitional Justice].
188.

U.N. Approach to Transitional Justice, supra note 187, at 8.

189. Truth Commissions, INT’L CTR. TRANSITIONAL JUST. (2008), http://ictj.org/sites/default/
files/ICTJ-Global-Truth-Commissions-2008-English.pdf;
see
also
Integrated
Disarmament,
Demobilization and Reintegration Standards: 6.20 DDR and Transitional Justice, U.N. DISARMAMENT,
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commissions over the last three decades,190 highlighting the popularity (and
potentially the utility) of these mechanisms. Depending on the objective
pursued, truth commissions allow for both the victims to tell their story and
the perpetrators to admit the crimes they committed in order to promote
forgiveness and reconciliation. 191
Similar to truth commissions,
commissions of inquiry and fact-finding missions investigate past human
rights abuses to discover the truth but follow narrower mandates 192 that
focus on a particular event, category of crime, or time period.193
B.

Peace with Justice in Colombia

The peace process in Colombia reflects one manifestation of the peace
with justice approach. In particular, elements of both peace and justice
approaches were integrated into the agreement that was ultimately adopted
in Colombia in December 2016. 194 This agreement, between the
Colombian government and the FARC, included the establishment of a

DEMOBILIZATION, & REINTEGRATION RESOURCE CTR. 3 (Dec. 2009), https://www.ictj.org/sites/default/
files/UN-DDR-and-Transitional-Justice-2009-English.pdf.
190. Kieran McEvoy et al., Criminology and Transitional Justice, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK
CRIMINOLOGY 391, 392 (Alison Liebling et al. eds., 6th ed. 2017); OFF. HIGH COMM’R HUM. RTS.,
RULE-OF-LAW TOOLS FOR POST-CONFLICT STATES: TRUTH COMMISSIONS, HR/PUB/06/1, 1 (2006),
http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/RuleoflawTruthCommissionsen.pdf; see Essential Best
Practices for Truth Commissions, INT’L CTR. FOR TRANSITIONAL JUST. 1 (Dec. 2009), http://www.
iccnow.org/documents/ICTJ_SDN_briefing_AUPD-TJRC.pdf; Truth and Memory, INT’L CTR. FOR
TRANSITIONAL JUST., http://ictj.org/our-work/transitional-justice-issues/truth-and-memory (last visited
Apr. 22, 2018).

OF

191. U.S. DEP’T STATE, Truth Commissions (May 16, 2016), https://www.state.gov/documents/
organization/257772.pdf.
192.

See U.N. Approach to Transitional Justice, supra note 187, at 8.

193. JANE ALEXANDER, DEP’T FOR INT’L DEV., A SCOPING STUDY OF TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE
POVERTY REDUCTION 32 (2003), http://www.gsdrc.org/docs/open/ssaj56.pdf.
While such
mechanisms are particularly useful to establish the truth, a restrictive mandate may also result in
overlooking certain abuses. Id. In Sri Lanka, for instance, the United Nations expresses serious
concerns over the mandate of the three Commissions of Inquiry into the Involuntary Removal or
Disappearances of Persons, which was limited not only in terms of geographic and temporal scope, but
also as to the types of human rights violations under review. Id.; see also U.N. Office of the High
Commissioner, OHCHR Technical Note: The Nepal Act on the Commission on Investigation of
Disappeared Persons, Truth and Reconciliation, 2071 (May 21, 2014), http://www.ohchr.org/documents/
countries/np/ohchrtechnical_note_nepal_cidp_trc_act2014.pdf; Commissions of Inquiry: Sri Lanka,
U.S. INST. PEACE (Jan. 1, 1995), https://www.usip.org/publications/1995/01/commissions-inquiry-srilanka.

AND

194. Nicholas Casey, Colombia Signs Peace Agreement with FARC After 5 Decades of War,
N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 26, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/27/world/americas/colombia-farcpeace
-agreement.html [hereinafter Casey, Colombia Signs].
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justice mechanism that offers amnesty.195 The provisions of the agreement
emphasize the importance of “consolidating peace and realizing the rights
of victims,” the “promot[ion of] a stable and lasting peace,” and the
Colombian state’s responsibility to “investigate, clarify, prosecute and
sanction serious violations of IHRL [international human rights law] and
IHL [international humanitarian law].” 196 These provisions reflect the
blend of peace and justice that the agreement strives to accomplish.
In particular, the peace deal included provisions to establish a
Comprehensive System for Truth, Justice, Reparations and Guarantees of
Non-Repetition (Comprehensive System) to carry out a comprehensive
transitional justice plan, based on a 2015 “Special Peace Jurisdiction”
agreement between the Colombian Government and the FARC. 197 The
Special Jurisdiction for Peace was designed to include both a Peace
Tribunal and Judicial Panels to address cases of “serious violations of
human rights and humanitarian law” committed by FARC members.198
Although the justice mechanism has prosecutorial functions, the
agreement provides categorically that any perpetrators, who confess to
atrocities, will be exempt from prison, jail, or any “equivalent” form of
detention. 199 Instead, those who confess will be given “‘sanctions’ that
have a ‘restorative and reparative function’ . . . [.]” 200 These sanctions
entail “projects” that will be designed to aid victims of the conflict. 201
FARC members, who were not primarily responsible for the commission of
the most serious crimes and who wholly confessed their acts, will receive
either amnesty or alternative penalties such as community service and acts
of reparation.202

195.

Id.

196. Acuerdo Final Para la Terminación del Conflicto y la Construcción de una Paz Estable y
Duradera [Final Agreement to End the Armed Conflict and Build a Stable and Lasting Peace] ch. 5,
(Nov. 24, 2016), http://www.altocomisionadoparalapaz.gov.co/procesosyconversaciones/Documentos
%20compartidos/24-11-2016NuevoAcuerdoFinal.pdf [hereinafter Final Agreement].
197. Carrillo-Santarelli, supra note 122; Alejandro Valencia Villa, Challenges Facing the
Truth Commission of Colombia, PEACE PROGRESS: SEEKING TRUTH (May 2017), http://www.icipperlapau.cat/numero31/articles_centrals/article_central_4/.
198. Final Agreement, supra note 196, at 182; Human Rights Watch Analysis of ColombiaFARC Agreement, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Dec. 21, 2015, 6:21 PM), https://www.hrw.org/news/2015/
12/21/human-rights-watch-analysis-colombia-farc-agreement.
199.

Final Agreement, supra note 196.

200.

Human Rights Watch Analysis of Colombia-FARC Agreement, supra note 198.

201.

Id.; Final Agreement, supra note 196, at 182.

202. Final Agreement, supra note 196, at ch. 5.1.2.III; José Miguel Vivanco, Colombia Peace
Deal’s Promise, and Flaws, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Sept. 27, 2016, 10:39 AM), https://www.hrw.org/news/
2016/09/27/colombia-peace-deals-promise-and-flaws.
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If, however, FARC members refuse to confess, provide false
testimony, or fail to make an honest confession in a timely manner, they
will be prosecuted in the Colombian criminal justice system—although they
may achieve a reduced sentence by making a partial confession.203 Those
who take responsibility but do not do so in a timely manner may face a five
to eight year prison sentence.204 Those who do not confess at all and are
found guilty will serve a fifteen-to-twenty year prison sentence. 205
Conversely, an individual who committed gross human rights violations—
such as gender-based war crimes and crimes against humanity—will not be
eligible to receive amnesty and will face criminal prosecution. 206 Even
then, those who immediately confess their crimes may receive a less severe
punishment, such as a non-prison detention restriction on their liberty.207
The contours of the 2016 peace agreement draw on earlier Colombian
practice.208 In many ways, the 2016 agreement followed the accountability
framework that had been previously utilized to demobilize various antiFARC paramilitary groups, in particular the Justice and Peace Law in
2005. 209 To support demobilization, the Law allowed individuals that
participated voluntarily to take part in a truth-telling process via a special
prosecution tribunal.210 If fighters participated in this truth-telling process,
they were eligible for reduced sentences or even amnesties.211 In practice,
these mechanisms provided around ninety percent of the paramilitary
members with what is essentially de facto amnesty.212
The peace agreement introduced in 2016 attempted to draw from this
past Colombian experience, so as to strike a fine balance between peace and

203.

Final Agreement, supra note 196, at ch. 5.1.2.III.60; Carrillo-Santarelli, supra note 122.

204. Final Agreement, supra note 196, at ch. 5.1.2.2.III; Colleen Murphy, Colombia’s Special
Jurisdiction for Peace, U. ILL. (Oct. 9, 2017), https://will.illinois.edu/legalissuesinthenews/program/
colombias-special-jurisdiction-for-peace.
205.

Final Agreement, supra note 196, at ch. 5.1.2.2.III; Murphy, supra note 204.

206.

Final Agreement, supra note 196, at ch. 5.1.2.II.40.

207.

Id. at ch. 5.1.2.III.60; Carrillo-Santarelli, supra note 122.

208. Paul Williams & Tiffany Sommadossi, The Colombian Referendum: A Lesson on Peace
Without Justice, HUFFPOST (Oct. 7, 2016, 2:33 PM), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/thecolombian-referendum-a-lesson-on-peace-without_us_57f7d9dfe4b090dec0e71064.
209.

Id.; see generally L. 975, julio 25, 2005, DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.] (Colom.).

210. Williams & Sommadossi, supra note 208; see generally L. 975, julio 25, 2005, DIARIO
OFICIAL [D.O.] (Colom.).
211. See generally L. 975, julio 25, 2005, DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.] (Colom.); Colombia: The
Justice and Peace Law, CTR. FOR JUST. & ACCOUNTABILITY, http://cja.org/where-we-work/colombia/
related-resources/colombia-the-justice-and-peace-law/ (last visited Apr. 22, 2018).
212.

Colombia: The Justice and Peace Law, supra note 211.
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justice.213 Indeed, Colombian President Santos, one of the architects of the
peace agreement, highlighted in reference to the agreement that “perfect
justice would not allow peace.”214 Instead, President Santos argued that the
deal “achieves as much justice as possible while transitioning from conflict
to peace.”215 Ultimately, the system proposed was closer to an amnesty
based truth and reconciliation commission, than a true direct accountability
system.216
In October 2016, the (already signed) peace agreement was put to a
popular referendum.217 To the surprise of many, 50.24% of the population
voted to reject the peace agreement, and the referendum failed. 218 The
primary concerns of those who voted to reject the peace agreement
centered, in large part, on the balance of justice interlaced into the
agreement.219 For instance, one major concern was the legal immunity for
rank-and-file soldiers of the FARC,220 who were allegedly responsible for
crimes including murder, kidnapping, and rape against civilians.221 Another
concern was the lack of defining details for the tribunal in which FARC
leaders were to be tried, combined with the opportunity for FARC leaders
to receive reduced sentences or potentially even amnesty in return for early
confessions.222
An additional barrier to adopting the agreement was the agreement’s
commitment to provide FARC fighters with a monthly stipend for two
years, and the provision of $2500 payments to individual ex-combatants to
start a business.223 The ability of the FARC to restructure into a political
party under the peace deal was also a divisive issue. 224 Moreover, the
agreement permits FARC members not serving prison sentences to run for

213.

Final Agreement, supra note 196, at ch. 5.1.3.1.

214.

Vivanco, supra note 202.

215.

Id.

216. Rahul Srivastava, The Colombian Peace Referendum, ST ANDREWS FOREIGN AFF. REV.
(Oct. 7, 2016), http://foreignaffairsreview.co.uk/2016/10/the-colombian-peace-referendum/.
217.

Id.

218.

Id.

219.

Id.

220.

Id.

221.

Srivastava, supra note 216.

222.

Id.

223.

Id.

224. Colombia Referendum: Voters Reject FARC Peace Deal, BBC NEWS (Oct. 3, 2016),
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-37537252.
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office, and grants the FARC ten congressional seats for two terms.225 In
other words, there was a poignant concern—held by various international
human rights organizations in addition to the Colombian population—that
those most responsible for the commission of atrocity crimes would not be
held sufficiently accountable for their participation in the conflict.226
Following the rejection of the peace agreement in the October 2016
referendum, the draft agreement was submitted to the Colombian Congress
for revisions.227 Colombia’s Congress approved a revised version of the
agreement,228 and the public did not vote on the revised document.229 The
Agreement included over fifty changes to the version introduced in the
referendum.230 The new provisions of the agreement clarified the process
for prosecuting FARC members responsible before the special court. 231
However, the new agreement did not provide for prison sentences for those
who confessed to war crimes.232 The reasoning for this was that doing so
would cause the FARC to walk away from the peace agreement.233 The
new agreement also included a provision requiring the FARC to relinquish
assets, some of which were acquired through drug trafficking, to contribute
to a fund for compensating victims. 234 The agreement also did not
introduce limitations to the FARC’s ability to engage as a political party.235

225. Colombia’s Congress Approves Peace Tribunals for ex FARC Rebels, REUTERS (Nov. 28,
2017, 6:48 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-colombia-peace/colombias-congress-approvespea
ce-tribunals-for-ex-farc-rebels-idUSKBN1DS1C6.
226.

Vivanco, supra note 202.

227. Stephen Gill, Colombia’s Congress to Vote on Peace Deal Next Week, COLOM. REP. (Nov.
24, 2016), https://colombiareports.com/colombias-congress-vote-peace-deal-next-week/.
228. Nicholas Casey, Colombia’s Congress Approves Peace Accord with FARC, N.Y. TIMES
(Nov. 30, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/30/world/americas/colombia-farc-accord-juanmanu
el-santos.html?_r=0 [hereinafter Casey, Colombia’s Congress].
229.

Id.

230.

Associated Press, Colombia’s Government Formally Ratifies Revised Farc Peace Deal,
GUARDIAN (Dec. 1, 2016, 3:27), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/dec/01/colombiasgovern
ment-formally-ratifies-revised-farc-peace-deal [hereinafter Associated Press, Colombia].
231.

Final Agreement, supra note 196, at ch. 5.1.2; Casey, Colombia’s Congress, supra note

232.

Casey, Colombia’s Congress, supra note 228.

228.
233.

Id.

234.

Associated Press, Colombia, supra note 230.

235.

Id.
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Ultimately, in December 2016 the revised peace agreement went into
effect,236 and preparations for its implementation began. In assessing the
justice framework introduced as a result, it is also worth noting that
Colombia has also ratified the ICC, and therefore, the domestic mechanisms
under the agreement will operate while ICC investigations and preliminary
examinations in Colombia continue to function in parallel. 237 The ICC
opened a preliminary examination of the situation in Colombia in June
2004, on alleged crimes against humanity and war crimes. 238 This
preliminary examination is ongoing as of 2018, and most recently has
included field visits by the ICC to clarify various aspects of the Special
Jurisdiction for Peace.239
C.

Peace with Justice in Sierra Leone

Sierra Leone presents another instance of peace interwoven with
justice, although distinct from the Colombian context. In particular, the
Sierra Leone experience illustrates the practice of providing broad amnesty
via a peace agreement, combined with targeted, high-level prosecutions.
The 1999 Lomé Peace Agreement contained an amnesty provision that
prevented prosecutions for acts criminalized under Sierra Leonean law.240
In 2000, a hybrid Truth and Reconciliation Commission was established
with the broad purpose of truth-telling and establishing a historical record
of atrocities.241 In 2002, however, the Special Court for Sierra Leone (a
hybrid tribunal) was established by U.N. Security Council Resolution 1315,
with the purpose of prosecuting crimes under both international law and
Sierra Leone’s domestic law.242

236. Sibylla Brodzinsky, ‘Welcome to Peace’: Colombia’s Farc Rebels Seal Historic
Disarmament, GUARDIAN (June 27, 2017, 15:30), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/jun/27/colo
mbia-farc-weapons-war-government.
237. Colombia, COALITION FOR INT’L CRIM. CT., http://www.coalitionfortheicc.org/country/
colombia (last visited Apr. 22, 2018).
238. Preliminary Examination: Colombia, INT’L CRIM. CT., https://www.icc-cpi.int/colombia
(last visited Apr. 22, 2018).
239. Statement of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, Fatou Bensouda, on the
Conclusion of Her Visit to Colombia, INT’L CRIM. CT. (Sept. 13, 2017), https://www.icccpi.int//
Pages/item.aspx?name=170913-otp-stat-colombia.
240. Peace Agreement Between the Government of Sierra Leone and the Revolutionary United
Front of Sierra Leone, transmitted by Letter Dated 12 July 1999 from Kodjo Menzan of the Security
Council, art. IX, ¶ 2, S/1999/777 (July 7, 1999).
241. The Truth and Reconciliation Commission Act 2000 § 6(1), http://www.sierraleone.org/Laws/2000-4.pdf.
242.

S.C. Res. 1315, ¶¶ 1–2 (Aug. 14, 2000).
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Controversy arose in relation to the interpretation of the amnesty
provisions of the Lomé Peace Agreement, in light of the prosecutorial
framework of the Special Court. In theory, the amnesty provisions of the
peace agreement would have prevented the Special Court from pursuing
charges for acts criminalized under Sierra Leonean law.243 However, the
Special Court itself interpreted the amnesty provision as inapplicable to the
prosecution of international crimes.244 This interpretation found support in
the U.N.’s approach as the guarantor of the Lomé Agreement; in clarifying
the peace agreement, the U.N. stated that the amnesty and pardon article
was inapplicable to international crimes of genocide, crimes against
humanity, war crimes, and other serious violations of international
humanitarian law. 245 On this basis, the Special Court proceeded with
prosecutorial action for a select pool of high-level perpetrators, culminating
its work with the conviction of former Liberian President Charles Taylor.246
D.

Peace with Justice in the Côte d’Ivoire

Following the atrocities suffered by civilians in the Côte d’Ivoire’s
2010–2011 post-election crisis, 247 newly-elected President Ouattara
established a Special Investigation and Examination Cell, composed of
judges and prosecutors, to take steps against those most responsible for
atrocity crimes. 248 In 2015, the Special Cell charged more than twenty
individuals, including high-level commanders from both sides. 249 A
national truth commission, the Dialogue, Truth, and Reconciliation
Commission (CDVR), was also established in 2011 to investigate

243. Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, art. 10 (2000), http://www.rscsl.org/
Documents/scsl-statute.pdf.
244. Prosecutor v. Augustine Gbao, Case No. SCSL-2004-14-AR72(E), Decision on
Preliminary Motion of the Invalidity of Agreement between the UN and Government of Sierra Leone on
Est. of Special Court, para. II.9 (May 25, 2004), http://hrlibrary.umn.edu/instree/SCSL/SCSL-04-15T/Appeal_Decision.htm.
245. S.C. Res. 1315, ¶ 1–1, (Aug. 14, 2000); see There Can be No Amnesty for Genocide and
War Crimes - Annan, U.N. NEWS (Aug. 12, 2004), http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=
11615.
246. OPEN SOC’Y JUSTICE INITIATIVE, THE TRIAL OF CHARLES TAYLOR BY THE SPECIAL
COURT FOR SIERRA LEONE: THE APPEAL JUDGMENT 2 (2013), https://www.opensocietyfoundations.
org/sites/default/files/charles-taylor-appeal-brief-20130924_0.pdf.
247. Côte d’Ivoire: 5 Years on, Awaiting Justice, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Mar. 22, 2016, 12:01
AM), https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/03/22/cote-divoire-5-years-awaiting-justice.
248.

Id.

249.

Id.
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violations.250 By the time the CDVR’s mandate concluded in 2014, the
entity took statements from more than 72,000 Ivorian nationals. 251 The
final report was provided to President Ouattara, who did not make the
report publicly-available but did commit approximately $16.2 million to
indemnify victims on its basis. 252 A new commission, the National
Commission for Reconciliation and Indemnification of Victims, was
established in March 2015 to oversee a reparations program for victims of
an even wider range of abuses, committed between 1990 and 2012.253 This
package provided a blend of peace-prioritizing mechanisms with measures
for justice that expanded beyond traditional direct accountability.
Additional aspects of direct accountability also filtered into the Côte
d’Ivoire context. For instance, in January 2016 the ICC initiated a joint
trial of former president Laurent Gbabgo and Charles Ble Goude for crimes
against humanity committed in the course of the post-election crisis.254 The
ICC also sought Simone Gbagbo, the former first lady who remained in
Ivoirian custody where she was tried and convicted for “crimes against the
state.” 255 When the ICC claimed that she should be prosecuted for atrocity
crimes in The Hague, the Côte d’Ivoire charged her with crimes against
humanity and retained jurisdiction as a form of “positive
complementarity”256 although she was ultimately acquitted of the specific
crimes against humanity charges. 257 Meanwhile, former President
Gbagbo’s trial started in 2016, and he remains in ICC custody as
prosecutions continue. 258 In 2015 Ouattara was peacefully re-elected. 259
Although not all issues are settled (for example, protests broke out in 2016
250. Virginie Ladisch & Joanna Rice, Cote d’Ivoire Youth Find Voice Through Storytelling,
ICTJ (Oct. 27, 2016), https://www.ictj.org/news/cote-divoire-youth-political-voice-stories-war.
251. JIM WORMINGTON, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, “TO CONSOLIDATE THIS PEACE OF OURS”:
A HUMAN RIGHTS AGENDA FOR COTE D’IVOIRE (Corinne Dufka ed., 2015), https://www.hrw.org/
report/2015/12/08/consolidate-peace-ours/human-rights-agenda-cote-divoire.
252.

Id.

253.

Id.

254.

Côte d’Ivoire: 5 Years on, Awaiting Justice, supra note 247.

255.

Id.

256. Mark Kersten, Hold Your Horses, ICC Complementarity, JUST. IN CONFLICT: BLOG (June
21, 2016), https://justiceinconflict.org/2016/06/21/hold-your-horses-icc-complementarity/.
257. Côte d’Ivoire: Simone Gbagbo Acquitted After Flawed War Crimes Trial, HUM. RTS.
WATCH (Mar. 29, 2017, 12:00 AM), https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/03/29/cote-divoire-simonegbag
bo-acquitted-after-flawed-war-crimes-trial.
258.

Prosecutor v. Gbagbo & Blé Goudé, ICC-02/11-01/15, https://www.icccpi.int/cdi/gbagbo-

goude.
259. Cote d’Ivoire: Partial Justice, AL JAZEERA (Jan. 26, 2017, 15:02), https://www.
aljazeera.com/programmes/peopleandpower/2017/01/cote-partial-justice-170126114050818.html (citing
the filmmaker’s Victoria Baux view).
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in relation to various constitutional reforms) violence has largely settled and
economic growth is on the horizon.260
E.

Peace with Justice in Cambodia

Lastly, the Cambodian context provides an instance of peace with
justice, via sequencing. After a decade-long armed conflict between
Cambodia and Vietnam, the Paris Peace Accords were signed in 1991.261
The Paris Peace Accords formalized an arrangement that maintained the
Cambodian Khmer Rouge in political power despite its responsibility for
significant atrocities in Cambodian territory.262 In doing so, and in its more
general avoidance of addressing the issue of atrocity crimes, the Paris Peace
Accords effectively provided the Khmer Rouge with impunity.263 In effect,
the Cambodian peace process prioritized peace and stability, over
accountability.
Justice, however, was eventually introduced into the Cambodian
context in a later period, following the securement of peace. More than
fifteen years after the signing of the Paris Peace Accords, efforts for direct
accountability culminated in the establishment of the Cambodian Tribunal
(a hybrid tribunal) in 2006. 264 The court was established by agreement
between the U.N. and the government of Cambodia.265 The purpose of the
court was to prosecute those most responsible for violations of international
law and other grave crimes. 266 Although an imperfect prosecutorial
mechanism, to date the court has convicted three perpetrators.267
The experiences of Colombia, Sierra Leone, the Côte d’Ivoire, and
Cambodia display the diverse methods by which to pursue a “peace with
justice framework.” These case studies illustrate, to various degrees, the
260.

Id.

261. Final Act of the Paris Conference on Cambodia, U.S. INST. PEACE (Feb. 22, 2000)
https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/file/resources/collections/peace_agreements/final_act_10231991
.pdf.
262. Id.; Philip Shenon, Cause for Alarm?; The Peace Treaty Brings the Khmer Rouge into
Government, and that Frightens Many, N.Y. TIMES (1991), http://www.nytimes.com/1991/10/24/
world/cause-for-alarm-peace-treaty-brings-khmer-rouge-into-government-that-frightens.html.
263.

Shenon, supra note 262.

264. UN-Backed Tribunal Sentences Khmer Rouge Leaders to Life in Prison, UN NEWS (Aug.
7, 2014), http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=48433#.Wn9wzpPwZN1.
265.

Id.

266.

Id.

267. Seth Mydans, 11 Years, $300 Million and 3 Convictions. Was the Khmer Rouge Tribunal
Worth It?, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 10, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/10/world/asia/cambodiakhmer-rouge-united-nations-tribunal.html.
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potential utility of developing transitional mechanisms for justice,
providing general amnesties combined with targeted prosecutions, or
sequencing justice mechanisms following the establishment of peace and
stability. Although not without its limitations, this approach demonstrates
that in certain circumstances parties to a negotiation can choose to
interweave peace with justice, rather than pursuing one at the total expense
of the other.
V.

THE SYRIAN CRISIS

The purpose of this section is to explore the interplay between the
approaches of peace-first and justice-first in the context of the Syrian
conflict. The Syrian conflict is characterized by initial uncertainty as to
whether the peace-first approach or the justice-first approach would take
predominance in the peace process. After a pivotal failed effort at the U.N.
Security Council to instill significant justice measures into the Syrian
context, the Syrian process evolved towards a peace-first approach by those
seeking to end, or at least manage, the conflict. However, despite the
traction that the peace-first approach has gained in the Syrian context, there
are persistent efforts by key actors to weave accountability into the peace
process. While these efforts have had a relatively minor impact on the
process, and it is clear the approach to resolve the Syrian crisis will not be
one of justice-first, it remains to be seen whether the final stretch of the
peace process is driven by a peace-first approach, or whether a peace with
justice approach is able to emerge. The seedling efforts towards
accountability that are being instilled into the process now, may ultimately
lay the foundation for moving towards a more focused accountability in the
future.
In order to explore the interplay between the approaches of peace-first
and justice-first in the context of the Syrian conflict, this section will briefly
review the origins of the conflict, its “spill-in” and multi-dimensional
nature, and the U.N. peace process established to resolve the conflict. The
section will then trace the efforts of various key stakeholders to weave
justice into the peace process through several mechanisms such as U.N.
Security Council referral to the ICC, the establishment of a Commission of
Inquiry and an International, Impartial, Independent Mechanism, the
creation of a number of documentation efforts, a proposal for a Hybrid
Tribunal, and the use of universal jurisdiction.
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Origins of the Conflict

The Syrian conflict began with a small group of children writing antigovernment graffiti in Dara.268 They were arrested and tortured, sparking
nationwide protests, and leading to a multi-dimensional civil war now in its
eighth year.269 These nationwide protests against the Assad regime swept
across the country beginning March 2011, 270 coinciding with the Arab
Spring movement that swept through Yemen, Libya, Tunisia, and Egypt.271
The Assad regime responded with force and opposition groups began to
organize, and arm themselves, leading to the formation of the Free Syrian
Army. The Free Syrian Army began to use force in defending against
attacks by the Assad regime, and by mid-2011, what began as peaceful
protests had transformed into a full-fledged internal conflict.272 Fighting
has been near-constant since 2011.273 The conflict has also since expanded
to include a vast number of differing Syrian opposition fighting brigades, as
well as foreign terrorist organizations such as Jabhat al Nusra and ISIS. 274
Since its inception, the Syrian conflict has been marked by widespread
and brutal atrocities. The conflict has been characterized by a death toll
exceeding 470,000 along with more than 11 million displaced, 275 the
documented torture to death of more than 14,000, 276 the use of
internationally prohibited chemical weapons, inherently indiscriminate
barrel bombs, cluster munitions, and the indiscriminate use of incendiary
268. Mark MacKinnon, The Graffiti Kids Who Sparked the Syrian War, GLOBE & MAIL (Dec.
2, 2016), https://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/world/the-graffiti-kids-who-sparked-the-syrian-war/
article33123646/.
269. Id.; Avi Asher-Schapiro, The Young Men Who Started Syria’s Revolution Speak About
Daraa, Where it All Began, VICE NEWS (Mar. 15, 2016, 9:30 AM), https://news.vice.com/article/theyoung-men-who-started-syrias-revolution-speak-about-daraa-where-it-all-began.
270. MacKinnon, supra note 268; Syria: The Story of the Conflict, BBC NEWS (Mar. 11,
2016), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-26116868.
271. MacKinnon, supra note 268; Arab Spring: A Research & Study Guide: Yemen, CORNELL
U. LIBR., http://guides.library.cornell.edu/c.php?g=31688&p=200752 (last visited Apr. 22, 2018).
272.

Syria: The Story of the Conflict, supra note 270.

273. See Ben Hubbard & Neil MacFarquhar, New Cease-Fire Begins in Syria, but Violations
Are Reported Within Hours, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 29, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/29/world
/middleeast/syria-cease-fire.html; MacKinnon, supra note 268.
274. Syria War: A Brief Guide to Who’s Fighting Whom, BBC NEWS (Apr. 7, 2017),
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-39528673; see Michael Karadjis, US vs Free Syrian Army
vs Jabhat al-Nusra (and ISIS), NEW POL. (Dec. 19, 2017), http://newpol.org/content/us-vs-free-syrianarmy-vs-jabhat-alnusra-and-isis.
275.
276.

HRW WORLD REPORT: EVENTS OF 2016, supra note 1.

AMNESTY INT’L, HUMAN SLAUGHTERHOUSE: MASS HANGINGS AND EXTERMINATION AT
SAYDNAYA PRISON, SYRIA 5–6 (2017), https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/mde24/5415/2017/en/.
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weapons in civilian-populated areas.277 While many of the actors involved
in the conflict are responsible for atrocities, the vast majority have been
(and continue to be) committed by the Assad regime.
B.

Syria—A Multi-Dimensional Spill-In Conflict

In the Syrian conflict there are least six main groups of domestic
forces, along with their international allies, engaged in at least five distinct
conflicts.278 While most wars run the risk of spilling-over into neighboring
states, in the case of Syria the war has spilled into the country, with nearly a
dozen external actors directly supporting parties to the conflict and in a
number of instances deploying their own forces inside Syrian territory.279
The Syrian parties engaged in the conflict include:280
1. Government of the Syrian Arab Republic: The current Syrian
government, which has been under the executive rule of Bashar
al-Assad since July 2000.281
2. Free Syrian Army (FSA): Formed in August of 2011 by
defectors from the Syrian regime, the Free Syrian Army is one of
the predominant Syrian armed opposition groups, comprised of
more than fifty fighting factions.282
3. Kurdish Forces: The People’s Protection Units (YPG) is a
Kurdish force that has been active in the Syrian conflict. 283 The
YPG is considered a terrorist organization by the Turkish
government, and has been linked to the long-term insurgency war
in Turkey.
4. The Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF): A primarily Kurdish
force that also includes local Arab militias, the SDF is comprised
in large part by YPG fighters. 284 The SDF are forces particularly
277.

HRW WORLD REPORT: EVENTS OF 2016, supra note 1.

278. See generally Zachary Laub, Who Is Fighting in Syria’s Civil War?, PBS NEWS HOUR
(May 8, 2017, 9:28 AM), https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/fighting-syrias-civil-war.
279. See generally Syria Profile – Timeline, BBC NEWS (Feb. 7, 2018), http://www.bbc.com/
news/world-middle-east-14703995.
280. Syria: Mapping the Conflict, BBC NEWS (July 10, 2015), http://www.bbc.com/news/
world-middle-east-22798391.
281. Julia Zorthian, Who’s Fighting Who in Syria, TIME (Oct. 7, 2015), http://time.com/
4059856/Syria-Civil-War-Explainer/.
282. Guide to the Syrian Rebels, BBC NEWS (Dec. 13, 2013), http://www.bbc.com/news/
world-middle-east-24403003.
283.

Laub, supra note 278.

284. Id.; Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), SYRIAN CIVIL WAR MAP, https://syriancivilwarmap
.com/syrian-democratic-forces/ (last visited Apr. 22, 2018).
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active in northern Syria and benefit from U.S. support in antiISIS operations.285
5. Al Qaeda: Al Qaeda in Syria is comprised largely of nonSyrians, with only limited Syrian membership, and over the
course of the conflict has transformed into a range of Al Qaeda
“linked” organizations, most famously known as “Jabhat alNusra.” 286 Most recently, this entity has been renamed “Hayat
Tahrir al-Sham,” or HTS.287
6. ISIS: Infamously active in Syria, ISIS in this context is
comprised of both Syrian and non-Syrian fighters.288

Third party states and paramilitary organizations engaged in the
conflict include:289
1. Russia: Russia established an air base inside of Syria at the
invitation of the Assad regime in 2015 and deployed bomber and
fighter aircraft as well as special forces. 290 Russia regularly
attacks the Free Syrian Army, the Syrian Democratic Forces, and
occasionally ISIS.291
2. Iran: Iran deployed military forces and a significant number
of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) al-Quds
Force.292 Iranian forces on the ground in Syria may outnumber
the military forces of the Syrian regime.293 Iranian forces fight
on behalf of the Assad regime and engage primarily in operations
285.

Laub, supra note 278.

286. ELIZABETH O’BAGY, MIDDLE EAST SECURITY REPORT 6: JIHAD IN SYRIA 10 (2012),
http://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Jihad-In-Syria-17SEPT.pdf.
287. Tahrir al Sham: Al-Qaeda’s Latest Incarnation in Syria, BBC NEWS (Feb. 28, 2017),
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-38934206.
288.

Syria Profile – Timeline, supra note 279.

289. Alexandra Zavis, Who’s Who in Syria: A Look at 8 Key Players in the War, L.A. TIMES
(Oct. 3, 2015, 3:00 AM), http://www.latimes.com/world/middleeast/la-fg-syria-players-syria-war-20151
002-htmlstory.html.
290. Bill Chappell, Russia Begins Airstrikes in Syria After Assad’s Request, NPR (Sept. 30,
2015, 8:37 AM), https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2015/09/30/444679327/russia-beginscondu
cting-airstrikes-in-syria-at-assads-request.
291. Id.; Ryan Browne et al., Russian Forces Fire on US-backed Rebel Group in Syria,
Coalition Says, CNN: POLITICS, https://www.cnn.com/2017/09/16/politics/russia-fires-on-us-backedforces/index.html (last updated Sept. 17, 2017, 9:50 PM).
292. David Blair, Almost 700 Iranian Troops and Militia Fighters ‘Killed in Syria’ to Preserve
Bashar al-Assad, TELEGRAPH NEWS (May 10, 2016, 5:51 PM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/
2016/05/10/almost-700-iranian-troops-killed-in-syria-to-preserve-bashar-al/.
293. Majid Rafizadeh, Iran’s Forces Outnumber Assad’s in Syria, GATESTONE INST. (Nov. 24,
2016, 3:45 AM), https://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/9406/iran-soldiers-syria.
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against the Syrian Opposition, including the Free Syrian Army,
and the Syrian Democratic Forces.294
3. Hezbollah: Hezbollah is quite active in the Syrian conflict,
and as of 2016 an estimated 7000 Hezbollah fighters were based
in Syria. 295 Hezbollah largely fights in support of the Assad
regime, and as such engages primarily in operations against the
Syrian Opposition, including the Free Syrian Army.296
4. Turkey: Turkey deployed several thousand forces into
Syria, 297 both to protect civilians from attack by the Syrian
regime and to prevent Kurdish forces from holding contiguous
territory along the Turkish border. Turkey also deploys monitors
for the de-escalation zones.298 In 2017, Turkey largely succeeded
in securing a swathe of territory in northern Syria known as the
“Euphrates Shield” area.299 Early in the conflict Turkey downed
a Russian MiG fighter, which had crossed into its airspace,300 but
more recently acts in close cooperation with Russia.
5. The United States: The United States provides assistance,
including weapons, to both the Free Syrian Army and the Syrian
Democratic Forces.301 The United States has also conducted air
strikes against Al-Qaeda and ISIS as part of a US-led coalition
focused on the elimination of ISIS.302 Further, the United States
has deployed approximately 2000 special forces and an artillery

294.

Zavis, supra note 289.

295.

U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, BUREAU OF COUNTERTERRORISM, COUNTRY REPORTS ON
TERRORISM 2016 ch. 6 (2017).
296.

Id.

297. Turkey Ends ‘Euphrates Shield’ Operation in Syria, AL JAZEERA (Mar. 29, 2017),
https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/03/turkey-ends-euphrates-shield-operation-syria-1703292114289
70.html; Associated Press, Syria is Currently Host to Thousands of Foreign Troops: Who are They and
Will they Leave?, HAARETZ (Nov. 28, 2017, 12:56 PM), https://www.haaretz.com/middle-eastnews/thousands-of-foreign-troops-in-syria-but-will-they-leave-1.5627108.
298. Iran, Turkey, Russia to Deploy 500 Observers in Idlib, Syria, ISLAMIC REPUBLIC NEWS
AGENCY (Sept. 16, 2017, 8:53), http://www.irna.ir/en/News/82665953 (Iran).
299.

Turkey Ends ‘Euphrates Shield’ Operation in Syria, supra note 297.

300. Turkey Shoots Down Russian Warplane on Syrian Border, BBC NEWS (Nov. 24, 2015),
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-34907983.
301. Molly Hennessy-Fiske, Confused by All Those Groups Fighting in Syria? We Break it
Down with Arm Patches, L.A. TIMES (July 23, 2017, 8:50 AM), http://www.latimes.com/world/
middleeast/la-fg-syria-opposition-patches-2017-htmlstory.html.
302. Elizabeth McLaughlin, Two Years of U.S.-led Airstrikes on ISIS in Syria and Iraq in
Numbers, ABC NEWS (Aug. 8, 2016, 11:58 AM), http://abcnews.go.com/International/years-us-ledairstrikes-isis-syria-iraq-show/story?id=41206050.
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unit inside Syria.303 The majority of the United States military
efforts in the Syrian context are aimed towards the elimination of
ISIS.304 Notably, in April of 2017, the United States launched a
substantial cruise missile attack against air assets of the Assad
regime, in retaliation for the regime’s chemical weapons attack
on Khan Sheikhoun.305 In April of 2018, the United States, this
time joined by the United Kingom and France, responded to the
regime’s chemical weapons attack on Douma with additional
targeted strikes against regime military and research assets.
6. United Kingdom, France, and other EU states: These states
provide assistance to the Free Syrian Army and have conducted
air strikes and deployed special forces against Al-Qaeda and
ISIS, particularly as part of the US-led coalition.306
7. Saudi Arabia: Saudi Arabia provides funding and weapons to
the Free Syrian Army, and allegedly to Al-Qaeda. 307 As a
significant supporter of the Syrian opposition, Saudi Arabia is
particularly focused on anti-Assad engagement.308
8. Qatar: Qatar provides funding and weapons to the Free
Syrian Army, and allegedly to Al-Qaeda. The majority of
Qatar’s engagement in the Syrian context is particularly focused
on anti-Assad engagement, but not necessarily in cooperation
with Saudi Arabia.309

303. Barbara Starr, As ISIS Retreats, US is Set to Reveal Troop Numbers in Syria, CNN:
POLITICS (Nov. 24, 2017, 12:29 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2017/11/24/politics/syria-us-troops-numbers/
index.html.
304. COLIN H. KAHL ET AL., A STRATEGY FOR ENDING THE SYRIAN CIVIL WAR 1 (2017),
https://s3.amazonaws.com/files.cnas.org/documents/CNASReport-Syria-Final.pdf; McLaughlin, supra
note 302.
305. Michael R. Gordon et al., Dozens of U.S. Missiles Hit Air Base in Syria, N.Y. TIMES (Apr.
6, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/06/world/middleeast/us-said-to-weigh-military-responsesto-syrian-chemical-attack.html.
306. EU May Provide Training to Syrian Rebels, SPIEGEL ONLINE (Mar. 4, 2013, 4:18 PM),
http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/the-eu-is-set-to-support-syrian-rebels-with-military-traininga-886794.html (Ger.); Who is Supplying Weapons to the Warring Sides in Syria?, BBC NEWS (June 14,
2013), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-22906965.
307.

Who is Supplying Weapons to the Warring Sides in Syria?, supra note 320.

308.

Zavis, supra note 289.

309. Amena Bakr, Qatar Runs Covert Desert Training Camp for Syrian Rebels, REUTERS
(Nov. 26, 2014, 9:14 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-qatar-syria/qatar-runscove
rt-desert-training-camp-for-syrian-rebels-idUSKCN0JA1BX20141126.
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9. Jordan: Jordan provides support to the Free Syrian Army.
Jordan is also an active participant in overseeing de-escalation
zones in Syrian territory, particularly those in the south. 310
10. International Al Qaeda: International Al-Qaeda in Syria has
been active in the conflict since 2012. At the outset of its
participation, Al-Qaeda openly claimed the goal of removing
Assad and creating an Islamic state. Al-Qaeda has continued to
present itself as anti-Assad force throughout the duration of the
conflict.311
11. International ISIS: An offshoot of what was once Al-Qaeda
in Iraq, International ISIS in Syria became particularly prevalent
beginning in 2013, capturing significant portions of Syrian
territory and eventually claiming of Raqqa as its de facto
capital.312 At the peak of its power, approximately ten million
people lived under ISIS control. 313 ISIS engaged in offenses
against Syrian opposition armed groups, the Assad regime, SDF
forces, members of the US-led coalition, and others. As of late
2017 the US-led coalition seeking to eliminate ISIS claimed that
nearly ninety-eight percent of ISIS-held territory has been
liberated.314

The U.N. launched peace negotiations soon after the beginning of the
conflict. 315 The peace negotiations have proceeded through a variety of
iterations and have produced a certain measure of momentum and
accomplishments.316
The initial peace negotiations were headed by former U.N. Secretary
General Kofi Annan and yielded what has become known as the Geneva
Communiqué. 317 The Communiqué, endorsed by the U.N. Security
Council, provided for a new constitution, free and fair elections, the
310. Suleiman Al-Khalidi, Syrian Rebels Resist Jordan Pressure to Hand Over Border
Crossing, REUTERS (Oct. 5, 2017, 8:04 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-syriajordan/syrian-rebels-resist-jordan-pressure-to-hand-over-border-crossing-idUSKBN1CA116.
311. Valerie Szybala, Al-Qaeda Shows Its True Colors in Syria, ISW (Aug. 1, 2013),
http://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/ISWSyriaUpdate-AlQaeda-TrueColors-Syria.pdf.
312. Islamic State and the Crisis in Iraq and Syria in Maps, BBC NEWS (Mar. 28, 2018),
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-27838034.
313.

Id.

314.

Id.

315. Syria: Intra-Syrian Negotiations, UN NEWS, https://news.un.org/en/focus/syria (last
visited Apr. 22, 2018).
316. See Press Release, Security Council, Security Council Press Statement on International
Meeting on Syra in Astana, U.N. Press Release SC/12701 (Jan. 31, 2017).
317.

S.C. Res. 2118, (Sept. 27, 2013).
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establishment of a transitional governing body on the basis of mutual
consent, and other components that have collectively come to form the core
of the negotiating topics in the Geneva peace negotiations.318 The second
phase of the peace negotiations was headed by Lakhdar Brahimi 319 and
produced some limited momentum for a Transitional Governing Body
designed to create an interim arrangement to transition President Assad
from power and set the framework for a new constitution and elections.320
The talks stalled when the Assad regime refused to engage in substantive
negotiations on a political solution.321
Renewed momentum for the peace negotiations culminated in the
adoption of U.N. Security Council Resolution 2254 in December 2015,
ushering in the third phase of the peace process. 322 Staffan de Mistura
headed the third phase and while producing little in the way of specific
accomplishments has continued to provide a venue for the parties in the
event a desire for serious negotiations emerges.323 The third phase has also
expanded to include a parallel process in Astana, Kazakhstan managed by a
Russian, Iranian and Turkish Troika focused on de-escalation zones
(ceasefires for certain defined areas within the Syrian territory).324 Through
this process a series of de-escalation zones have been established.325 The
de-escalation zones have been somewhat successful in limiting the

318.

Id.

319. Yasmine Saleh & Shaimaa Fayed, Syria Agrees to Ceasefire During Eid Holiday:
Brahimi, REUTERS (Oct. 24, 2012, 5:39 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-syria-crisisbrahimi/
syria-agrees-to-ceasefire-during-eid-holiday-brahimi-idUSBRE89N0G820121024.
320. Syria Peace Talks Break Up as UN Envoy Fails to End Deadlock, GUARDIAN (Feb. 15,
2014, 10:17), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/feb/15/syria-peace-talks-break-up-geneva.
321.

Id.

322.

S.C. Res. 2254, (Dec. 18, 2015).

323. Tom Miles & Stephanie Nebehay, U.N. Calls Syria Talks a ‘Big Missed Opportunity’,
Seeks New Ideas, REUTERS (Dec. 14, 2017, 2:04 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideastcrisis-syria-un/u-n-calls-syria-talks-a-big-missed-opportunity-seeks-new-ideas-idUSKBN1E82TD; Tom
Miles, U.N. Says Planning for Syria Talks Toward End of January, REUTERS (Dec. 22, 2015, 5:37 AM),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-syria-un/u-n-says-planning-for-syria-talks-toward-end
-of-january-idUSKBN0U513B20151222.
324. Jun Pasaylo, Astana Talks to Fortify Syria Ceasefire Accord, GEOPOL MONITOR,
http://www.geopolmonitor.com/astana-talks-fortify-syria-ceasefire-accord/ (last visited Apr. 22, 2018);
Syrian War: All You Need to Know About the Astana Talks, AL JAZEERA (Oct. 30, 2017),
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/10/syrian-war-astana-talks-171029160554816.html.
325. Final De-Escalation Zones Agreed on in Astana, AL JAZEERA (Sept. 15, 2017),
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/09/final-de-escalation-zones-agreed-astana-170915102811730.ht
ml.
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violence, although violations by the regime and its allies continue.326 At
various times during these three phases the U.N. Security Council has
adopted resolutions supporting the peace negotiations and ratifying various
minor outcomes.327
Whatever momentum the Astana and Geneva processes may have
introduced for a political settlement, it is important to bear in mind that
Assad’s position has been strengthened by the facts on the ground.328 In
particular, with the support of Russia and Iran, the Assad regime has made
sweeping gains in retaking territory from ISIS and the Syrian Opposition.329
Absent a fundamental change in the military landscape, the Assad regime is
likely to maintain a significant military advantage on the ground. Given
this entrenchment, the likelihood of direct accountability for Assad or any
other high-level perpetrators is diminished, at least for the immediate
future.
C.

Seeking to Weave Justice into the Syria Peace Process

As noted above, the Syrian peace process began with uncertainty
towards how to resolve the peace versus justice puzzle—would a peace-first
approach take hold, or would efforts towards instilling justice take
primacy? International actors took the debate to the U.N. Security Council,
testing the waters of the peace versus justice puzzle with resolutions aimed
at creating critical accountability measures. However, these efforts were
quickly chilled by Russian and Chinese vetoes. In the wake of these vetoes,
the Syrian conflict has become characterized by heavy reliance on the
peace-first approach. However, there are persistent and ongoing efforts to
introduce at least a measure of justice into the peace process, and the
balance towards a peace with justice approach may yet tip in the future.
To track the efforts to weave justice into the peace process this section
will discuss the positions of the parties and mediators toward justice in the
Geneva peace negotiations; the actions of the Security Council and the

326. Nada Homsi & Anne Barnard, Marked for ‘De-Escalation,’ Syrian Towns Endure Surge
of Attacks, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 18, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/18/world/middleeast/syriade-escalation-zones-atarib.html.
327.

See, e.g., S.C. Res. 2254, (Dec. 18, 2015).

328. Laura King & Nabih Bulos, Syria May be in Ruins, but it Looks Like Assad ‘Has Won the
War Militarily’, L.A. TIMES (Sept. 2, 2017, 4:00 AM), http://www.latimes.com/world/middleeast/la-fgsyria-assad-2017-story.html; Tom O’Connor, How the U.S. Lost the War in Syria to Russia and Iran,
NEWSWEEK (Oct. 11, 2017, 11:25 AM), http://www.newsweek.com/us-lost-war-syria-iran-russiawin
ning-final-battle-674833.
329. O’Connor, supra note 328 (noting that the Syrian government army has retaken almost
every major urban center [excluding Raqqa]).
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General Assembly, the initiatives of civil society and non-state actors, and
the use of universal jurisdiction by some European states.
1.

Peace Negotiations

The parties and mediators to the Syrian peace negotiations have a
mixed record of attempts to introduce accountability measures into the
negotiations. The Syrian Opposition has incorporated a measure of justice
into their proposals, whereas the regime has not meaningfully addressed
accountability.330 The U.N., meanwhile, has been lukewarm at best on the
issue of accountability. 331 In defense of justice, so to speak, the Syrian
Opposition has staunchly refused any negotiation proposals that would
permit the Assad regime to remain in power and thereby avoid
accountability. The Syrian Opposition also has refused to countenance any
proposals that would result in Assad or members of his regime securing de
facto or de jure impunity.332
On the proactive side, the Opposition has been clear that any peace
agreement should result in a tangible mechanism for accountability. The
Opposition has produced a range of public material proposing various broad
frameworks for accountability that could be incorporated into a peace
agreement.333 For instance, in its September 2016 Vision Statement, the
Syrian Opposition calls for a specific transitional justice committee
composed of diverse and competent judges and lawyers, with the aim of
balancing “between reconciliation efforts, on the one hand, and
accountability, on the other.” 334 The committee is charged to fulfill
international transitional justice standards, and develop mechanisms “to
ensure accountability, reparation for the victims [ . . . ] achieve institutional
reform, propose mechanisms to investigate violations and crimes, and keep
records related to human rights violations.”335

330. Syrian Opposition Says Assad Must Go, SBS NEWS, https://www.sbs.com.au/news/syrianopposition-says-assad-must-go (last updated Mar. 13, 2016).
331. Kailey Love, Will U.N.’s Accountability Mechanism Provide Justice in Syria?, WASH.
REP. MIDDLE E. AFF., June–July 2017, at 62, https://www.wrmea.org/digital-issue/june/july-2017digital-flipbook.html.
332. See Nic Robertson & Mohammed Tawfeeq, Bashar al-Assad Needs to Leave Before
There’s Peace, Syrian Opposition Says, CNN, https://www.cnn.com/2017/11/23/middleeast/syrianopposition-no-bashar-al-assad/index.html (last updated Nov. 23, 2017, 9:24 PM).
333. HIGH NEGOTIATIONS COMM’N, EXECUTIVE FRAMEWORK FOR A POLITICAL SOLUTION
BASED ON THE GENEVA COMMUNIQUÉ ¶¶ 44–45 (2016), http://english.riadhijab.com/userfiles/HNC%20
Executive%20Summary%20-%20English.pdf.
334.

Id.

335.

Id. ¶ 46.
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Notably, the Syrian Opposition has not made any calls for the creation
of an ad hoc or hybrid tribunal or other comprehensive accountability
mechanism. The Opposition also has not yet proposed the application of
retroactive jurisdiction of the ICC, by which the (future, transitional) Syrian
state would submit to the ICC’s jurisdiction to prosecute crimes within its
jurisdiction taking place on Syrian territory from the onset of the conflict.336
The Assad regime, meanwhile, has rejected all claims for accountability for
violations committed in the course of the conflict. Indeed, the regime has
refused to address the general issue of accountability for war crimes in any
genuine way.337 Rather, the regime has focused attention exclusively on
accountability for supposed “terrorists,” a term that the regime utilizes for
entities that oppose the Assad government.338 The U.N., meanwhile, has
taken a relatively tepid stance in the peace negotiations on issues relating to
justice. In fact, none of the U.N. mediators have ever called for direct
accountability in the context of the U.N.-led peace negotiations.
2.

The U.N. Security Council

Given the lack of intensive engagement by the parties in relation to
accountability measures in the context of the peace process, as well as
larger uncertainty on the geopolitical level, it was unclear in the early stages
of the Syrian conflict which approach within the peace versus justice puzzle
would take hold. There were multiple efforts to introduce justice into the
Syrian context via the U.N. Security Council, which reflected an early
testing ground to determine which approach might come to take primacy in
the Syrian conflict. However, few of these efforts at the U.N. Security
Council found success; following this failure to move forward with
important accountability mechanisms, the peace-first approach took rapid
hold over the Syrian peace process.
For instance, in 2014, some members of the U.N. Security Council put
forth a draft resolution to refer the situation in Syria to the ICC.339 The
resolution received widespread public support by member states of the

336. Jennifer Trahan, New Paths to Accountability for Crimes in Syria and Iraq (Including ICC
Jurisdiction Over Foreign Fighters), JUST SECURITY (Nov. 12, 2014), https://www.justsecurity.org/173
08/paths-accountability-crimes-syria-iraq-including-icc-jurisdiction-foreign-fighters/.
337. Zena Tahhan, Saving Syria: Is International Law the Answer?, AL JAZEERA (Mar. 16,
2017), http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2017/03/years-syria-accountability-free-zone-170312
082121458.html.
338. Ben Hubbard, His Grip Still Secure, Bashar al-Assad Smiles as Syria Burns, N.Y. TIMES
(Sept. 17, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/18/world/middleeast/his-position-still-securebashar
-al-assad-smiles-as-syria-burns.html.
339.

U.N. SCOR, 7180th mtg., U.N. Doc. SC/11407 (May 22, 2014).
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United Nations.340 Within the Security Council, thirteen of the Council’s
fifteen member-states voted in favor of the resolution.341 However, both
China and Russia vetoed the resolution.342
The U.N. Security Council has also attempted to lay the foundation for
accountability in relation to the use of chemical weapons in Syria.343 In this
regard the Security Council has experienced a mixed record. While the
Security Council has succeeded in taking steps that allow for a measure of
information-gathering, Russia has constrained these efforts by exercising its
veto power to prevent a strong foundation for accountability.344
In August 2015, the U.N. Security Council issued Resolution 2235 to
establish a joint mission between the Organization for the Prohibition of
Chemical Weapons (OPCW), and the U.N. Joint Investigative Mechanisms
(JIM).345 The mandate of the OPCW-JIM was to identify those responsible
for the use of chemical weapons in Syria.346 In August 2016 and again in
November 2016, the OPCW-JIM presented reports that, for the first time,
attributed responsibility for the use of chemical weapons inside Syria to the
Assad regime’s armed forces.347 In a subsequent report, the OPCW-JIM
determined that the Assad regime was responsible for the use of chemical
weapons in the infamous attack on Khan Sheikhun on April 4, 2017.348
340. Ian Black, Russia and China Veto UN Move to Refer Syria to International Criminal
Court, GUARDIAN (May 22, 2014, 11:07), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/may/22/russiachina-veto-un-draft-resolution-refer-syria-international-criminal-court.
341.

U.N. SCOR, 7180th mtg., U.N. Doc. SC/11407 (May 22, 2014).

342.

Id.

343. OPCW, Fact Sheet: OPCW - UN Joint Investigative Mechanism (Jan. 2017), https:/
/unoda-web.s3-accelerate.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/OPCW-JIM-FactSheet.pdf
[hereinafter OPCW-UN].
344. Black, supra note 340; Michelle Nichols, Russia Casts 10th U.N. Veto on Syria Action,
Blocking Inquiry Renewal, REUTERS (Nov. 16, 2017, 4:17 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/usmideast-crisis-syria-chemicalweapons/russia-casts-10th-u-n-veto-on-syria-action-blocking-inquiryrenewal-idUSKBN1DG31I.
345.

OPCW-UN, supra note 343.

346.

Id.

347. OPCW Executive Council Adopts Decision Regarding the OPCW-United Nations Joint
Investigative Mechanism Reports About Chemical Weapons Use in the Syrian Arab Republic, ORG. FOR
PROHIBITION CHEMICAL WEAPONS (Nov. 11, 2016), https://www.opcw.org/news/article/opcwexecutive-council-adopts-decision-regarding-the-opcw-united-nations-joint-investigative-mechanismre
ports-about-chemical-weapons-use-in-the-syrian-arab-republic/; U.S. Dep’t of State, Fourth Report of
the Joint Investigative Mechanism (2016).
348. U.N. Secretary-General, Letter dated Oct. 26, 2017 from the Secretary-General addressed
to the President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/2017/904 (Oct. 26, 2017) [hereinafter U.N.
Secretary General, Letter]. The use of chemical weapons is a war crime under the Rome Statute of the
ICC. See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 8(2)(b)(xvii)–(xviii), July 17, 1998,
2187 U.N.T.S. 91 (entered into force July 1, 2002).
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In relation to what would be done on the basis of attribution to the
Assad regime, Virginia Gamba—the Head of the OPCW-JIM—declared
that the OPCW-JIM “believes that those with effective control in the
military units referred to in this report or others responsible for the use of
chemicals as weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic must be held
accountable.”349 To support such accountability, the OPCW-JIM had the
authority to conduct further investigations to determine the specific
individuals involved in perpetrating or organizing the particular incidents in
question.350
In response to this growing momentum towards accountability for the
Assad regime for the use of chemical weapons, Russia cast a veto in
October 2017 to prevent the renewal of the OPCW-JIM’s mandate (which
was scheduled to expire in mid-November 2017). 351 As a result of the
Russian veto, this second potential avenue for accountability through the
UN Security Council was halted.352 From this pivotal point, the Syrian
peace process evolved into a heavily peace-first oriented approach.
3.

The U.N. General Assembly

In addition to efforts by the U.N. Security Council to introduce
mechanisms for justice into the Syrian context, the U.N. General Assembly
has created two primary initiatives. The first is the U.N. Commission of
Inquiry (COI), which is mandated to investigate the commission of
atrocities.
The second is the International, Impartial, Independent
Mechanism (IIIM), which was mandated to collect, analyze and preserve
evidence of the commission of atrocities.353
The COI is a documentation mechanism with a mandate to investigate
“all alleged violations of international human rights law since March 2011”

349. Press Release, Security Council, Security Council Considers Fourth Report by Joint
Investigative Mechanism, U.N. Press Release DC/3668 (Oct. 27, 2016).
350.

U.N. Secretary General, Letter, supra note 348.

351. Rodrigo Campos, Russia Vetoes Extension of Mission Probing Chemical Weapons Use in
Syria, REUTERS (Oct. 24, 2017, 11:08 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-syriaun/russia-vetoes-extension-of-mission-probing-chemical-weapons-use-in-syria-idUSKBN1CT25P.
352.

Id.

353. Rep. of the H.R.C. on Its Seventeenth Special Session, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/S-17/2 (2011);
Frequently Asked Questions on the International, Impartial and Independent Mechanism to Assist in the
Investigation and Prosecution of Persons Responsible for the Most Serious Crimes Under International
Law Committed in the Syrian Arab Republic Since March 2011 (‘The Mechanism’), UNITED NATIONS,
https://www.un.org/News/dh/infocus/Syria/Frequently_asked_questions_on_IIIM.pdf (last visited Apr.
22, 2018) [hereinafter FAQ on the IIIM].
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inside Syria.354 The COI has produced more than twenty reports since its
inception in August 2011, documenting numerous violations of
international law after interviewing thousands of witnesses and victims and
analyzing significant physical evidence. 355 Although the COI’s mandate
and purpose represents a fundamentally important task in laying the
foundation for future prosecutions, the COI has struggled to succeed.
Indeed, in August 2017, Carla Del Ponte—former prosecutor for the
Yugoslavia and Rwanda Tribunals and one of the three members of the
COI—resigned from the COI in protest of its failure to be effective.356 In
particular, Ms. Del Ponte noted the serious impact of the COI’s limited
powers—without a more sufficient mandate, in her view the COI has “no
possibility of seeking justice for victims.”357 In addition, Ms. Del Ponte
pointed to the inaction of the U.N. Security Council in response to the
COI’s work.358 In describing her decision to leave the COI, Ms. Del Ponte
said, “[i]t was all about the inaction of the security council because if you
look at all the reports we have published, we have obtained nothing in terms
of injustice. It is unbelievable.”359
The IIIM is a mechanism under the purview of the U.N. General
Assembly that was established in part due to Russia’s repeated veto of
Security Council efforts to refer Syria to the ICC.360 The IIIM prioritizes
the collection, analysis, and preservation of evidence of human rights
violations and war crimes—as opposed to directly engaging in
investigations of the acts themselves. 361 The COI is one of the many
sources from which the IIIM obtains evidence. Additional sources for the
IIIM include individuals, states, NGOs, and regional organizations. At the
354. Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic: About the
Commission of Inquiry, UNITED NATIONS HUM. RTS. COUNCIL, http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/
HRC/IICISyria/Pages/AboutCoI.aspx (last visited Apr. 22, 2018) [hereinafter About the Commission of
Inquiry].
355.

Id.

356.

Patrick Wintour, UN Syria Investigator Quits Over Concern About Russian Obstruction,
GUARDIAN (Aug. 7, 2017, 14:17), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/aug/07/we-arpowerlessunsyria-investigator-carla-del-ponte-quits-over-lack-of-political-backing.
357.

Id.

358.

Id.

359.

Id.

360. James Reinl, Could Syria’s ‘Prosecutor without A Tribunal’ Work?, AL JAZEERA (May
31, 2017), http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2017/05/syria-prosecutor-tribunal-work17052911
0910869.html.
361. Responding to Misconceptions Regarding the IIIM, SYRIA JUST. & ACCOUNTABILITY
CTR. (Aug. 2, 2017), https://syriaaccountability.org/updates/2017/08/02/responding-to-misconceptionsregarding-the-iiim/ (stating that the IIIM is headed by Catherine Marchi-Uhel, a seasoned former judge
and war crimes attorney).
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present, the IIIM does not publicly disclose its findings and
recommendations.362 The overarching policy of the IIIM is to essentially
compile as much evidence of human rights violations and war crimes in
Syria as possible and share that information with groups seeking to
prosecute those crimes once it has vetted them for commitment to similar
goals and standards as the IIIM.363
The IIIM is designed to support other entities engaging in
prosecutorial efforts, including regional organizations and states pursuing
options under universal jurisdiction, by sharing evidence with these
entities.364 As a result, the IIIM could potentially increase the number of
claims brought against perpetrators in Syria.365 The IIIM may also support
any future prosecutions brought by the ICC in the event a new Syrian
government submits to its retroactive jurisdiction, or prosecutions brought
by a future hybrid court for Syria.366 Alternatively, if the IIIM deems that
no such prosecution will effectively come to pass, the IIIM could release
the information as part of a truth commission.
4.

Civil Society

In addition to justice efforts put forth by the U.N., civil society has
taken steps to introduce justice mechanisms into the Syrian context. In
particular, despite the obstacles to direct accountability in the short-term, a
range of groups are engaging in efforts to at the least establish a record of
violations, and potentially to support future efforts for justice.367 Given the
advent of new technology combined with burgeoning political will and
resourcing, efforts to generate and preserve documentation have
proliferated. 368 In particular, civil society groups have utilized complex
documentation mechanisms that could support accountability as well as a
range of expanded justice mechanisms, including reparations, truth-telling,
and memorialization.369 Taken in combination with U.N. documentation
efforts such as those pursued by the COI, civil society documentation
362.

Id. (adding that the IIIM will occasionally release periodic reports).

363.

About the Commission of Inquiry, supra note 354.

364.

FAQ on the IIIM, supra note 353.

365.

Responding to Misconceptions Regarding the IIIM, supra note 361.

366.

FAQ on the IIIM, supra note 353.

367. CITIZENS FOR SYRIA, SYRIAN CIVIL SOCIETY ORGANIZATIONS REALITY AND
CHALLENGES 7–9 (Mhd. Bay trans., 2017), https://citizensforsyria.org/OrgLiterature/Syrian_CSOs_
Reality_and_challenges_2017-CfS_EN.pdf
368.
369.

Id. at 16.

ERESHNEE NAIDU, SYRIA JUSTICE & ACCOUNTABILITY CENTRE, SYRIA:
DOCUMENTATION AND ITS ROLE IN MEMORIALIZATION (2013), http://syriaaccountability.org/wpcon
tent/uploads/SJAC-Documentation-Memorialization-Memo-2013_EN.pdf.
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efforts have contributed to a relatively rich pool of documentation material
to support various future justice-related efforts.
For instance, the Commission for International Justice and
Accountability (CIJA), is an international NGO that has been heavily
engaged in gathering and processing a significant pool of evidence relating
to atrocity crimes.370 In the course of its work, CIJA has gained access to
more than 700,000 pages from Syrian Government’s Intelligence and
Security agencies. 371 The purpose of CIJA is to lay the foundation for
future prosecution “along the lines of Nuremberg,” according to its
Executive Director.372
Similarly, The Syria Justice and Accountability Centre (SJAC) is
another entity that gathers intensive documentation in relation to atrocity
crimes in Syria.373 SJAC analyzes the materials that it receives according to
international law, with the purpose of promoting justice and accountability,
and preserving evidence in order to “advance transitional justice and peacebuilding.”374
Furthermore, the Syrian Accountability Project (SAP) is an
internationally-recognized platform that is documenting war crimes and
crimes against humanity taking place in the Syrian context.375 The project
is led by David Crane, the former Chief Prosecutor for the Special Court for
Sierra Leone.376 In addition to gathering documentation, SAP analyzes the
collected materials with reference to such relevant legal frameworks as
international humanitarian law, international criminal law, and domestic
Syrian criminal law.377
These efforts, while not in and of themselves necessarily sufficient for
a comprehensive justice initiative, could provide fundamental support for
diverse accountability mechanisms in the future.
370. Mark Kersten, Event: Prospects of Justice, Avenues for Accountability – Investigating
War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity in Syria, JUST. IN CONFLICT (Mar. 1, 2016),
https://justiceinconflict.org/2016/03/01/event-prospects-of-justice-avenues-for-accountabilityinvestigati
ng-war-crimes-and-crimes-against-humanity-in-syria/.
371. Stephanie Nebehay, Experts Say War Crimes Case Against Assad Government Growing,
REUTERS (Mar. 15, 2017, 10:49 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-syriawarcrimes
/experts-say-war-crimes-case-against-assad-government-growing-idUSKBN16M24Z.
372.

Id.

373. About SJAC, SYRIA JUST. & ACCOUNTABILITY CENTRE, https://syriaaccountability.org/
about/ (last visited Apr. 22, 2018).
374.

Id.

375. The Syrian Accountability Project, SYRACUSE U. C. L., http://syrianaccountabilityproject
.syr.edu/ (last visited Apr. 22, 2018).
376.

Id.

377.

Id.
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Regime Defectors

Defectors from the Assad regime have also contributed significantly to
the tapestry of justice mechanisms taking place in the Syrian context. The
“Caesar Photographs,” for instance, is a particularly striking documentation
and awareness effort. 378 A former Assad regime forensic photographer,
who is called by the alias “Caesar,” smuggled more than 55,000 photos of
the bodies of detainees tortured or starved to death by the Assad regime. 379
The photographs were a component of the Syrian security branch’s efforts
to develop a formal record of deaths in their detention centers; each body is
marked with an identification number. 380 The photographs have been
highly effective as awareness-raising tools and establish a poignant record
of atrocities taking place in Syrian. The photographs have already been
utilized to support justice efforts. For example, in Spain, a case was lodged
against the Syrian government for “state terrorism” on the behalf of a
Syrian-Spanish woman who recognized her brother among the photographs
of victims. 381 Although the case itself has not resulted in a clear
prosecutorial path, this step illustrates the potential utility of the
photographs—and other related documentation efforts—in supporting
future prosecutorial efforts, if and when the time is right.
These efforts to document atrocity crimes support preparation for
future prosecutions, whether by the ICC, by a future hybrid tribunal, or by
third party states under a theory of universal jurisdiction (discussed further
below). The justice-related impacts of the Caesar project have already
reverberated among policy makers, for instance prompting the United
States Senate to introduce a bill in April 2017 after the Khan Sheikhoun gas
attack by the Syrian regime.382 Among the measures included within the
bill, was the call to establish a hybrid court for Syria to prosecute Assad and
his regime.383 The bill was modeled on a previously-produced draft statute
known as the “Chautauqua Blueprint” for an extraordinary tribunal for
atrocity crimes in Syria, drawn up by chief prosecutors of several

378. Syria: Stories Behind Photos of Killed Detainees, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Dec. 16, 2015,
5:47 PM), https://www.hrw.org/news/2015/12/16/syria-stories-behind-photos-killed-detainees.
379.

Nebehay, supra note 371.

380. PRIYANKA MOTAPARTHY & NADIM HOURY, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, IF THE DEAD
COULD SPEAK: MASS DEATHS AND TORTURE IN SYRIA’S DETENTION FACILITIES (2015), https://www.
hrw.org/sites/default/files/report_pdf/syria1215web_0.pdf.
381.

Nebehay, supra note 371.

382.

Syrian War Crimes Accountability Act of 2017, S. 905, 115th Cong. (2017).

383.
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international criminal tribunals under the initiative of the Public
International Law & Policy Group.384
6.

Universal Jurisdiction

Perhaps the most creative of current efforts to pursue accountability in
Syria is the steadily growing list of countries that are attempting to use
universal jurisdiction to prosecute those responsible for atrocities. 385
Universal jurisdiction is the legal construct, which provides that any
national court in any country can prosecute any individual from any country
for the gravest of international law crimes, including “crimes against
humanity, war crimes, genocide, and torture.” 386 Although specific
procedures vary, typically the prosecuting state needs the defendant to be
within its territory before its domestic courts have the power to arrest and
try that person. 387 Prosecuting universal jurisdiction cases poses several
steep logistical obstacles, such as gathering evidence and compelling
appearances, which have rendered it an inefficient or otherwise morally
questionable practice, even if it is occasionally an effective means of
pursuing justice.388
In the Syrian context, Sweden, Finland, Germany, Switzerland, and
Spain have had moderate successes with prosecuting certain individuals
from the Assad regime’s security forces, but have been unable to detain or
convict higher-level officials or military officers.389 In the Spanish context,
a case was filed against nine high-ranking security officers of the Assad
regime, but the case was dismissed before it could go to trial due to
domestic interpretation of the Spanish court’s jurisdiction. 390 In the
384. The Chautauqua Blueprint for A Statute for A Syrian Extraordinary Tribunal to Prosecute
Atrocity Crimes, SYRACUSE U.: INST. FOR NAT’L SECURITY & COUNTERTERRORISM, http://insct.syr.
edu/wp-content/uploads/2013/09/Chautauqua-Blueprint1.pdf (last visited Apr. 22, 2018).
385. Noha Aboueldahab, The Perils of Impulsive Promises for Justice in Syria, BROOKINGS
(Apr. 24, 2017), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/markaz/2017/04/24/the-perils-of-impulsive-promisesfor-justice-in-syria/.
386.

Universal Jurisdiction, supra note 126.

387.

Id.

388. Hussein Ibish, Universal Jurisdiction Raises as Many Problems as It Solves, NATIONAL
(Sept. 28, 2013), https://www.thenational.ae/universal-jurisdiction-raises-as-many-problems-as-itsolves1.277149. In the post-WWII era when the concept was relatively new, Israeli Mossad Special Forces
abducted Adolf Eichmann from Argentina for trial and eventual execution for war crimes and atrocity
crimes. See id.
389. Aboueldahab, supra note 385 (noting Spain’s investigation into Assad-sponsored state
terrorism in 2013); Reinl, supra note 360 (noting Sweden’s successful sentencing of a former Syrian
opposition fighter to life in prison in Sweden for war crimes).
390. Adam Entous, A Photo of Her Brother’s Corpse Popped Up on Her Phone. Now Syrian
Officials Could be Put on Trial for War Crimes., WASH. POST (Feb. 2, 2017), https://www.
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Swedish context, meanwhile, a successful prosecution was completed,
although the individual in question was a relatively low-level Syrian
perpetrator and the evidence was sufficient to convict only for violating
human dignity, as opposed to a crime attached to more serious
punishment.391 In Germany, criminal complaints have been filed against
high-level members of the Assad regime, under a theory of universal
jurisdiction.392 The outcome of these complaints remains to be seen. In
general, both the evidentiary collection problem and the means to compel
suspects to appear before courts that are asserting universal jurisdiction
continue to be challenges in Syria.
7.

The International Criminal Court

Syria has signed but not ratified the Rome Statute, thus precluding the
ICC’s jurisdiction over the atrocity crimes being committed in Syria. 393
Although Syria could be referred to the ICC via U.N. Security Council
referral, as set forth above, such a referral was vetoed by Russia and China
in 2014 394 and almost certainly would be vetoed again. However,
eventually, it may be possible to make use of retroactive ICC jurisdiction.
When Assad does finally depart Syria (one way or another), the Syrian
people, and the international community could pressure the new Syrian
government to ratify the Rome Statute, and then prosecute Assad and other
high-level perpetrators implicated in the Syrian war at the ICC.395

washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/from-a-trove-of-grim-photos-a-case-against-assadsgovern
ment/2017/02/01/728575d0-e8d7-11e6-bf6f-301b6b443624_story.html?utm_term=.f1a250139819; see
also Simon Hooper, Torture Complaint Filed Against Syrian Officials in Spanish Court, NEWSDEEPLY:
SYRIA DEEPLY (Feb. 3, 2017), https://www.newsdeeply.com/syria/articles/2017/02/03/torturecomplaintfiled-against-syrian-officials-in-spanish-court; Editorial, Spanish Court Drops Complaint Against Syrian
Security Forces, REUTERS (July 21, 2017, 8:45 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisissyria-spain/spain-court-drops-complaint-against-syrian-security-forces-idUSKBN1A61J1.
391. Anne Barnard, Syrian Soldier is Guilty of War Crime, A First in the 6-year Conflict, N.Y.
TIMES (Oct. 3, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/03/world/middleeast/syria-war-crime.html.
392. Barbara Unmüßig, Opening Speech: Towards Accountability for International Crimes in
Syria, HEINRICH BÖLL STIFTUNG (Nov. 10, 2017), https://www.boell.de/en/2017/11/10/opening-speechtowards-accountability-international-crimes-syria.
393.

Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, supra note 348.

394. Rep. of the S.C., at 5, U.N. Doc. S/PV.7180 (2014); Peter Nadin, How the UN Security
Council Failed Syria, INTERPRETER (Aug. 30, 2017, 18:09), https://www.lowyinstitute.org/theinterpre
ter/how-un-security-council-failed-syria.
395.
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CONCLUSION

Ultimately, there are no easy answers in regard to the Syrian crisis, or
to the fundamental puzzle of peace, justice, and the potential combination
thereof. The case of Syria illustrates an immense weight of international
crime balanced against the impossibility of immediate options for direct
accountability—balanced, on the other side, against the immense
importance of securing peace and halting hostilities. Ultimately, the last
chapter on accountability in Syria remains to be written. Although after an
initial period of certainty, the Syrian context thus far has come to reflect the
predominance of a peace-first approach. Yet, the record is clear that, if
nothing else, justice is persistent. Moreover, given the rich array of players
in the Syrian context paired with the intensity of the conflict, sustainable
peace is likely to be elusive without at least a measure of justice. The
tilting balance, however, of both how much justice, and the nature of that
justice, is unclear. It is possible that Syria will go the path of Colombia,
with a mechanism that focuses, in its essence, on the transitional elements
of justice. Alternatively, Syria may take on the Sierra Leonean model, with
prosecutions for the most high-ranking perpetrators, and alternative
mechanisms for mid-to-low-level perpetrators. Appeasement is unlikely to
win the day in Syria, and although it is likely that a “justice-first” approach
is no longer truly feasible in this challenging context, the menu of options
for weaving justice into peace remain. It is possible that, through these, the
long arm of justice will eventually reach the Syrian context.
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